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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the impacts of Climate Change policies on the 
Korean economy. The following chapters investigate major issues of climate change policies 
such as initial emission allowance allocation methods in a cap and trade policy for an 
electricity sector and a carbon tax policy while reforming current energy taxes and the 
electricity pricing system.  
Chapter two assesses initial emission allowance allocation methods such as auction, 
uniform benchmark, fuel specific benchmark in the Korean electricity market with a Mixed 
Complementarity Problem (MCP) model. We found that giving away free permits makes the 
emission reduction more expensive, but the extra capacity triggered by the free allowances to 
new entrants based on the fuel-specific benchmark raises social welfare when the industry is 
not competitive.   
Chapter three provides an integrated model that combines a top-down, macro-
econometric model and the bottom-up, MCP electricity model built in chapter two in view of 
the importance of the electricity sector which is the largest source of CO2 emissions in Korea. 
Most relations between variables in the behavioural equations are set up on theoretical 
grounds. Their long-term equilibrium relationships are confirmed by an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration suggested by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) and standard specification tests. Conside and Mount (1984)‟s dynamic linear logit 
- iii - 
model is employed to capture fuel substitution behaviours in the macro-econometric model. 
The integrated model adopts a soft link method which incorporates multiple power output 
decisions and a price responsive demand function by the iteration method for linking the two 
models. The validity of the integrated model is checked by good predictive performance in an 
ex-post simulation exercise. 
Chapter four analyses the effects of restructuring the energy tax and electricity pricing 
system when a carbon tax is introduced using the integrated model combining the top-down 
and bottom-up models provided in chapter three. Simulation results show that restructuring 
pre-existing energy taxes and the electricity pricing system can lessen the economic costs of 
CO2 emissions reduction, which implies that adjusting the energy pricing system to reflect 
social costs accurately is the way to reduce emissions more efficiently. However, gradual 
restructuring of the current electricity pricing system would be recommended in order to 
minimize the negative effect on the industrial competiveness in the Korean economy. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
The greenhouse emissions (GHG) in Republic of Korea has shown strong growth in 
the period from 1990 to 2010. The amount of GHG in 2010 is around 669 million tonnes CO2, 
equivalent (hereafter, CO2e) which ranks 9th in the world. The growth of GHG between 1990 
and 2005 is 90.1%, which ranks 1st among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. As for the contribution of each sector, the energy industries 
sector (electricity and petroleum refining) accounts for 38%, followed by manufacture and 
industries sector (24.9%), transport sector (12.6%), industrial processes (9.4%), and 
commercial and residential sector (8.7%) in 2010
1
.  
To help mitigate climate change, the government has operated the Inter-ministerial 
Committee on United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 
1998 and has formulated and implemented action plans for climate change every three years 
in order to introduce climate change policy. According to the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, 
Korea being a non-Annex I country is required to identify nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions including a GHG emission reduction target.  
Therefore, the Korean Cabinet on 17 November 2009 approved the 2020 target of 
reducing estimated 2020 emissions by 30 per cent from "business-as-usual”, (BAU) levels 
                                                 
1
 The statistics are from Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center of Korea‟s website:  
http://www.gir.go.kr/og/hm/ic/b/OGHMICB011.do?headerValue=04&leftValue=01 
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which is equivalent to a 4 percent reduction from the 2005 level. Total CO2 emissions are 
estimated at 813 million tonnes in the BAU case.  
To achieve the Copenhagen Accord commitment of a 30 per cent reduction, the 
government will introduce a cap and trade scheme to be implemented in 2015 to achieve the 
reduction target cost-effectively. Over 300 of the largest companies emitting 60-70 per cent of 
the nation's greenhouse gases will be involved in the cap-and trade scheme. In the initial stage, 
90 per cent of emission allowances will be allocated to emitters free of charge. The remainder 
would be auctioned, with the proportion to be auctioned to increase over time after the first 
phase. In the final phase, all allowance will be auctioned.  
However, several concerns over the free allocation methods have been raised in the 
electricity sector which is the largest source of emissions; even though the Coase theorem 
states that the initial allocation method does not prevent the market from reaching the efficient 
solution (Coase, 1960), the free allocation method would cause two problems in the real 
world; „windfall profits‟ and distortion of investment. Sijm et al. (2006) point out that power 
companies can gain considerable windfall profits through passing on the opportunity cost of 
the freely allocated permits. As for the second problem, Å hman and Holmgren (2006) and 
Neuhoff et al. (2006a) insist that the allocation methods allowing more permits to a specific 
carbon intensive technology such as a coal power plant give the wrong signals for investment 
decisions. Given the long economic life of power plants, distorted investment caused from the 
allocation method raises the economic cost of achieving the emission target in the long-run. 
Therefore, it is necessary to design an efficient initial allocation method in the initial stage of 
the cap and trade scheme.  
- 3 - 
In addition to the cap and trade scheme, the government is considering introducing a 
carbon tax policy which imposes taxes on the carbon contents of hydrocarbon energy products 
such as petroleum, coal, and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to internalize the externality of 
GHG emissions caused from combusting the energy products. Currently, the tax rates on 
energy products do not reflect their externalities (Kim 2012)
2
 and the government maintains 
low electricity tariffs for industrial competitiveness and price stabilization. This has led to 
distortions in relative prices, thereby resulting in an unreasonable energy consumption 
structure, in particular excessive electricity consumption. Hoeller and Coppel (1992a,b) point 
out that maintaining the distorted pre-existing energy taxes and adding the carbon tax would 
further worsen distortions. Thus, the need for rearranging current energy taxes and 
restructuring the electricity pricing system before introducing the carbon tax policy has been 
raised in order to lessen the economic cost of the carbon tax. 
Under these circumstances, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effects of the 
main climate change policies on the economy in order to provide insight into the questions 
surrounding the issues. The two specific subjects to be examined are as follows; 
1.  Investigate potential effects of initial emissions permit allocation methods on 
output, investment, emissions, electricity and emissions permit prices, and social welfare in 
the Korean electricity market. Several allocation rules such as auctioning and free allocation 
on a uniform best available technology (BAT) benchmark or a fuel specific benchmark to 
existing and new investment are simulated to compare their impacts. 
                                                 
2
 Kim (2012) has pointed out that the Korean government impose similar level of taxes on petroleum products 
for vehicles, but relatively high taxes are imposed on natural gas and no taxes on electricity, diesel and coal for 
heating energy compared to EU‟s minimum level of energy and carbon taxes (Directive 2003/96EC).   
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2.  Analyse the effects of a carbon tax policy on the economy and emissions using an 
integrated model. Furthermore, the role of restructuring current energy taxes and electricity 
pricing systems is examined in order to find a more cost-effective policy. 
 
1.2. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of three main chapters, exploring major climate change policy 
issues such as emission permit allocations and carbon tax‟s impacts on the economy.  
Chapter 2 assesses the first main issue: the impact of initial emission allowance 
allocation methods in the Korean electricity market when a cap-and-trade scheme is 
introduced. The Korean electricity market is modelled in detail in order to quantify the effect 
of different emission allowances allocation plans. A multi-period version of the Mixed 
Complementarity Problem (MCP) structure adopted in this model allows the model to 
incorporate operation and capacity planning under imperfect competition along with related 
environmental issues at the same time. To my best knowledge, this is the first attempt to use 
the MCP model to incorporate investment decisions subject to the allocation rules such as 
auctioning, fuel specific benchmark, and uniform benchmark to new entrants.  
Chapter 3 builds up an integrated model that combines a top-down and a bottom-up 
approach for analysing the second main issue, the impacts of carbon tax policies. Taking into 
consideration the importance of the electricity sector, which accounts for the largest portion of 
total emissions, it links the bottom-up electricity market model based on the MCP framework 
explained in chapter two and a top-down model, the macro-econometric model. Overall, the 
integrated model is more suitable to analyze the climate change policy in that it allows the 
- 5 - 
model to captures the supply side in detail and macroeconomic interaction at the same time. 
Among integration methods, the model adopts a soft link method which is regard as the most 
effective system to transfer information from the electricity model dealing with the 
complexity of power generation to the top-down model. The macro-econometric model, in 
which the number of equations is 148 including 57 behavioural equations and 91 identities,  
employs an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration 
suggested by Pesaran et al. (2001) in order to find a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between variables in behavioural equations which in line with economic theory. The validity 
of the equation is confirmed by standard specification tests. Additionally, a dynamic linear 
logit cost share model (Considine and Mount, 1984) which is one of the standard inter-fuel 
substitution models are adopted to estimate own-price and cross-price elasticities of final 
energy demands such as petroleum, coal, electricity, and city-gas, which determines fuel 
switching effects. Finally, we perform an ex-post simulation to check the model‟s predicative 
performance before executing a carbon tax policy simulation.  
Chapter 4 analyses the second main issue using the integrated model established in 
chapter three. What are the effects of restructuring current taxes on energy products and 
electricity tariffs regulated from the government on the economy, emissions, and mix of 
energy demands when a carbon tax policy is introduced? Four scenarios are set up to compare 
their effects on the economy: (1) no carbon taxation; (2) a carbon tax of 50,000 won per tonne 
of carbon while maintaining the current taxes and electricity pricing system; (3) the carbon 
tax policy with reforming the current taxes on energy products by exempting kerosene, 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), and LNG which are already highly taxed compared to their 
social cost from the carbon taxation; (4)  the carbon tax policy while restructuring the tax 
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system and the electricity pricing system by allowing an electricity supplier to impose a cost 
reflective tariff om customers. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by summarizing the main findings from the previous 
chapters and suggesting possible extensions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
ASSESSMENT OF INITIAL EMISSION ALLOWANCE 
ALLOCATION METHODS IN THE KOREAN ELECTRICITY 
MARKET
3
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
On 17 November 2009 the Korean Cabinet approved the 2020 target of reducing 
projected CO2 emissions for 2020 by 30 per cent from "Business-as-usual" (BAU) levels, or a 
4 per cent reduction from the 2005 level of 569 million tonnes of CO2e.
4
 The BAU emission 
projection for 2020 is estimated at 813 million tonnes. The government initially set a plan for 
a three-phase cap-and-trade scheme, with the first phase running for three years from 2013 to 
2015, then the second phase starting in 2016 to run through 2020, and the last phase 
commencing from 2021. Over 300 of the largest companies emitting 60-70 per cent of the 
nation‟s greenhouse gases will be involved in the cap-and trade scheme. In the initial stage, 90 
per cent of emission allowances will be allocated to emitters free of charge. The remainder 
would be auctioned, with the proportion to be auctioned to increase over time after the first 
phase. In the final phase, all allowances will be auctioned.  
                                                 
3
 A version of this chapter was published in the journal Energy Economics in May, 2014. The online version is 
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988314000528 
4
 Time series data is available at http: //www.gir.go.kr /og/hm/ic/b /OGHMICB011.do?headerValue = 04&left 
Value=01 
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However, the government decided in February 2011 to postpone emission trading, 
mainly due to opposition from industrial sectors. According to the revised bill, emission 
trading will be implemented in 2015. Besides, as vested interests‟ (carbon intensive industries) 
resistance increases, the bill would allow for a higher proportion of emission allowances to be 
handed for free to heavy emitters. Debates have been continuing over the amount of emissions 
allowances to be given to specific sectors for free and over the handling of new entrants.  
This argument has also been observed in European Union Member States (MSs) since 
preparation for the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) Phase І 
(2005¬2007).  All MSs had to distribute allowances to industrial installations for free: at least 
95 per cent of total allowances in the first ETS period and 90 per cent in the second period. 
The vast majority of emission allowances have been distributed to existing emitters in 
proportion to their historical emissions, which is referred to as grandfathering.
5
 Auctioning 
was an option for the remainder. This goes against the efficiency-focused economic 
perspective that advocates the auction (see Cramton and Kerr, 2002)
6
. Nevertheless, the 
grandfathering allocation has remained the dominant rule in most MSs because of political 
resistance and concerns such as adverse effects on industrial competitiveness.   
After the first phase of EU-ETS, the effect of the free emission allowances to existing 
firms has been investigated empirically and the potential effects of other allocation options 
have been assessed by scholars. In particular, studies have paid attention to the electricity 
sector, since electricity has been considered a special sector which is likely to determine the 
emission price. In fact, electricity is the largest sector in the ETS, as over 40 per cent of total 
                                                 
5
 More precisely, we define grandfathering as the method of allocating emission allowances to existing emitters 
for free based on their historical emissions in a recent base period of specific years. 
6
 Cramton and Kerr (2002) point out that auctioning allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexible ways 
to distribute costs, brings greater incentives for innovation, and avoids political arguments over the allocation of 
rents. 
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allowances in the ETS were distributed to the sector. Besides this, electricity was the only 
sector in a net short position over the initial period (Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008). This 
means that the situation of power generation determines the overall demand for the 
allowances and would have a major impact on allowance prices. The long economic life of 
power plants also has an enduring effect on the cost of achieving future emission targets.  
Existing power plants were provided with allowances in most MSs based on historic 
emissions for the first phase of the EU-ETS. Historic emissions are calculated for a recent 
reference period within a fixed time frame or updated. Finally, adjustment factors such as 
expected growth and future compliance for reduction could be applied to the historic emission 
records. 
Grandfathering has several advantages for introducing an emission trading policy; it 
reduces political resistance from carbon intensive industries as they are guaranteed sustainable 
profits under the regime (Å hman et al., 2007) and provides incentives for industries to report 
installations‟ past emissions at the same time. In particular, another reason to favour the 
historic emissions were that EU-MSs did not have enough time to build up a suitable 
benchmark, mainly because of difficulties for various sectors and legal issues at the beginning 
of the EU-ETS (Ellerman et al., 2010). On the other hand, most MSs applied the benchmark 
to new entrants from the first phase. 
However, there has been a consensus that the free allocation, namely the historic 
emission approach, led to two main problems: „windfall profits‟ and distortion of investment. 
Power companies gained substantial windfall profits from the grandfathered emission 
allowances. They could pass on the opportunity costs of CO2 in liberalized electricity markets, 
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as economic studies demonstrate (Sijm et al., 2006)
7
, even though their monetary costs did 
not rise. Even worse, some allocation methods to new technology give the wrong signal to 
investment decisions. Generally, carbon-intensive power plants such as coal receive more 
allocations than lower carbon technologies such as gas, under the historic emission allocation. 
Therefore, the allocation distorts investment decisions towards carbon-intensive technology. 
Considering fossil fuel power plants‟ life of decades and fixed allowance budgets, distorted 
investment decisions significantly increase the total cost of achieving the emission target in 
the future (Å hman and Holmgren, 2006; Neuhoff et al., 2006a).  
After the ETS phase1, there was a tendency to gradually adopt benchmarks instead of 
the historic emission approach. Although the majority of MSs base their allocation method on 
historical emissions (for an overview of allocation provisions in all MSs, refer to Rogge and 
Linden, 2008), this movement recognizes the adverse effects on the economy mentioned 
before. This study defines the benchmark as a free allocation method to both existing and new 
entrants using a specific emission rate per unit output (e.g. tCO2/MWh) combined with the 
unit‟s capacity and either actual or a common operation time for each installation. Glancing at 
the benchmark systems adopted in MSs for the second phase, they show different provisions. 
But the benchmarks could be divided into two main categories. Firstly, emission values based 
on the best available technology (BAT) or on average performance could be applied to a 
particular technology group, which is called the fuel-specific benchmark in this thesis. 
Secondly, a single BAT emission value could be set for all plants, known as the uniform 
benchmark.  
                                                 
7
 An opportunity cost arises, because a firm is able to use the freely allocated permits to cover the emissions or 
sell the permits to other firms who need more permits, which represents an opportunity cost, regardless of 
whether the permits are freely allocated or bought in the market. Thus, in line with economic theory, a firm is 
expected to add the emission costs to its production or trading costs. Finally, the firm is able to gain windfall 
profits by means of increased electricity prices with no additional costs by grandfathering. 
Giving away permits also involves an opportunity cost for the government as it government loses the chance to 
use the fund from an auction to finance spending or cut existing taxes. 
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In general, compliance and strict emission factors under the benchmark improve 
energy efficiency compared to the historic emission approach, but the following criticism has 
been made regarding the fuel-specific benchmark: it often sets a higher emission factor for 
more carbon-intensive power plant types, meaning that more emission allowances are 
provided to coal power plants than to gas power plants. As existing studies (Hepburn et al., 
2006; Neuhoff et al., 2006a) point out, this creates a bias towards more carbon-intensive 
technology in terms of firms‟ operating and investment decisions. Consequently, it increases 
CO2 emissions and drives up CO2 prices. Finally, consumers face higher electricity prices
8
, 
reflecting the CO2 prices in the long term.  
In contrast, the uniform benchmark prevents these distortion problems in that all 
plants receive emission allowances equally. If the emission factor is based on low-carbon 
technology, gas fired power plants such as CCGT are a more attractive option for investment, 
so that effective abatement of CO2 in the power sector for long periods can be accomplished. 
However, several European countries are vulnerable to the security of natural gas supplies, 
with concerns about their long-term availability and an increase in dependence on a few 
countries. For this reason, the uniform benchmark to new entrants has been avoided in several 
MSs (typically, Germany) where coal-fired plants account for the majority of the power mix. 
These various allocation provisions in MSs will be unified through full auctioning which will 
be implemented in the power sector from the third phase, 2013 onwards; (European 
Parliament and Council, 2009)
9
. 
                                                 
8
 This would hold unless the allocation of permits to new plants leads to a large increase in capacity. 
9
 There are four exemptions; (1) generators for district heating and cogeneration activities in respect of heating 
and cooling, (2) a specific MS in which the electricity network was not connected with the EU system in 2007, 
(3) less than 400MW in a MS which was connected by a single line in 2007, (4) a MS in which more than 30% 
of electricity was generated from a single fossil fuel and the GDP per capita did not exceed 50% of the average 
GDP per capita of the EU in 2006. 
- 12 - 
The Korean government is at the point where it needs to decide initial allocation 
methods given the facts that these allocations will last until 2026 and have a significant 
impact on investment incentives, particularly in the next few years. However, there have been 
few attempts to investigate the impact of the allocation plans on the Korean electricity sector 
so far, even though the sector is the largest source of emissions. The electricity sector is 
expected to play a major role in deciding the emission price given the electricity sector‟s high 
marginal abatement costs and relatively large emission size. Therefore, the purpose of this 
study is to assess the effect of allocation methods consisting of full auction, the fuel-specific 
benchmark, and the uniform BAT benchmark for existing and new entrants on social welfare 
in order to draw a reasoned political implication. In order to do this, this paper employs a 
Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) model which is able to incorporate operation and 
investment decisions, taking account of capacity and emission constraints under different 
allocation scenarios in the competitive electricity market. In particular, the model is designed 
to allow endogenous investment decisions subject to different allocation rules to new entrants, 
which is an advance on the existing literature. The main outcomes from the model consist of 
capacity mix, electricity prices, emission prices, and social welfare, under the allocation 
scenarios. We found that firms invest more with the fuel-specific benchmark than with 
auctioning, and though the cost of emissions reduction is higher, the extra investment (which 
had been below socially optimal levels) means that social welfare actually rises.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section explains how the 
emission trading market reacts to different allocation methods. Section three gives an 
overview of the MCP framework and describes the full model of this study. In section four, 
we apply the MCP model to the Korean electricity market. Section five compares the results 
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of the electricity sector‟s emissions, total new investment capacity, emission allowance prices, 
electricity prices, and social welfare for all allocation scenarios. The final section concludes. 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Panel A in Figure 2.1 depicts how the permit price is determined under different 
emission permits allocation methods to existing power plants in the emission trading system. 
Let us assume that there are two players in the emission trading market: an aggregated 
electricity sector and non-electricity sector. The marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves of 
electricity sector and non-electricity sector are shown as eMAC and neMAC respectively, which 
are equivalent to their demand function for emission permits. The origin for emissions of the 
electricity sector in Figure 2.1 is the left-hand axis and the origin for emissions of the non-
electricity sector is the right-hand axis. The vertical line at O  represents the overall emission 
cap. Suppose that the eMAC  function is given by elbQaP  , where a  and b are parameters, 
P  is CO2 price, and  elQ  is the total CO2 emissions of the electricity sector, which is subject to 
inel QQQ  , where nQ  is emission permits purchased in the market and  iQ  is freely allocated 
emission permits in the initial period. Therefore, a change in free allocation permits moves the 
initial point along the eMAC  curves. 
The emission cap is represented by the length, OO  . The equilibrium permit price, eP  is 
determined by point E , where nee MACMAC  . The extent to which free permits are allocated to 
the electricity sector determines the number of permits bought or sold. Points U and F  on the 
eMAC  represent positions corresponding to different allocations. 
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        Figure 2.1. Principles of the emission trading system 
 
At point F, the existing power plants are receiving the full BAU amount of freely 
allocated allowances and would sell the quantity of permits, 
feQQ . With a stricter allocation 
method, such as the uniform benchmark to existing power plants, the relatively small 
allowance is shown at point U, where the quantity of permits the sector needs to purchase is 
euQQ , thus the cost of purchasing permits is ■ ESQQ ueu . With full auctioning, the electricity 
sector would need to purchase all its permits, 
eOQ . In this case, the CO2 cost is increased to   
■ EPOQ ee . A generation firm needs to choose between using the emissions permits or selling 
them, which means an opportunity cost arises regardless of whether the permits are freely 
allocated or purchased. If generators pass through the opportunity cost to electricity prices in 
each case, different allocation methods to existing installations end up having the same effect 
on electricity prices
10
.  
                                                 
10
 In principle, if firms internalize the opportunity cost of freely allocated allowances, the initial allocation 
methods may not make a difference to the electricity price. But, in practice, generators might not impose the full 
opportunity costs of emission allowances on the electricity price because of competitiveness pressures and the 
threat of new entrants (Reinaud, 2003). Also Sijm et al. (2006) point out that three elements: expectation of 
updating, voluntary agreements or regulatory threat, and uncertainties constrain opportunity cost pricing in the 
initial period of the EU ETS. 
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Panel B in Figure 1 describing the effects of different allocation methods for new 
investment capacity on the CO2 prices in the market is based on the hypothesis under which 
the allocation rules have an impact on the investment decisions of firms. Å hman and 
Holmgren (2006) reach a conclusion that the allocation to new investment is very likely to 
affect investors through changing the operation of a specific fuel type‟s technology and 
revenues.  Our simulation result supports their point (see section five). Furthermore, Neuhoff 
et al. (2006a) have shown that allocating permits to new plants on the basis of their emissions 
could cause generators to invest in a more carbon-intensive capacity mix than if investment 
did not attract free permits. 
Firstly, let us suppose that emission cap and the non-electricity sector‟s MAC curve 
are fixed at all times. If generation firms invest more in carbon-intensive technology, which is 
triggered by a fuel-specific benchmark allocation to new installations, this causes the marginal 
abatement cost to rise as the number of carbon-intensive plants increases. Thus, eMAC  
will 
shift to the right: to 
he
MAC . Consequently, the permit price rises from eP  to hP . On the other 
hand, a leftward shift from eMAC  to elMAC  illustrates a decrease in the marginal abatement 
cost by the fact the generation firms invest in low-carbon technology, which is prompted by 
the full-auction or strict benchmark allocation to new installations. This leads to a decrease in 
the permit price from eP  to lP . Therefore, we can conclude that different allocation methods to 
new power plants could affect the permit price in the emission trading market. It is important 
to note that this result does not violate the Coase theorem which states that the market 
equilibrium is independent of the initial allocation (Coase, 1960). The equilibrium price and 
quantity are not affected by the allocation rules to existing plants as seen in Panel A in Figure 
1. The different outcomes seen in Panel B of Figure 1 come from the fact that investment 
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decisions are affected by the allocation rule and so marginal abatement cost curves change. 
Effectively, the act of investing leads to an endogenous change in the investor‟s endowment, 
rather than the exogenous change in property rights that Coase considers.  
The rest of this chapter estimates the magnitude of these effects of initial allocation 
methods in the Korean electricity sector. 
 
2.3. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
As the electricity markets have been deregulated in many countries (i.e. shifting from 
monopoly to competition), a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) model has been 
extended to cope with short-term output competition and investment decisions under the 
oligopolistic electricity market. Ventosa et al. (2002) provide a notable model in which 
generation firms decide output and capacity expansion in the Cournot manner. The model 
fulfils the Nash-Cournot equilibrium on the condition that the first order conditions of all 
players are satisfied. Compared to earlier works, it shows more flexibility for extension and 
powerful solution processing by taking advantage of the complementarity structure. Linares et 
al. (2006, 2008) extended Ventosa et al.‟s work in two ways. First, the Conjectural Variations 
(CV) approach of Garcí-Alcalde et al. (2002) is adopted for more realistic spot market 
simulation. Secondly, emission allowances and tradable green certificates are modelled 
endogenously. This model is partially based on Linares et al.‟s work (2006), but Cournot 
competition in the short-term market is adopted, rather than the CV method, and endogenous 
investment decisions relevant to allocation rules to new entrants are explicitly modelled.  
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Formally, a non-linear program is built as the objective function of each firm in the 
model. The derivation of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the objective function leads to a 
MCP formulation. The general MCP is defined as:  
Given a function 
nn RRf :  and bounds nRul , , find the vectors nRvwz ,,  
subject to the following constraints 
(2.1)           
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where  uzl , T is the transposition of a matrix, and the function, F  must be 
continuously differentiable in order to express a model. For further information, refer to 
Rutherford (1995) and Ferris and Munson (2000). 
 
2.3.1. Model overview 
The Korean electricity market is modelled in detail in order to quantify the effect of 
different allocation plans. A multi-period version of the MCP structure adopted in this model 
allows the model to deal with operation and capacity planning under imperfect competition 
along with related environmental issues at the same time.  
Each firm is assumed to maximize its profit, defined as revenues minus operating 
costs, investment costs and purchasing emission permits costs subject to technical and 
environmental regulation constraints. The firm chooses an optimized decision considering 
others‟ strategy. A Nash equilibrium defines a set of strategies such that no firm wishes to 
change its decision unilaterally, taking competitors‟ decisions as given. The Nash-equilibrium 
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in the model is achieved by satisfying the first-order optimality conditions simultaneously 
with respect to operation, investment, and environmental decisions. Formally, the whole 
model can be set as a Nash game (     where x is the vector of strategy decisions   
         ,   is the vector of profits             and e is a player vector            . 
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy vector       
      
   such that     
     (      
 ) 
for all          . 
The key feature of modelling the investment decision is that the model is designed for 
each firm to decide new capacity taking into account the allocation rules such as auction, fuel 
specific benchmark, and uniform benchmark to new entrants. Consequently, the model 
compares equilibrium wholesale electricity prices, emission allowance prices, and new 
installed capacity, given different allocation plans.  
 
2.3.2. Model assumptions 
First and most importantly, in order to guarantee the existence of a unique solution, 
the objective function (eq. 2.2) and constraints conditions (eq. 2.3~2.7) should be strictly 
quasi-concave and convex respectively. The former is ensured by setting a decreasing demand 
function of the price and increasing cost functions and the latter is guaranteed by using linear 
equations in this model.      
Secondly, while power plants are discrete units
11
 in the real world, it is assumed that 
each firm‟s capacity (of each technology type) is a continuous variable, for the sake of 
simplicity. In addition, the model considers electricity demands over the course of a year at a 
                                                 
11
 A typical power station has units with capacities of 500 to1200MW. 
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time. The data are grouped as peak, plateau, and off-peak hours according to the load levels 
with a total of 14 blocks. The total demand for electricity at each load level is given by a 
linear function of the price. Besides this, the operating cost of firms is modelled as a quadratic 
fuel consumption function in which all fuel prices such as coal, gas, and heavy oil are 
assumed to be fixed over whole years. On the other hand, start-up costs and ramp rate 
constraints in the cost function are excluded, since those conditions have little effect on 
investment decisions in the long term. 
Thirdly, the equilibrium electricity price and investment decisions are determined in a 
Cournot manner. A linear demand function is employed. Each firm chooses its output given 
its competitors‟ strategy to maximize its own profit. Then, the equilibrium electricity price is 
derived from substituting the summed firms‟ output into the inverse demand function (see eq. 
8). However, before applying the oligopoly theory to the Korean electricity market, it should 
be noted that the market has been operating as a Cost-Based Pool (CBP) in which generators 
had to bid at variable cost and this set the price since 2001. Attempts to create Two Way 
Bidding Pool (TWBP)
12
 competition, which allows distributors to submit price responsive 
demand bids and generators offer power at prices above variable cost, ceased in 2003 due to 
the change in the political environment. But the current administration continues to attempt 
the policy of competition. Therefore, the model assumes that the TWBP is introduced in the 
electricity market where distribution firms are allowed to bid in order to represent the trend of 
industry policy and justify application of the oligopoly theory. The assumptions of the 
Cournot model fit well into the properties of the deregulated electricity market: homogeneous 
goods, non-storable, and few firms in the electricity market. In addition, the theory assures a 
                                                 
12
 Under the CBP system which is a preliminary stage for TWBP, the marginal price is determined by the merit 
order system in which each unit is ranked according to generators‟ bid based on its variable cost. On the other 
hand, the electricity price is determined by a market mechanism in the TWBP where both the generation and 
distribution firms submit supply and demand bids, respectively. 
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unique equilibrium and avoids complex computational processes. But it often gives very high 
equilibrium prices compared to real data in the electricity market, because equilibrium prices 
are sensitive to the price elasticity of demand and firms are assumed not to react to 
competitors‟ output and price changes13. Therefore, this model indicates the price level in a 
potential market where the price is formed because of the substantial market power by 
dominant firms under the emission trading scheme rather than forecasting the actual future 
electricity prices. 
Regarding investment decisions, firms are able to choose technology and capacities 
among nuclear, two types of coal (bituminous and anthracite), CCGT, and oil power plants in 
order to maximize their profit. Note that renewable investments require subsidy and are 
therefore exogenous, while the problems in modelling their intermittent output mean that they 
are best modelled by changing the residual demand curve
14
. The Cournot investment 
equilibrium is accomplished when no firm wishes to change its investment decision given its 
competitors‟ capacities.  It is important to note that each technology has a specific time to 
build constraint in the real world. For example, while nuclear power plants have the longest 
lead time, almost 5 years, CCGT plants have the lowest time, 2 years. Although the model 
does not impose the time to build constraint explicitly, firms are assumed to have perfect 
foresight so that they are able to choose the optimal time to commence construction of new 
plants.  In addition, they have perfect information about the government scheme for the 
distribution of emission allowances; when the initial allocation method is implemented by 
                                                 
13
 Wolfram (1999) confirms that the price predicted by the Cournot model tends to be higher than the real spot 
price in the British electricity market from her empirical study, and suggests that the level of the real price can be 
explained as the effect of threats of other companies entering the market and of regulatory action. 
14
 Thus the residual demand curve shows the demand facing the traditional sources of power generation. 
Renewable energy sources supported from the government‟s policy are often given special treatment in models, 
because they could not be compared with the traditional technology due to their low economic efficiency and 
renewable energy‟s intermittent output. Their outputs are usually modelled by using a residual demand curve 
(see section 2.4.2.). Ventosa et al. (2002) and Linares (2006) have similar short lists of candidate technologies. 
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each scenario and an auction is introduced in the final stage (see the allocation plans in 
section 2.4.3.). Lastly, we assume that firms have access to enough capital through efficient 
capital markets to finance their desired investment programme.  
Fourthly, the endogenous emission price modelling is based on Linares et al.‟s work 
(2008). It is assumed that there are many players in a perfectly competitive emission 
allowances market. Players in the emission allowances market are classified into two main 
groups, the electricity sector and non-electricity sector. Further disaggregation would need 
each sector‟s Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) to construct its emission allowance demand 
function. The electricity sector‟s allowances demand function is derived in this model, since 
firms choose buying or selling the allowances in response to output decisions. As for the non-
electricity sector, it is assumed that this sector will play as a price taker (i.e. a competitive 
fringe) in the emission market. This assumption allows the clearing emission price to be 
independent of different allocation methods for the non-electricity sectors. Therefore, the 
residual supply curve is built up by subtracting the non-electricity sector‟s demand from the 
total supply curve, subject to the emission cap by government (see equations 2.10~12).  
Fifthly, we do not model early closures of power plants, for the sake of simplicity. To 
my best knowledge, there have been no attempts to model decisions for investment and 
possible closure at the same time in the electricity market studies due to technical difficulties. 
Thus, this study simply reflects the plan for closing old power plants by exogenous modelling. 
Note that the allocation rules could also affect firms‟ behaviour over closures, as studies such 
as Neuhoff el al., 2006a and Å hman et al., 2007 point out. 
Lastly, the model assumes that relative fuel prices in 2013 will be maintained during 
the planning horizons in this study. This assumption can be justified by the following two 
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reasons; firstly, the prices of uranium for nuclear and coal have been stable compared to the 
prices of LNG and heavy-oil mainly due to relatively abundant reserves. However, LNG and 
heavy oil prices have been volatile, it is possible, given tight oil and shale gas, that they could 
be lower over the next decades than they are now, or higher because of rising energy demand. 
Assuming a constant level is a compromise between these. Secondly, there is already a big 
gap between the marginal costs of each technology (Nuclear<Coal<CCGT) in Korea because 
of their fuel prices and relatively similar efficiencies of power plant (CCGT has the highest 
one). In particular, Korea imports natural gas as liquefied natural gas, so that the marginal 
cost of a CCGT is approximately 3.4 times higher than the coal fired plant, which means that 
reasonable fuel price scenarios without extreme cases do not change the merit order system 
(output of each technology) in the Korean electricity market and hence the main simulation 
results. In other words, while the absolute level of electricity prices will depend on these fuel 
prices, the overall merit order will be insensitive to plausible assumption. 
 
2.3.3. Mathematical formulation 
This section provides the objective function and constraints, then derives the KKT 
conditions. Full notations are described in the Appendix. 
 
2.3.3.1. Objective function 
The objective of each firm, i  is to maximize profit; market revenues, minus operating 
costs, investment costs, and net emission allowance purchase given relative constraints for 
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years indexed by t and 14 load segments per year, indexed by l. The objective function is 
given by 
(2.2)  
t
ti,
emis
tt
tec t
ttec,i,teci,t
tec t l
2
teci,lt,tec,i,teci,ttec,tlt,
t l
lt,i,lt,tlt,i NprIcir)qcq(cvrdqprdπMax lt,tec,i,  
where key decision variables are electricity output 
ltteciq ,,, , capacity investment tnteciI ,, , and 
net emission allowance purchase 
tiN , . As explained before, the electricity price ltp ,  and the 
emission allowance price emis
tp are determined by the Cournot equilibrium and perfect 
competition respectively in this model. As for parameters, 
ttecv , , tecici , , tecic , , and tecic , are fuel 
cost, investment cost, linear and quadratic variable cost respectively. 
ltd ,  represents the 
duration of load level and tr  is the discount factor. Technology indexed by tec consists of 
nuclear, bituminous coal, anthracite coal, heavy oil, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), and 
gas-turbine (GT). 
 
2.3.3.2. Constraints 
2.3.3.2.(a) Output constraint 
The output of each firm must be smaller than its total capacity, which is defined as 
initial capacity 
ltteciK ,,,  plus sum of new installed capacity

t
t
tteciI
1
,, . tec  indicates availability 
of a power plant considering forced outage rates and planned maintenance days. 
(2.3) 
q
ltteci
t
ttecitectecitecltteci IKq ,,,,,,,,,                                ltteci ,,,  
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2.3.3.2.(b) Nuclear output constraint 
The model imposes an additional output constraint on nuclear power plants. The 
nuclear power plant might withhold their output strategically in order to raise the electricity 
prices and cover their high fixed cost from the increased prices in a liberalized market despite 
their low variable costs. But they could not exercise their market power in the real world due 
to the huge start-up costs of a nuclear power plant and regulations from the government. Thus, 
the model imposes a „must-run‟ condition, which implies that firms owning nuclear plants 
should produce more than the minimum output boundary set by the nuclear power plants‟ 
load factor, nuc  multiplied by their capacity.   
(2.4) 
nq
ltteciltteci
t
tnucinucnucinuc qIK ,,,,,,,,,                             ltteci ,,,                              
 
2.3.3.2.(c) Emission constraint  
The amount of pollution emitted by each firm must be less than the amount of 
emission allowances it owns. Each firm has three sources of emission allowances: net 
emission purchase, 
tiN ,  and free emission allowances to existing and to new investment 
capacity given different allocation plans. It should be noted that banking and borrowing are 
not allowed in this model, as banking and borrowing would be prohibited during the first 
stage according to the potential Act. Thus, each firm‟s emission and total permit should be 
balanced every year. 
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(2.5)     
e
ti
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tteci
AC
teci
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tec l
ltteciteclt IGKGNqd ,,,
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,
,
,,,,,    ti,                          
where the capacity index C consists of existing plants, e and new entrants, n in the 
benchmarking factor ACG , . In addition, the allocation rules indexed by A are distinguished as 
the auction,  , the fuel-specific benchmark, f and the uniform benchmark, u in this model. 
Table 2.1 explains how the benchmarking factors are calculated in the corresponding 
allocation methods. 
Table 2.1. Benchmarking factors in allocation methods 
 
Existing power plants New power plants 
Auction 0
., aeG
 
0., anG
 
Uniform benchmark shrsefG
ue .,
 
shrsefG un .,
 
Fuel specific benchmark tectec
fe hrefG .,
 tectec
fn hrefG .,
 
 
For example, under the fuel-specific benchmark, the benchmarking factor is calculated 
by the emission factor times the actual operation hours per technology such that 
tectec
fC hrefG ., . Therefore, the amount of allowances to existing plants or new entrants is 
calculated by the benchmarking factor, fCG ,  multiplied by installed capacity, teciK , or new 
entrants‟ capacity
tteciI ,, . On the other hand, the uniform benchmark factor, 
uCG , is determined 
by the standard emission factor, sef  multiplied by the standard operation hour, shr . In the 
case of auctioning, the factor ,CG  is equal to 0. It must be noted that a zero-emission 
technology such as nuclear is not allowed to have free allowances in this model.  
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2.3.3.2.(d) Net emission permit purchase constraint 
The net emission permit purchase has a lower and an upper boundary. It means that 
the maximum permits purchased from each firm and the maximum permits each firm can sell 
should be less than the total number of permits in the emission market. Since permit sales 
occur when 
tiN ,  has a negative value, this second constraint implies that the value of tiN ,  
must be greater than a negative floor,
lo
tiN , . In other words, the equations describe that the 
power generation sector is not able to sell or buy their permits more than total number of 
permits (i.e. emission cap) in the emission market at each period.    
(2.6)    λ                              NN
nup
ti,
up
ti,ti,  ti,                                                
(2.7)    λ                               NN
nlo
ti,ti,
lo
ti,  ti,                                                
 
2.3.3.3. Auxiliary equation 
Equation (2.8) states that the total output of each firm consists of all power plants‟ 
generation. The electricity price equation is given by a linear demand function as equation 
(2.9). 
(2.8) 
tec
lttecilti qq ,,,,,                                                                                                                          
(2.9) 
i
ltiltltlt qbap ,,,,,                                                                                                                  
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The emission allowance price is obtained by the equation below
15
: 
(2.10)   





  tnet
tec l
ltteciteclt
emis
t
emis
t CapNqdbP
0,
,,,,                                                                   
 
2.3.3.4. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
Constructing a Lagrange function containing the objective function (2.2) and the 
inequality conditions (2.3~2.7) multiplied by their dual variables and then deriving the first 
order KKT conditions with respect to the decision variables yields the following equations 
(2.13)      
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nq
lt,tec,i,teclt,
e
ti,
q
lt,tec,i,
lt,tec,i,teci,teci,ttec,tlt,lt,i,
ijj,
lt,j,lt,lt,tlt,lt,tec,i,

 
      
(2.14)     ttec,i, 0GλληλθcirI0
An,
t
e
ti,
l l
nq
lt,tec,i,nuc
q
lt,tec,i,tecnteci,tttec,i,                     
(2.15)     ti, 0λλλprNN
e
ti,
nl
ti,
nu
ti,
emis
ttti,
lo
ti,                                     
 
                                                 
15
 Equation (2.10) is derived as the following process: The emission cap has to be equal to all allowances 
purchased by all sectors and grandfathered to both sectors. 
(2.11)     ne
t
ne
t
i
e
ti,
i
e
ti,t GFNGFNCap          
where 
i
e
tiGF ,
and ne
tGF  are total grandfathered allowances of the electricity sector and the non-electricity 
sector respectively. The non-electricity sector‟s demand function for emission allowances is simply assumed to 
be a function of the allowance price and the total grandfathered allowances, which is as follows: 
(2.12)    
ne
t
emis
t
emis
t
ne,0
t
ne
t GFPbNN      
Then, substituting (2.11) and the emission constraint equation (2.5) into (2.12) yields the emission price equation. 
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The inequality constraints corresponding to dual variables are as follows 
(2.16)       lt,tec,i,0IθKθqλ0
t
ttec,i,tecteci,teclt,tec,i,
q
lt,tec,i,                     
(2.17)       lt,tec,i,0qIηKηλ0 lt,tec,i,
t
tnuc,i,nucnuci,nuc
nq
lt,tec,i,          
(2.18)      ti,0IGKGNqζdλ0
tec
ttec,i,
An,
ttec,i,
tec
Ae,
ti,
tec l
lt,tec,i,teclt,
e
ti,           
(2.19)      ti,                               0NNλ0
up
ti,ti,
nu
ti,                                    
(2.20)      ti,                                 0NNλ0 ti,
lo
ti,
nl
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where the symbol   indicates the complementary slackness condition, which implies the two 
non-negative variables are orthogonal.  
 
2.3.4. IMPLEMENTATION 
The profit maximization problem, subject to operation, investment, and environmental 
constrains and auxiliary equations, has been applied to the MCP framework by deriving KKT 
conditions. The model has 41,475 equations and variables with 393,092 non-zero elements. 
The MCP model is implemented in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) and 
solved by the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000). 
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2.4. APPLICATION TO THE KOREAN ELECTRICITY MARKET  
The model has been applied to the Korean electricity market in order to investigate the 
impact of different emission allocation policies on social welfare. Capacity mix, electricity 
prices and emission allowance prices are provided by means of the MCP framework, which is 
able to incorporate those issues endogenously. The model analyses the Korean electricity 
market from 2010 to 2030. In the middle of the period, the emission trading policy is assumed 
to be introduced in 2015 in all allocation cases.  
 
                    Figure 2.2. Generation mix by fuel in 2008 (unit: output share, %) 
 
The industry had a total electricity generating capacity of 72,491 MW in 2008. 
Electricity generation from coal and nuclear accounts for the largest combined share of 76.8 
per cent, followed by natural gas, oil, and renewable in 2008 as seen in Figure 2.2.   
 
2.4.1. Firms 
The Korean electricity industry, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), had 
been operated as a vertically integrated monopoly constituting of power generation, 
transmission and distribution.  
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The basic plan for the restructuring of the electric power industry; “The Basic Plan for 
Restructuring of the electricity industry” was announced in 1999. Soon after, the National 
Assembly approved the Electricity Business Act promoting the restructuring of the electricity 
supply industry in 2000.  
Consequently, the vertical combined structure was separated. The generation sector of 
KEPCO was split into six generating companies as subsidiaries of KEPCO: Korea South-East 
Power (KOSEP), Korea Midland Power (KOMIPO), Korea Western Power (WP), Korea 
Southern Power (KOSPO) and Korea East–West Power (KEWP), which have similar total 
capacity and types of generation facilities (for instance, coal and CCGT power plants) in order 
to maximize the effect of divestitures in the competitive market, and Korean Hydro and 
Nuclear Power (KHNP) which takes charge of all nuclear plants. For the gradual process of 
transition to the competitive market, the Cost Based Pool (CBP), which is a preliminary stage 
for the Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP), has been operated since 2001.  
Thus, the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) was established as a non-profit organisation 
in the same year for operating the market and system. KEPCO has operated the transmission 
and distribution sector. Although a few IPPs have participated in the market, they still account 
for a small portion, since they are operating CCGT power plants that mostly run at peak times 
in the market; this is called a marginal power plant as it sets electricity prices.  
Therefore, the six major generation firms and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
have been included as players in the model. Table 2.2 shows the status of the generation 
companies in 2008. 
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Table 2.2. Korean generation companies in 2008                                                             (unit: MW) 
Firms Nuclear 
Bituminous 
Coal 
Anthracite 
Coal 
Heavy Oil GT CCGT 
KHNP 17,716 - - - - - 
KOSEP - 6,580 325 529 - 922 
KOMIPO - 4,000 400 150 888 2,812 
KOWP - 4,000 - 1,400 - 2,280 
KOSPO - 4,000 - 600 - 3,600 
KOEWP - 4,500 400 1,800 - 2,100 
IPPs - - - - - 5,249 
Source: Korea Power Exchange, Electric Power Statistics Information System 
To model technology, existing power plants are divided into Nuclear, Bituminous coal, 
Anthracite coal, Heavy oil, GT and CCGT. Among them, the Nuclear, Bituminous coal and 
CCGT plants are included for new investment options. Anthracite coal, heavy oil, and open 
cycle gas turbines are ruled out as they are dominated by the other technology on cost grounds. 
While KHNP is the only company now owning nuclear plants, all firms are allowed to invest 
in nuclear plants. The model aggregates the same technology power plants owned by each 
firm into one unit in its assets to reduce the scale of the model. Lastly, we are assuming 
constant fuel and operating costs in real terms in view of the various possible energy market 
scenarios as mentioned in section 2.3.2 and their limited impact on the merit order in Korea.  
Their major characteristic parameters are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
2.4.2. Electricity demands 
In this model, the linear demand function is adopted as equation (2.9) in each load 
block. The model employs the method for the electricity demand function in each block and 
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elasticity suggested by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) analysing the market power in a 
deregulated Californian electricity market. To determine coefficients 
lta , and ltb , , the linear 
demand function has a price elasticity of demand of 0.1 in the short run based on our 
estimation results for Korea in next chapter
16
. Note that the elasticity value, 0.1 is also used by 
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) for California. The demand function passes through a 
standard point at the predicted demand and average retail price excluding transmission and 
distribution costs in 2009. On the other hand, the elasticity in the first and second blocks (at 
peak loads) is assumed to be 0.01, which considers inelastic demands at peak times in the 
market.  Since peaks are dominated by households who usually do not see real-time prices, 
elasticity is expected to be much lower at these times. The 
ltb , equation is calculated by the 
elasticity formula
17
.  
As for the predicted demand, it is assumed that the annual electricity demand in all 
periods has the same demand pattern as in 2009. We generate new load duration curves from 
the mathematical formula introduced in Kim et al. (2007), which satisfies the peak and total 
output according to the 5
th
 basic plan of long term electricity supply and demand published by 
the Ministry of Knowledge Economy of Korea (2010) as shown in Table 2.3 below. The total 
electricity demand (GWh) and Peak demand (MW) are expected to grow at an average rate of 
about 3% per year during the periods. After 2020, electricity demands in all blocks are simply 
assumed to rise at 2% annually from 2021 to 2030. Then residual demands are derived by 
                                                 
16
 We estimate the own price elasticity of total electricity demand for three sectors; industry, commerce and 
public, households using the cost share logit model (Considine and Mount, 1984) which is one of the inter-fuel 
substitution models. The results show that the own electricity price elasticity of industry, commerce, and public 
households sectors are -0.05, -0.06, and -0.13 respectively (see section 3.4.2.7. in chapter 3). 
17
 The elasticity formula is as follows 
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means of subtracting renewable energy and pumped-storage
18
 outputs from the total demands. 
The demand data are converted into a stepwise approximated load duration curve (LDC) with 
14 blocks, in order to reduce the computational burden in this model. Finally, 
lta ,  is 
calculated by substituting 
ltb ,  into the linear demand function equation.  
Table 2.3. Annual electricity demand forecast 
Year Total Demand (GWh) Peak (MW) 
2011 443,786 73,713 
2012 462,091 76,161 
2013 482,400 79,784 
2014 502,613 83,360 
2015 520,842 86,754 
2016 536,092 89,629 
2017 550,527 92,281 
2018 567,175 95,075 
2019 582,461 97,405 
2020 598,221 99,653 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy of Korea (2010) 
 
2.4.3. Allocation plans 
We assume that the emission trading scheme consists of two stages: 1
st
 stage (2015-
2025) and 2
nd
 stage (2026-2030). An initial allocation method in the electricity sector will 
hold until the end of the first stage, 2025, which gives eleven years of free allocation in some 
cases. Then, all emission allowances will be auctioned from the second stage, 2026.  
                                                 
18
 There are approximately 3.9 GW of pumped-storage power plants in Korea, which pump water at cheap 
energy costs overnight and use it to generate when prices are higher in the day. Thus, pumped energy multiplied 
by an efficiency factor should be added to base load blocks. 
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The government‟s plan specifies a 4 per cent reduction from the 2005 level, so it is 
estimated that the economy-wide emission target would be 570.3 million tonnes CO2 in 2020. 
The model assumes that the total of allowances under the ETS is consistent with the national 
target in 2020. The allowances in earlier years will decrease at an annual rate of 1% to reach 
the target in 2020. The national target in periods from 2021 to 2030 is simply assumed to be 
fixed at the level of 2020 in the model. Annual emission permits will be distributed to the 
emitters according to established allocation scenarios for the first eleven years (2015~2020) 
and then auctioned from 2026.  
According to „An enforcement decree for emission allowances allocation and trade‟ 
established on July, 23, 2012, the Korean government prohibits the inflow of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs), from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in developing 
countries which are certified by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC), entirely by the end of the second phase, 2020, in order to prompt domestic 
abatement activities. Besides, the available supply of CERs, their prices, and thus the effects 
of the CERs on the permit price in a domestic market after a decade are unknown quantities. 
Therefore, the allowances from the CDM have been neglected in the model.  
As mentioned in section 2.3.2, the non-electricity sector‟s allowances demand function 
is modelled to build up the residual supply function, which allows the electricity sector to 
decide their output and investment in response to the emission price. The demand function of 
the non-electricity sector for emission allowances has been set up according to Lee et al.‟s 
work (2009) estimating the MAC of industrial sectors in Korea
19
.  
 
                                                 
19
 The slope parameter is estimated at 0.00132 Won/tCO2 by OLS estimation. See page 56 in Lee et al. (2009) 
for the other sectors‟ MACC. 
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Table 2.4. Parameters for emission allowances allocation scenarios 
 
Bituminous 
Coal 
Anthracite 
Coal 
Heavy Oil GT CCGT 
Output(GWh) 185,826 7,978 11,970 762 41,111 
Capacity(MW) 23,080 1,125 4,479 888 11,715 
Load factor (%) 92 81 31 10 40 
Historic operation 
hours (hr/year) 
8051 7091 2673 858 3509 
F.B. emission factor 
(tCO2/MWh) 
0.75 0.80 0.65 0.55 0.35 
Standard operation 
time (hr) 
6000 
U.B. emission factor 
(tCO2/MWh) 
0.35 
Note: Domestic anthracite coal power plants are receiving a subsidy so that they are running as „must-run‟ plants 
in the market. Historic operation hours are estimated based on the Korean Electric Power Corporation (2010). 
 
In terms of allocation scenarios during the first stage from 2015 to 2022, the model 
considers typical allocation methods: an auction (A.U.) and two types of grandfathering: (1) 
uniform benchmark with standard operation hours (U.B.) and (2) fuel-specific benchmark 
with historical operation hours (F.B.) are considered. The historic operation hours are 
calculated based on the output in 2009, since using a recent (but past) load factor is a typical 
method of allocating permits to plants. The standard operation hours are calculated from the 
average value between the bituminous coal and the CCGT plants‟ operation time. The specific 
parameters are summarized in Table 2.4.  
The model is used to analyse a total of ten scenarios in initial allocation methods. 
There are three allocation rules (A.U., U.B., F.B.) to incumbents and the same number of 
rules to new entrants along with a base scenario (no emission policy case).  However, in order 
to concentrate on contrasting cases and more realistic scenarios, five scenarios are presented 
here. The most realistic scenario is that the government would start the emission trade policy 
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with the fuel specific benchmark for existing power plants and the uniform benchmark for 
new entrants (case 4), as several EU countries did for the second phase of the EU-ETS. Then 
follows the scenario (case 5) in which they might impose the same (fuel-specific benchmark) 
allocation rule for new entrants. Finally, base and full auction cases are provided to compare 
the effects of other scenarios. 
1) Base case: no emission controls (Base)  
2) Auction to existing power plants + Auction to new entrants (A.U. to A.U.) 
3) U.B. to existing power plants + U.B. to new entrants (U.B. to U.B.) 
4) F.B. to existing power plants + U.B. to new entrants (F.B. to U.B.) 
5) F.B. to existing power plants + F.B. to new entrants (F.B. to F.B.) 
 
2.5. RESULTS 
Although the nation‟s emission target will be fulfilled in all allocation policies 
according to equation (2.10), they have different effects on the economy. This section 
summarizes key features such as the electricity price, emission allowance price, total 
electricity sector emissions, capacity mix, and social welfare of all allocation scenarios
20
.  
 
2.5.1. Total new investment  
Without the ETS, firms are definitely in favour of a coal power plant as an investment 
option in the market. A total of 8,046 MW of coal power plants will be added, which 
                                                 
20
 Annual average results are provided in Appendix 2. 
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represents 57 per cent of the total new capacity. This is mainly due to its cheaper operation 
than gas and cheaper construction costs than nuclear power plants in the Korean market.  
As shown in Figure 2.3, the ETS has changed the scale of investment and capacity 
mix. It can be seen that the more allowances are given to new investment, the more new 
capacity is built up. The largest amount of new capacity, 16,872 MW is observed with the 
fuel-specific benchmark to existing plants and new entrants. 
 
                 Figure 2.3. Total new investment capacity in the different allocation cases 
 
This is because the allowance is working as a kind of subsidy. If new capacity is 
endowed with allowances, firms do not need to purchase a large amount of allowances in the 
market, so the new plants will be incentivized. As a result, the coal power plant remains a 
dominant technology with the fuel-specific benchmark rule, representing 39 per cent of the 
total new investment capacity. On the contrary, the auction rule to new entrants leads to less 
investment, 15,492 MW, and causes firms to mainly choose nuclear power plants, which 
account for 67 per cent of the new capacity. The main reason for this result is that coal and 
CCGT plants have to purchase all the permits they need in the auction system. Thus, the 
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profits of those plants are significantly damaged, which makes generators prefer the nuclear 
power plant. 
The capacity of new coal power plants is significantly reduced with the auction and 
the uniform benchmark rule to new entrants, since the allowances given to a coal power plant 
are not enough to compensate for its higher costs. Therefore, investment in coal power plants 
is replaced by lower carbon technology such as nuclear power.  
 
2.5.2. Total CO2 emissions in the electricity sector  
Without the ETS, the electricity sector‟s emissions will reach 299.86 million tonnes of 
CO2 in 2030, but the launch of the emission trading scheme with any of the allocation 
methods described in this model reduces expected total emissions in the electricity sector. 
These reductions are attributed to switching fuels from coal and oil to gas and investing in 
cleaner technology such as nuclear and CCGT plants.   
 
                   Figure 2.4. Electricity sector’s total CO2 emissions in the different allocation cases 
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Apart from the base case, the largest emissions are found in the full fuel-specific 
benchmark. As carbon-intensive technologies are endowed with more allowances here than in 
any other allocation methods, the output from coal power plants still occupies a relatively 
high portion, 41.4 per cent in 2030. In addition to the operating decision, the coal power plant 
is a dominant technology for investment with the fuel-specific benchmark so newly built coal 
power plants with high emission factors contribute to the increase in emissions. However, the 
full fuel-specific benchmark is able to lessen emissions compared to the base case by 20.4 per 
cent in 2030. This is mainly due to an increase in nuclear output compared to the base case. 
On the other hand, the output share of the CCGT remains almost stationary in all allocation 
cases. The CCGT share of electricity output in 2030 represents at least 18.7 per cent in the 
F.B. to F.B. case and at most 21.3 per cent in the base case. This implies that allocation 
policies had little effect on the marginal plants‟ operation times in the Korean market. This is 
because the nuclear power plant with low variable costs prevails over the CCGT with high 
fuel costs in dealing with emission constraints. In any cases, the CCGT‟s running will be 
restricted to within peak times. Thus, the amount of fuel switching from coal to gas is 
relatively small regardless of the allocation policies
21
. The difference in the number of freely 
allocated permits for existing plants between the U.B. to U.B. and the F.B. to U.B. cases does 
not change output decisions, as the Coase Theorem implies, which leads to identical results 
for emissions, emission allowance prices, and electricity prices.  
The most notable increase in nuclear output is found with the auction allocation. The 
largest share, 43.2 per cent of the total output, is accounted for by nuclear power. 
                                                 
21
 The relatively small effect of fuel switching from coal to LNG is mainly due to high fuel cost of LNG. Since 
Korea imports natural gas as LNG, the fuel price of LNG is about 3.4 times higher than Bituminous coal‟s price. 
The marginal cost (won/MWh) of bituminous coal and CCGT plant when they add the opportunity cost of CO2 
emissions can be calculated as about 123,160 and 149,130 respectively given the maximum emission permit 
price. As a result, the Bituminous coal plant remains as a dominant technology in the merit order. 
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Consequently, the auction brings the least emissions, 209 million tonnes of CO2 (24.5 per cent 
reduction from the base) in 2030. Almost identical results for emissions are observed in the 
full uniform benchmark and the fuel-specific benchmark to the uniform benchmark, which 
reduce the base emission by approximately 23.6 per cent in 2030. 
 
2.5.3. Emission allowances prices 
As the annual emission cap decreases, the allowance price increases with the passage 
of time, as indicated in Figure 2.5.  The full auction case leads to the lowest allowance price, 
but the full fuel-specific benchmark induces the highest allowance price. It is interesting to 
note that Figure 2.5 shows little difference between the prices of different allocation cases in 
the initial periods. The prices start at about 42,000 won per tonne of CO2, which is 
approximately equivalent to €28.222. However, as time goes by, the gap between the scenarios 
widens to 9,340 won per tonne of CO2 at the end of the first stage, 2025. This is because the 
scarcity value of an emission allowance increases with the higher-carbon investment 
encouraged by some allocation methods.  
As mentioned earlier, the national emission cap is assumed to be met in all cases, but 
the fuel-specific benchmark to new entrants makes firms favour carbon intensive technology 
such as coal power plants, which increases electricity sector emissions significantly. 
Consequently, costs to achieve the emission target also rise according to the scarcity principle. 
Relatively higher emission allowance prices from the simulation in the Korean market as 
compared to the second period of the EU-ETS (€8 per tonne of CO2 in April, 2012) might be 
caused by the high marginal abatement cost curves of carbon-intensive industries, dependence 
                                                 
22
 This article refers to the exchange rate of won per euro, 1,490 won in April, 2012.  
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on coal power plants in the country, or a tougher target compared to the EU after all the 
renewables they are building. 
 
                    Figure 2.5. Annual average CO2 prices in the different allocation cases 
 
2.5.4. Electricity prices   
As the electricity demand continues to rise annually, the price, in general, goes up as 
shown in Figure 2.6. The introduction of the emission trading policy with any allocation 
method increases the electricity price. The highest electricity price is observed in the A.U. to 
A.U. case, which follows the U.B. to U.B., the F.B. to U.B., and the F.B. to F.B. Compared to 
the base case, the average increase is 12.2 per cent, 10.6 per cent, 10.6 per cent, and 9.5 per 
cent respectively. While the A.U. to A.U. case has the lowest carbon price, it also has the 
lowest investment in new capacity, and this lower level of capacity gives the highest 
electricity price. In contrast, the F.B. case leads to more investment and relatively lower 
electricity prices.  
Given the CO2 prices under all scenarios, the average impact of CO2 cost pricing is 
estimated at 28￦/kWh in the A.U, 24￦/kWh in the U.B. to U.B. and the F.B. to U.B., and 
22￦/kWh in the F.B. to F.B, which are equivalent to €14.8/MWh ~ €18.8/MWh. These 
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results are in line with the German case in Sijm et al.‟s (2006) work that estimates electricity 
price increases due to CO2 costs at €20/tCO2 using the COMPETES simulation model. That 
study shows the price increase in Germany is higher than in any of the other countries 
modelled. This is mainly due to the fuel mix, with a high dependence on coal. It implies that 
the extent which electricity prices increase due to the ETS is determined by the share of 
carbon-intensive power generation such as coal power plants in an electricity market. 
 
                   Figure 2.6. Annual average electricity prices in the different allocation cases 
 
However, taking account of dynamic investment behaviour, the results above show 
that free allocation to new entrants gives generators incentives to build up new capacities. In 
particular, the fuel-specific benchmark to new entrants accelerates investment in coal-fired 
plants. This results in higher competition in the electricity market, which lowers electricity 
prices. 
 
2.5.5. Social welfare  
Taking into consideration the external effect of the emission allowance allocation 
method in the electricity on the emission market, the model estimates social welfare in a 
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partial equilibrium setting, internalizing the external effect into the electricity sector. Social 
welfare in this model is the sum of consumers‟ surplus, the firms‟ profits, and the revenue 
from selling permits to the electricity sector, less the pass-along cost that measures external 
costs caused by the allocation rule to electricity sector. In other words, if the electricity sector 
cuts its emissions by less, other industrial sectors need to incur additional costs to reduce their 
emissions by enough to meet the overall national target. 
We assume that all the revenues from selling permits to the electricity sector are 
simply redistributed to households. As Burtraw et al. (2001) point out, if the revenue is used 
to decrease pre-existing distortionary taxes, it could create additional economic value, but in 
order to limit the scope of this study, we rule out analysing the effect of such tax interaction 
on welfare. Therefore, the agents are assumed to return all of the revenue from selling permits 
to consumers in this model, since this is regarded as the least valuable option, increasing 
consumers‟ surplus only by the face value of the revenue. We do measure these revenues as a 
separate item in our welfare analysis, however.  
In terms of the external effect, recall that total emissions are assumed to be the same in 
each scenario. Therefore, the impact of increased emissions in the electricity sector on other 
sectors, named the pass-along cost, is defined as the cost that is incurred by reduction of 
additional emissions in the non-electricity sector instead of the electricity sector. If the 
electricity sector purchases emission allowances instead of reducing its own emissions, the 
sector selling those allowances must incur the cost of lower emissions. We call this cost the 
pass-along cost. 
Figure 2.7 demonstrates this pass-along cost concept. Point C gives the level of 
emissions in the electricity sector, cQ  , and the permit price, cP , 
in the scenario with the lowest 
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electricity emissions.  In some other scenario, in which the electricity sector emits eQ tCO2, the 
permit price is eP  , determined by the emission allowance price equation (10). The increase in 
the permit price from cP  to eP  is caused by the additional investment in higher-carbon plant 
discussed earlier. Therefore, the trapezoid area, CEQQ ec  represents the pass-along cost that the 
non-electric sector must bear. This cost is normalised relative to the non-electricity sector‟s 
emissions level from the full auction case, determined by ex-ante simulation. 
 
                        Figure 2.7. Pass-along cost determination 
                          Note: the slope parameter is obtained from Korean research, Lee et al. (2009). 
 
Table 2.5 shows the results for social welfare, given the different allocation methods. 
Numerical values in parentheses indicate changes relative to the base case. It is also important 
to note that although the difference in electricity sector emissions between the cases is in fact 
offset by changes in the non-electricity sector, valued at a social cost of carbon of $25 per 
ton
23
 in 2010 dollars the electricity reductions are worth between approximately 390 and 469 
billion won. 
                                                 
23
 The value was chosen on the basis of a survey by Tol (2013) which provides the mean, $25 and a standard 
deviation, $22 of values from the literature using a 3 percent discount rate. 
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Table 2.5. Social welfare in the different allocation cases (unit: trillion Won) 
 
Base A.U. to A.U. U.B. to U.B. F.B. to U.B. F.B. to F.B. 
 
Consumer Surplus 
 
 
3,336.18 
 
 
3,179.84 
(-156.34) 
 
 
3,207.04 
(-129.14) 
 
 
3,207.04 
(-129.14) 
 
 
3,226.34 
(-109.84) 
Producer profit 
 
1,451.03 
 
1,403.42 
(-47.61) 
1,424.23 
(-26.80) 
1,467.67 
(16.64) 
1,447.31 
(-3.72) 
Revenue from selling 
permits to electricity 
sector 
 
- 198.61 152.71 109.28 121.72 
Pass-along cost - - 5.10 5.10 12.92 
Social welfare 
(Net surplus) 
 
4,787.21 
 
4,781.87 
(-5.34) 
4,778.88 
(-8.33) 
4,778.88 
(-8.33) 
4,782.45 
(-4.76) 
Reduction in the 
electricity sector 
(1,000 tCO2) 
- 67,730 65,240 65,240 56,350 
 
Although it appears that relatively minor changes in social welfare occur 
among scenarios, significant differences in distributional effects depend on the different initial 
allocation methods. Generally, increased electricity prices in all allocation scenarios cause a 
reduction in consumer surplus. In the auction case, even though the allowance price is lowest, 
the lower investment levels drive up electricity prices and firms pass the highest carbon costs 
through to electricity prices, and so the losses in consumer surplus are greatest.  
The emission allocation methods‟ effect on producer profit shows diverse results. The 
profit of generation firms decreases in the full auction and the uniform benchmark cases. 
Generally, as the marginal power plant, CCGT sets higher electricity prices due to the ETS; 
infra marginal units such as nuclear and coal power plants benefit from increased electricity 
prices. But, the increases in electricity prices do not exceed the increases in costs of 
purchasing emission allowances (i.e., the cost pass-through rate is less than one). For this 
reason, if all allowances are distributed by the auction or the uniform benchmark, the 
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generation firms‟ profit will be reduced. In contrast, the firms realize windfall profits from the 
fuel-specific benchmark to incumbents and uniform benchmark to entrants and the full fuel-
specific benchmark cases during the initial period. This implies that existing coal power 
plants are not faced with relatively high costs of purchasing their emission allowances with 
the fuel-specific benchmark allocation. Furthermore, they earn additional rents by passing 
through the opportunity cost of free emission allowances to electricity prices.  However, from 
the second stage, generators‟ profits are significantly reduced in the full fuel-specific 
benchmark, since firms must purchase all permits as much as they expanded capacity of 
carbon intensive power plants such as the coal power plant in the first stage. 
Overall, the fuel-specific benchmark to all power plants ranks at the top in social 
welfare, even though it is only slightly higher than in the auction case. It can be interpreted 
that giving away free permits makes the emission reductions more expensive as seen in the 
pass-along cost and emission permit prices, but the extra capacity triggered by the free 
allowances to new entrants based on the fuel-specific benchmark raises social welfare when 
the industry is not very competitive.   
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated the effect of different allocation methods on the Korean 
electricity market by using an MCP model that incorporates operation, investment, and 
emission problems in an oligopolistic manner. Taking into account the importance of the 
electricity sector in the ETS policy, emission prices are determined partially by the electricity 
sector‟s emissions and then interact with electricity prices and investment decisions in the 
model. In particular, the allocation rules are explicitly modelled by separating existing power 
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plants and new entrants. As for the allocation rules, an auction for both existing power plants 
and new entrants, a uniform benchmark for all plants, a fuel-specific benchmark to existing 
power plants and uniform benchmark to new entrants, and a fuel-specific benchmark for all 
plants have been analysed in order to compare the effects of the allocation rules on emission 
prices, electricity prices, the capacity mix and social welfare. 
We found that generation firms act differently depending on the allocation of permits 
to new investments, (although not to existing plant), which brings various impacts on the 
economy. The ETS would push up electricity prices by at least 9.5 per cent in the full fuel-
specific benchmark case and by at most 12.2 per cent in the full auction case. Thus, consumer 
surplus is reduced in all allocation scenarios. On the other hand, increases in producer surplus 
during the initial period are observed in the F.B. to U.B. and the F.B. to F.B. cases, since 
opportunity costs of the permit price are passed on to electricity prices. As for the level of 
emissions in the electricity sector, the auction and the uniform benchmark shift operation and 
investment toward lower-carbon technology such as nuclear and CCGT, which leads to 
relatively lower levels of emissions, 208.7-211.2 million tonnes of CO2 in 2030 respectively. 
On the other hand, investment in carbon-intensive technology, typically coal power plant, and 
its operations are incentivized by the fuel-specific benchmark. As a result, this method records 
the largest emission level among the allocation scenarios, 220.1 million tonnes of CO2 in 2030. 
The greater emissions from the electricity sector result in additional abatement costs in the 
other sector to achieve the national emission target.  
The model derives practical implications for the market organization by means of 
scoring the social welfare of all of the allocation methods. We close the discussion by 
summarizing the properties of the allocation methods in the initial period. 
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Firstly, the auction is the most powerful policy to reduce the electricity sector‟s 
emissions, without imposing the pass-along cost on the other sector. Besides, the auction has 
several merits: it satisfies the polluter pays principle and does not create any incentives 
around carbon-intensive technology. The government gains the highest revenues from an 
auction, which can be redistributed in various ways, for example investment in new green 
technology or reducing income taxes of households. But the reality is that the ETS is facing 
political resistance from the industries involved. The auction would be unhelpful in gaining 
political agreement from these industries.  
Secondly, using the uniform benchmark for new and existing plants has almost as 
much impact in reducing emissions as the auction, but it incurs the highest social costs as 
shown in social welfare, since compared to the auction case, the more carbon-intensive 
investment increases the electricity sector‟s externality as measured by the pass-along cost 
calculation and the lower revenues from selling permits to electricity market. However, it has 
a merit among the methods with freely allocated permits; the uniform benchmark corresponds 
with the principle of equality. 
Thirdly, the F.B. to U.B. in which existing plants are endowed with allowances by the 
fuel-specific benchmark and new investment capacity is provided with allowances by the 
uniform benchmark combines advantages from both allocation methods: it lessens opposition 
to the ETS by providing a relatively large amount of allowances to existing power plants in 
the initial ETS period, and using the uniform benchmark for new investment means that it is 
still a relatively effective way to abate emissions. It is interesting to confirm that as predicted 
by theory, the U.B. to U.B. and the F.B. to U.B. yield the same outcomes in output, 
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investment, electricity prices and emission permit prices. This result proves the Coase 
theorem holds with respect to allocation rules to existing power plants
24
.  
Lastly, the government could consider the fuel-specific benchmark allocation method 
for the initial period when the market possesses a tight capacity to meet the electricity demand 
which is expected to increase continuously in next decades, since this allocation method 
encourages new investment as seen in the result. But it is important to mention that although 
the fuel-specific benchmark to existing and new entrants ranks the highest in social welfare, 
interpretation of the results requires attention, since the difference in social welfare compared 
to the all-auction case is not very large and the allocation method creates distorting effects on 
the economy. As highly incentivized coal fired plants become a prominent option for new 
capacity, their emissions increase the demand for emission allowances and thus inflate the 
allowance prices. This case shows relatively lower electricity prices than other cases in its 
early years. However, in view of the long economic life span of the plant, the allowance 
prices remain at a higher level in the long term. This gives a valuable insight into the dynamic 
interaction between allocation methods and emission prices. If the government sticks to this 
allocation method in order to minimize early impacts on electricity prices, this increases the 
cost of carbon to the economy by raising emission prices. It is also noteworthy to mention that 
firms would realize significant windfall profits under the fuel-specific benchmark without 
government intervention.  
There are, however, two questions for the ETS that remain to be explained. This 
model is unable to assess various closure rules, in that retired power plants continue to hold 
and could sell grandfathered allowances in this model. This is also a controversial issue in the 
                                                 
24
 We also find this when comparing the results of other allocation scenarios that also have the same allocation 
rules to new investment such as auction to uniform benchmark, though we do not describe these due to space 
limitations.  
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European member states that own numerous somewhat aged power plants. The MCP 
framework required us to treat investment as a continuous variable, rather than modelling the 
decision to build an integer number of plants of standard sizes. Clearly, further research is 
needed to address these limitations. 
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APPENDIX 2 
A.2.1. Notation 
A.2.1.1. Indices 
   Firms 
t    Periods (years)  
l     Load levels  
C   Capacity types  ne,  
       e  and n  stand for existing power plants and new entrants respectively. 
A    Emission allowances allocation types  uf ,,  
       ,, f  and u  stand for auction, fuel specific benchmark, and uniform benchmark respectively. 
 
A.2.1.2. Parameters 
tla ,               Intercept of demand function in load level l in period t 
tlb ,               Slope of electricity demand function in load level l in period t 
emis
tb              Slope of emission allowances demand function of non-electricity sector in period t 
teciteci cc ,, ,         Linear and quadratic heat rate of technology (
2/,/ MWhMcalMWhMcal ) 
tCap              Total amount of emission allowances in period t ( 2tCO ) 
tehci               Capacity investment cost of technology (1,000￦) 
tld ,               Duration of load level l in period t (hours) 
tiFI ,             Annual investment budget of firm i in period t (thousand won) 
tecef             
Emission factor of technology ( MWhtCO /2 ) 
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techr              Operation hours of technology (hours) 
ACG ,            Benchmarking factor by capacity types and allocation rules ( MWtCO /2 )  
tteciK ,,           Existing technology capacity in period t  
up
tiN ,              Net emission permit purchase upper bound in period t ( 2tCO ) 
lo
tiN ,              Net emission permit purchase lower bound in period t ( 2tCO ) 
0,ne
tN            Non-electricity sector‟s demand for emission allowances at price zero in period t ( 2tCO ) 
tecsef          
Standard emission factor of technology ( MWhtCO /2 ) 
tecshr            Standard operation hours of technology (hours) 
tr                 Discount rate in period t 
nuc               Load factor of nuclear power plant 
tec               Availability of capacity in period t 
tec              Emission rate of technology ( MWhtCO /2 ) 
ttehv ,              Fuel cost of technology in period t (1,000￦) 
 
A.2.1.3. Decision variables 
tteciI ,,            Investment capacity of technology in period t ( MW ) 
tiN ,              Net emission permit purchase in the permit market in period t ( 2tCO ) 
ltteciq ,,,         Power generation by technology in load l in period t ( MW ) 
 
A.2.1.4. Dual variables 
k
ti,                 Constraint of capacity investment in period t 
e
ti ,                 Constraint of emissions in period t 
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nq
ltteci ,,,           Constraint of nuclear power plant generation in load level l in period t 
nu
ti ,                 Constraint of net emission permit purchase upper bound in period t 
nl
ti ,                 Constraint of net emission permit purchase lower bound in period t 
q
ltteci ,,,           Constraint of technology generation in load level l in period t 
 
A.2.1.5. Auxiliary variables 
ltp ,                 Electricity price in load l in period t (1,000￦ / MWh ) 
emis
tp               Emission allowances price in period t (1,000￦ / 2tCO ) 
ltiq ,,                 Total power generation of firm in load level l in period t ( MW ) 
 
 
A.2.2. Parameters of technology 
Table A.2.1. Parameters of the construction cost, operation cost, and emission rate 
 
NUCLEAR 
Bituminous 
Coal 
CCGT 
Anthracite 
Coal 
Heavy Oil GT 
Construction cost 
(1000Won/MW) 
1,956,000 1,008,000 804,000 - - - 
Fuel cost 
(1000Won/Mcal) 
0.00129 0.01803 0.06111 0.02615 0.06323 0.06111 
Linear heat rate 
(MCal/MWh) 
2,213 2,061 1,704 2,273 2,195 2,195 
Emission Rate 
(tCO2/MWh) 
0 0.86 0.45 0.95 0.80 0.66 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on Roh and Choi (2010) and Korean Electric Power Corporation (2010). 
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A.2.3. Annual average results  
Table A.2.2. The results of the BASE case 
Time 
Emissions 
(MtCO2) 
Prices(thousand won) Capacity (MW) Output (GWh) 
Elec. Emission Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total 
2010 165.85 177.31 - 17,716 23,970 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,176 131,910 164,300 9,362 55,505 986 4,879 366,942 
2011 174.02 180.81 - 17,716 24,207 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,413 131,910 170,860 9,362 59,819 1,291 6,229 379,471 
2012 182.03 184.16 - 17,716 24,447 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,653 131,910 177,180 9,362 64,214 1,599 7,577 391,842 
2013 189.56 188.22 - 17,716 24,745 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,951 131,910 183,070 9,362 68,216 1,961 8,916 403,435 
2014 198.70 194.07 - 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 190,360 9,362 72,740 2,436 10,528 417,337 
2015 206.86 200.79 - 17,716 25,704 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,910 131,910 197,180 9,362 76,357 2,809 11,908 429,526 
2016 213.03 206.35 - 17,716 26,148 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 67,354 131,910 202,430 9,362 78,981 2,997 12,979 438,659 
2017 217.78 210.98 - 17,716 26,528 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 67,734 131,910 206,550 9,362 80,865 3,154 13,795 445,636 
2018 223.80 215.75 - 17,716 26,949 1,125 17,129 4,479 888 68,286 131,910 211,370 9,362 84,242 3,346 14,727 454,957 
2019 229.45 220.10 - 17,716 27,349 1,125 17,290 4,479 888 68,847 131,910 215,940 9,362 87,601 3,467 15,487 463,767 
2020 234.71 223.98 - 17,716 27,722 1,125 17,440 4,479 888 69,371 131,910 220,190 9,362 90,807 3,604 16,160 472,034 
2021 240.00 228.15 - 17,716 28,131 1,125 17,608 4,479 888 69,946 131,910 224,480 9,362 94,002 3,730 16,824 480,308 
2022 245.25 232.32 - 17,716 28,554 1,125 17,792 4,479 888 70,554 131,910 228,770 9,362 97,317 3,860 17,376 488,595 
2023 250.53 236.19 - 17,716 28,970 1,125 18,045 4,479 888 71,223 131,910 232,980 9,362 101,010 3,945 17,891 497,098 
2024 255.17 239.11 - 17,878 29,325 1,125 18,363 4,479 888 72,058 133,260 236,630 9,362 104,690 3,991 18,186 506,119 
2025 258.59 241.07 - 18,361 29,611 1,125 18,608 4,479 888 73,072 137,280 239,520 9,362 107,210 4,002 18,304 515,678 
2026 262.07 242.97 - 18,851 29,903 1,125 18,873 4,479 888 74,118 141,360 242,460 9,362 109,790 4,012 18,426 525,410 
2027 265.58 244.84 - 19,354 30,201 1,125 19,143 4,479 888 75,190 145,540 245,410 9,362 112,390 4,024 18,564 535,291 
2028 269.14 246.62 - 19,851 30,501 1,125 19,409 4,479 888 76,252 149,720 248,340 9,362 115,120 4,047 18,711 545,300 
2029 272.71 248.29 - 20,338 30,799 1,125 19,680 4,479 888 77,309 153,870 251,220 9,362 117,870 4,088 18,894 555,304 
2030 276.44 249.87 - 20,820 31,126 1,125 19,957 4,479 888 78,395 158,080 254,290 9,362 120,570 4,123 19,129 565,555 
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Table A.2.3. The results of A.U. to A.U. case 
Time 
Emissions 
(MtCO2) 
Prices(thousand won) Capacity (MW) Output (GWh) 
Elec. Emission Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total 
2010 165.85 177.31 - 17,716 23,970 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,176 131,910 164,300 9,362 55,505 986 4,879 366,942 
2011 174.02 180.81 - 17,716 24,207 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,413 131,910 170,860 9,362 59,819 1,291 6,229 379,471 
2012 182.03 184.16 - 17,716 24,447 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,653 131,910 177,180 9,362 64,214 1,599 7,577 391,842 
2013 189.56 188.22 - 17,716 24,745 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,951 131,910 183,070 9,362 68,216 1,961 8,916 403,435 
2014 198.70 194.07 - 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 190,360 9,362 72,740 2,436 10,528 417,337 
2015 192.43 222.60 42.09 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 183,550 9,362 82,833 1,902 4,472 414,029 
2016 193.49 235.68 54.68 17,716 25,186 1,125 17,058 4,479 888 66,452 131,910 182,740 9,362 87,836 1,992 4,008 417,849 
2017 191.42 242.01 64.67 18,459 25,186 1,125 17,140 4,479 888 67,276 138,100 180,320 9,362 89,346 1,760 3,204 422,093 
2018 189.27 247.12 74.08 19,568 25,186 1,125 17,191 4,479 888 68,437 147,330 177,940 9,362 90,390 1,537 2,511 429,070 
2019 187.45 251.54 83.16 20,573 25,186 1,125 17,223 4,479 888 69,475 155,690 175,650 9,362 91,337 1,331 2,191 435,561 
2020 185.66 255.56 91.94 21,526 25,186 1,125 17,247 4,479 888 70,451 163,620 173,220 9,362 92,199 1,093 2,128 441,622 
2021 187.31 258.20 92.03 22,202 25,186 1,125 17,350 4,479 888 71,229 169,240 174,420 9,362 93,793 1,173 2,128 450,116 
2022 188.98 260.79 92.11 22,892 25,186 1,125 17,456 4,479 888 72,026 174,990 175,620 9,362 95,411 1,267 2,128 458,778 
2023 190.99 263.18 92.39 23,560 25,277 1,125 17,555 4,479 888 72,885 180,550 177,340 9,362 96,827 1,330 2,177 467,586 
2024 193.43 265.35 92.91 24,202 25,463 1,125 17,646 4,479 888 73,803 185,890 179,670 9,362 98,055 1,361 2,257 476,595 
2025 195.90 267.49 93.42 24,858 25,652 1,125 17,738 4,479 888 74,740 191,350 182,040 9,362 99,309 1,395 2,338 485,793 
2026 198.37 269.59 93.92 25,529 25,846 1,125 17,835 4,479 888 75,703 196,940 184,370 9,362 100,570 1,452 2,418 495,113 
2027 200.88 271.62 94.42 26,204 26,040 1,125 17,958 4,479 888 76,694 202,600 186,710 9,362 101,990 1,508 2,470 504,640 
2028 203.44 273.47 94.93 26,857 26,225 1,125 18,157 4,479 888 77,731 208,190 188,920 9,362 103,940 1,556 2,442 514,411 
2029 206.04 275.25 95.44 27,515 26,409 1,125 18,373 4,479 888 78,789 213,840 191,150 9,362 105,970 1,609 2,413 524,344 
2030 208.71 276.81 95.97 28,136 26,580 1,125 18,570 4,479 888 79,778 219,500 193,420 9,362 108,080 1,639 2,405 534,406 
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Table A.2.4. The results of U.B. to U.B. case 
Time 
Emissions 
(MtCO2) 
Prices(thousand won) Capacity (MW) Output (GWh) 
Elec. Emission Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total 
2010 165.85 177.31 - 17,716 23,970 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,176 131,910 164,300 9,362 55,505 986 4,879 366,942 
2011 174.02 180.81 - 17,716 24,207 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,413 131,910 170,860 9,362 59,819 1,291 6,229 379,471 
2012 182.03 184.16 - 17,716 24,447 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,653 131,910 177,180 9,362 64,214 1,599 7,577 391,842 
2013 189.56 188.22 - 17,716 24,745 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,951 131,910 183,070 9,362 68,216 1,961 8,916 403,435 
2014 198.70 194.07 - 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 190,360 9,362 72,740 2,436 10,528 417,337 
2015 193.15 220.75 42.55 17,716 25,481 1,125 17,078 4,479 888 66,767 131,910 185,170 9,362 82,244 1,760 4,135 414,581 
2016 194.87 231.15 55.56 17,716 25,764 1,125 17,368 4,479 888 67,340 131,910 185,550 9,362 87,551 1,641 3,292 419,305 
2017 194.96 239.27 66.92 17,889 25,947 1,125 17,600 4,479 888 67,928 133,360 184,490 9,362 91,229 1,496 2,702 422,640 
2018 193.19 244.13 76.53 18,931 25,987 1,125 17,737 4,479 888 69,147 142,020 182,130 9,362 92,726 1,272 2,224 429,734 
2019 191.58 248.37 85.72 19,882 25,992 1,125 17,860 4,479 888 70,227 149,940 179,620 9,362 94,288 1,024 2,128 436,361 
2020 189.98 252.09 94.60 20,754 25,992 1,125 18,030 4,479 888 71,268 157,200 176,810 9,362 96,183 840 2,128 442,523 
2021 192.61 254.05 95.26 21,259 26,145 1,125 18,231 4,479 888 72,127 161,400 179,050 9,362 98,251 870 2,128 451,061 
2022 195.29 256.06 95.91 21,797 26,334 1,125 18,458 4,479 888 73,081 165,870 181,410 9,362 100,180 884 2,128 459,834 
2023 198.02 258.02 96.59 22,342 26,526 1,125 18,702 4,479 888 74,062 170,410 183,830 9,362 102,160 895 2,128 468,785 
2024 200.79 259.94 97.25 22,898 26,721 1,125 18,956 4,479 888 75,068 175,040 186,260 9,362 104,200 908 2,128 477,898 
2025 203.59 261.82 97.92 23,464 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 76,110 179,750 188,710 9,362 106,260 939 2,128 487,149 
2026 205.13 264.62 97.83 24,281 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 76,926 186,540 190,080 9,362 107,190 1,056 2,128 496,356 
2027 206.64 267.36 97.72 25,116 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 77,762 193,510 191,430 9,362 108,160 1,146 2,128 505,736 
2028 208.10 270.05 97.57 25,965 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 78,611 200,750 192,700 9,362 109,130 1,235 2,128 515,305 
2029 209.57 272.69 97.42 26,834 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 79,480 208,160 193,990 9,362 110,080 1,332 2,128 525,051 
2030 211.20 275.06 97.35 27,662 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 80,308 215,450 195,320 9,362 111,190 1,440 2,191 534,954 
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Table A.2.5. The results of F.B. to U.B. case 
Time 
Emissions 
(MtCO2) 
Prices(thousand won) Capacity (MW) Output (GWh) 
Elec. Emission Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total 
2010 165.85 177.31 - 17,716 23,970 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,176 131,910 164,300 9,362 55,505 986 4,879 366,942 
2011 174.02 180.81 - 17,716 24,207 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,413 131,910 170,860 9,362 59,819 1,291 6,229 379,471 
2012 182.03 184.16 - 17,716 24,447 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,653 131,910 177,180 9,362 64,214 1,599 7,577 391,842 
2013 189.56 188.22 - 17,716 24,745 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,951 131,910 183,070 9,362 68,216 1,961 8,916 403,435 
2014 198.70 194.07 - 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 190,360 9,362 72,740 2,436 10,528 417,337 
2015 193.15 220.75 42.55 17,716 25,481 1,125 17,078 4,479 888 66,767 131,910 185,170 9,362 82,244 1,760 4,135 414,580 
2016 194.87 231.15 55.56 17,716 25,764 1,125 17,368 4,479 888 67,340 131,910 185,550 9,362 87,551 1,641 3,292 419,305 
2017 194.96 239.27 66.92 17,889 25,947 1,125 17,600 4,479 888 67,928 133,360 184,490 9,362 91,229 1,496 2,702 422,640 
2018 193.19 244.13 76.53 18,931 25,987 1,125 17,737 4,479 888 69,147 142,020 182,130 9,362 92,726 1,272 2,224 429,734 
2019 191.58 248.37 85.72 19,882 25,992 1,125 17,860 4,479 888 70,227 149,940 179,620 9,362 94,288 1,024 2,128 436,361 
2020 189.98 252.09 94.60 20,754 25,992 1,125 18,030 4,479 888 71,268 157,200 176,810 9,362 96,183 840 2,128 442,523 
2021 192.61 254.05 95.26 21,259 26,145 1,125 18,231 4,479 888 72,127 161,400 179,050 9,362 98,251 870 2,128 451,061 
2022 195.29 256.06 95.91 21,797 26,334 1,125 18,458 4,479 888 73,081 165,870 181,410 9,362 100,180 884 2,128 459,834 
2023 198.02 258.02 96.59 22,342 26,526 1,125 18,702 4,479 888 74,062 170,410 183,830 9,362 102,160 895 2,128 468,785 
2024 200.79 259.94 97.25 22,898 26,721 1,125 18,956 4,479 888 75,068 175,040 186,260 9,362 104,200 908 2,128 477,898 
2025 203.59 261.82 97.92 23,464 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 76,110 179,750 188,710 9,362 106,260 939 2,128 487,149 
2026 205.13 264.62 97.83 24,281 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 76,926 186,540 190,080 9,362 107,190 1,056 2,128 496,356 
2027 206.64 267.36 97.72 25,116 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 77,762 193,510 191,430 9,362 108,160 1,146 2,128 505,736 
2028 208.10 270.05 97.57 25,965 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 78,611 200,750 192,700 9,362 109,130 1,235 2,128 515,305 
2029 209.57 272.69 97.42 26,834 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 79,480 208,160 193,990 9,362 110,080 1,332 2,128 525,051 
2030 211.20 275.06 97.35 27,662 26,920 1,125 19,234 4,479 888 80,308 215,450 195,320 9,362 111,190 1,440 2,191 534,954 
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Table A.2.6. The results of F.B. to F.B. case 
Time 
Emissions 
(MtCO2) 
Prices(thousand won) Capacity (MW) Output (GWh) 
Elec. Emission Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total Nuclear B.coal A.coal CCGT GT Oil Total 
2010 165.85 177.31 - 17,716 23,970 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,176 131,910 164,300 9,362 55,505 986 4,879 366,942 
2011 174.02 180.81 - 17,716 24,207 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,413 131,910 170,860 9,362 59,819 1,291 6,229 379,471 
2012 182.03 184.16 - 17,716 24,447 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,653 131,910 177,180 9,362 64,214 1,599 7,577 391,842 
2013 189.56 188.22 - 17,716 24,745 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 65,951 131,910 183,070 9,362 68,216 1,961 8,916 403,435 
2014 198.70 194.07 - 17,716 25,186 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 66,392 131,910 190,360 9,362 72,740 2,436 10,528 417,337 
2015 195.01 217.72 43.76 17,716 26,214 1,125 16,998 4,479 888 67,420 131,910 189,690 9,362 79,428 1,502 3,505 415,398 
2016 197.62 228.19 57.32 17,716 26,811 1,125 17,013 4,479 888 68,032 131,910 192,220 9,362 82,368 1,383 2,808 420,050 
2017 198.99 236.28 69.47 17,716 27,269 1,125 17,178 4,479 888 68,656 131,910 192,980 9,362 85,464 1,240 2,290 423,246 
2018 199.01 241.85 80.19 18,444 27,609 1,125 17,276 4,479 888 69,820 137,970 192,660 9,362 86,852 984 2,128 429,956 
2019 198.20 245.81 89.84 19,323 27,862 1,125 17,330 4,479 888 71,007 145,280 191,390 9,362 87,650 781 2,128 436,591 
2020 197.25 249.38 99.07 20,151 28,118 1,125 17,375 4,479 888 72,136 152,180 189,910 9,362 88,558 583 2,128 442,721 
2021 200.17 251.39 99.85 20,655 28,395 1,125 17,450 4,479 888 72,992 156,370 192,880 9,362 89,866 601 2,128 451,207 
2022 203.10 253.38 100.62 21,175 28,680 1,125 17,528 4,479 888 73,875 160,700 195,880 9,362 91,180 623 2,128 459,873 
2023 205.98 255.47 101.34 21,739 29,008 1,125 17,614 4,479 888 74,852 165,390 198,860 9,362 92,393 633 2,128 468,766 
2024 208.91 257.52 102.05 22,314 29,344 1,125 17,701 4,479 888 75,850 170,180 201,890 9,362 93,637 642 2,128 477,839 
2025 211.87 259.52 102.77 22,899 29,699 1,125 17,789 4,479 888 76,880 175,050 204,950 9,362 94,919 649 2,128 487,057 
2026 213.55 262.34 102.71 23,709 29,699 1,125 17,789 4,479 888 77,690 181,790 206,570 9,362 95,748 734 2,128 496,332 
2027 215.18 265.11 102.62 24,540 29,699 1,125 17,789 4,479 888 78,521 188,700 208,110 9,362 96,578 852 2,128 505,730 
2028 216.79 267.82 102.50 25,383 29,699 1,125 17,789 4,479 888 79,364 195,860 209,610 9,362 97,471 940 2,128 515,370 
2029 218.36 270.48 102.36 26,246 29,699 1,125 17,789 4,479 888 80,227 203,210 211,030 9,362 98,397 1,035 2,128 525,162 
2030 220.09 272.85 102.30 27,060 29,699 1,125 17,906 4,479 888 81,158 210,250 212,280 9,362 100,100 1,118 2,128 535,238 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN INTEGRATED MODEL COMBINING TOP-DOWN AND 
BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO ENERGY–ECONOMY 
MODELLING 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional models for the quantitative assessment of economic impacts induced by 
energy and environment policies could be identified as either a top-down model that focuses 
on the macroeconomic feedbacks or a bottom-up model that concentrates more on the 
physical energy flow system and technology options. After the first oil shock of 1973~74, 
energy experts have been aware of the important changes it caused; substitutions between 
energy sources, technology innovations, and impacts on energy policies such as subsidies and 
taxes. These challenges in terms of both the demand and the supply sides could not be 
captured simultaneously by the single method. Consequently, modellers started to build up 
integrated models that combine the top-down and bottom-up models in order to exploit the 
comparative advantages of both types of model: economic interaction and rich technology 
respectively. Furthermore, growing concerns over climate change issues incentivised 
development of the integrated method. Hourcade et al. (2006) point out that the performance 
of an integrated model satisfies three dimensions; technologically explicit, behaviourally 
realistic and with macroeconomic feedback, which is able to provide a more reliable tool in 
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assessing effects of climate change policies; the government‟s emission target, carbon tax, 
and distribution of specific technology in the economy. For these reasons, the integrated 
model has become a dominant tool in energy and environment policy modelling. 
As the Korean government needs to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
it is considering introducing various policies such as an emission trading scheme and carbon 
taxes which are regarded as an effective economic instrument policy. Therefore, in recent 
years, several studies have been made to quantify the effect of carbon policies on the 
economy in Korea. However, most of these studies are conducted by a single method such as 
Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) or optimisation models for analysing the effects 
on the national economy and specific energy intensive industries respectively. Recently, there 
have been two studies (Noh, 2009; Oh, 2012) that built up integrated models for the 
assessment of climate change policies. However, the former study does not specify an 
electricity sector and the latter does not reflect each generation technology‟s capacity 
constraints and the demand side‟s load duration curves, even though the electricity sector is 
the most important sector accounting for the largest emission source. 
As explained earlier, the single method has limitations in capturing technology and 
economic interactions together. In the case of CGE models, the approach is suitable to capture 
medium and long-run effects and analyse multiple industrial sectors. But, it is often criticized 
for reliance on external sources for parameter values, which often lack adequate econometric 
justification in their models and for using a simple production function for the complexities of 
real industries. Depending on assumed parameters on demand and supply sides‟ cross-price 
elasticities to determine fuel switching from carbon-intensive energy to less intensive fuels, 
the results show significant differences in terms of the economic costs of GHG mitigation.  
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On the other hand, the optimization studies, typically using MARKAL, have a 
tendency to underestimate the mitigation costs on the basis modellers pass over various 
hidden costs, transaction costs, other constraints, or exaggerate the scale of technologies that 
have low or even negative costs. Therefore, the effect on GDP is likely to be undervalued 
significantly (Helm, 2003).  Helm recommends that research should estimate the main costs 
and supply curves involved in all technology options and avoid unrealistic projections of 
technical progress and innovation to evaluate the carbon cost fairly. 
In other words, more sophisticated methods for capturing the supply side‟s 
engineering information and robust parameters on macroeconomic variables are required to 
investigate the effect of climate change policies. 
Taking into account the current state of the literature, this study provides an integrated 
model that combines top-down and bottom-up models for analysing the climate change policy. 
Overall, the integrated model is more suitable to analyse the climate change policy in that it 
captures technological diversity in detail and interactions between the supply side and 
economic variables at the same time through overcoming the weaknesses and taking the 
advantages of both methods. In view of the importance of two factors (the possibility of fuel-
switching and the electricity sector) that play a critical role in determining GHG mitigation 
costs, this study builds up an integrated model combining a bottom-up MCP electricity market 
model established in the previous Chapter Two and a top-down model: the macro-
econometric model in which most behavioural equations are set up in line with economic 
theory and a long-run relationship between variables is confirmed by an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration (Pesaran et al., 2001) and 
standard specification tests. In addition, a dynamic linear logit model (Considine and Mount, 
1984) is adopted to measure inter-fuel substitution possibilities. The macro-econometric 
- 62 - 
model consists of seven blocks: supply side, demand side, prices and wage, fiscal and 
monetary, finance, foreign trade, and energy and environment blocks with total 150 equations 
including 73 behavioural equations and 73 identities.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section overviews the 
modelling for energy and economy methods, inter-fuel substitution models, and the 
econometric methodology for behavioural equations. Section three explains the structure of 
the integrated model and describes the result of estimating the equations. Section four 
performs an ex-post simulation and evaluates the model‟s performance. Section five 
concludes this chapter.  
 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The section reviews three subjects; (1) modelling approaches for energy and economy, 
(2) inter-fuel substitution models, and (3) the econometric methodology for behavioural 
equations. The first subject classifies the models analysing the effect of energy issues on the 
economy. The second investigates the proper econometric model for analysing the effect of 
inter-fuel substitution, which plays an important role in determining emissions and the costs 
incurred in policy simulations. The last subject examines cointegration methods to overcome 
the spurious regression problem which has often occurred in estimating macroeconomic 
variables. The literature on these subjects has been surveyed by many published articles. For 
example, the classification of energy models is well documented in Bhattacharyya and 
Timilsina (2009). An integrated model‟s advantages and the detailed integration methods are 
described in Hourcade et al. (2006) and Bohringer and Rutherford (2008) respectively. As for 
the second subject, Considine and Mound (1984) provide a linear logit regression model 
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adopted in an economic model. Besides, Urga and Walters (2003) compares translog and logit 
models. The review for the ARDL bounds test adopted as one of the cointegration methods in 
this model is mainly conducted by summarizing Pesaran et al.(2001) and application studies, 
Mah (2000) and Narayan (2005) which point out that the bounds test is superior to the 
methods provided by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991, 1995) for small sample 
sizes.  
 
3.2.1. Modelling approaches for energy and economy 
Modelling methods for energy and environmental policies could be divided into top-
down (T.D.) b2ottom-up (B.U.), and integrated models linking the two approaches. This 
section overviews the properties of each type of model.  
 
3.2.1.1. Top-down approach 
The T.D. approach can be generally divided into three types of models; (i) Input-
Output, (ii) Computational General Equilibrium (CGE), and (iii) Macro-econometric models. 
Overall, this structure is well suited to assess the effects of price instrument policies such as 
taxes and emission allowance permits on the economy. But, a production function in the T.D. 
models is not able to feature the detailed properties of technologies such as the split between 
fixed and operation costs, capacity limitations, potential options of new energy technologies, 
and the physical restrictions of energy system. The following sub-section briefly overviews 
the three main model types of the T.D. approach. 
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3.2.1.1.(a) Input-Output model 
The input-output model has long been used for various economic analyses. It provides 
a framework that represents the relationships between different national sectors in terms of 
value added and input and output coefficients relative to total production. The input-output 
tables are generally used via their economic indicators (e.g. employment per value added), 
Thus, the model derives the direct and indirect energy demand through inter-industry 
transactions. It also can capture changes in energy demands and outputs from given scenarios 
such as energy policies. 
However, most input-output models have several limitations; fixed input-output 
relations over time, limited ability to capture inter-fuel substitutability and technological 
advances. Typical studies using the input-output model for energy demand and energy issues 
can be found in Wei et al. (2006) and Nathani et al. (2006). 
 
3.2.1.1.(b) Computable General Equilibrium model 
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model has been widely used for 
analysing recent climate change policy issues. Based on the Walrasian concept of equilibrium, 
the CGE model assumes utility maximisation and cost minimisation behaviours by 
households and firms respectively. Thus, the model draws equilibrium prices and quantities 
when all markets clear. The CGE model is suitable to analyse effects of price-induced policies 
such as taxes, subsidies, or other changes in energy prices on the economy. The method 
adopted powerful solution algorithms which allow modellers to include multiple sectors and 
countries in a system (i.e., it has good expandability).  
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While the CGE approach is able to describe choices between technologies by adopting 
a type of substitution function, it is, however, still difficult to describe specific technological 
properties as in the input-output model. In addition, the CGE model is criticised for the 
parametric specifications, which can lack adequate econometric justification. Therefore, the 
results from CGE models are heavily dependent on the size of parameters specified in models. 
Notable extended models designed for climate change policy can be found in GEM-E3 
(General Equilibrium Model for Europe and the World, Capros et al. 1997), and EPPA (The 
MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis Model, Babiker et al 2001).  EPPA is an 
example of a recursive dynamic model that assumes that agent behaviour depends on the 
current and past states of the economy, whereas a model such as WITCH (Bossetti et al., 2009) 
assumes forward-looking behaviour. 
 
3.2.1.1.(c) Macro-econometric model 
The macro-econometric model was first introduced by Tinbergen; the model has been 
used for analysing economic policy in a nation. The model‟s structure was based on four 
antecedents; general equilibrium by Leon Walras, the business cycle, Keynes‟ general theory, 
and the empirical literature on Keynes‟ general theory (Bodkin et al. 1991). The macro-
econometric model consists of a number of equations linking economic variables. The choice 
of variables is mainly based on economic theories, and the coefficients on variables are 
determined by econometric methods using historical data. The model accounting for the 
operation of the economy provides a tool for economic policy experiments such as monetary, 
fiscal, and energy policy in the short and medium-term.  
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 The macro-econometric model was expanded to represent the relationships between 
intermediate industries by Duesenberry et al.(1965). It firstly provided the foundation 
combining a macro-econometric model and the Leontief input-output system
25
. This method 
has been named the macro-econometric and input-output model. A notable model for the 
energy system is Energy-Environment-Economy Model for Europe (E3ME) which consists of 
41 consumers and 42 industries in 29 European countries (Barker, 1998).  
However, the traditional aggregated macro-econometric model is vulnerable to the 
Lucas critique (1976); policy conclusions or predictions from the model, in which equations 
are built up by observed historical correlations between macroeconomic variables, would be 
invalid. This is because the agent does not simply repeat their behaviour but responds 
optimally when new policies are introduced, so that the historical correlations would change.  
To overcome the Lucas critique, the equations derived from inter-temporal 
optimization with rational expectation methods based on micro-foundations have been 
introduced in macro-econometric models. In particular, Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) is evaluated as a model which is free from the Lucas critique. The 
DSGE consists of equations derived from micro-economic foundations, which are able to 
represent agents‟ preferences and rationality. The parameters in equations are mainly obtained 
by econometric methods. The model represents the real world with the assumption of price 
and wage rigidities and imperfect competition
26
. Nowadays a number of policy-making 
institutions, such as central banks have employed the DSGE method to analyse monetary 
policies. Recent DSGE models have been extended by adding an energy production sector in 
                                                 
25
 A conventional macro-econometric and input-output model adopts econometric methods to estimate final 
demands such as consumption, investment, and net exports, which in turn are transformed into each sector‟s final 
demand by the input-output system. Then industrial sectors‟ value-added are calculated given the Leontief 
inverse and value addition matrixes. Finally, national GDP is counted by summing up the sector‟s value added. 
26
 The DSGE modelling methodology is well documented in Woodford (2003). 
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which energy serves as an intermediate input in final goods production. Many of these models 
have been built for the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks (Lee and Ni, 
2002; Kormilitsina, 2001; Sánchez, 2011; Roger, 2005; Bodenstein et al., 2012).  
However, it has drawbacks when used to analyse climate change policies; simulations 
for the specific level of variables such as carbon taxes or emission permit prices cannot be 
performed, since the DSGE adopts a log-linearization method which takes the log-deviation 
of a variable from its steady-state in order to estimate nonlinear specifications. If modellers 
experiment with an exogenous proportional change in a decision variable, modellers face the 
problem of how to define the steady-state variable that can be changed by external effects
27
. 
Even worse, it is unreasonable to require the modeller to specify a growth rate or proportional 
change in carbon tax rates in a country in which the carbon tax policy is not implemented yet, 
because establishing scenarios for change in the carbon tax rate is not available. Note that 
even modern macro-econometric models rule out the log-linearization method to retain 
decision rules in levels in order to examine shocks that change the steady stage of the model 
(see Harrison et al.‟s description of the Bank of England Quarterly Model (2005)). 
For this reason, the traditional macro-econometric model is still generally used rather 
than the DSGE for studying climate change issues. On the other hand, DSGE models have 
been mainly used for analysing the effects of shocks on macroeconomic variables. 
 
3.2.1.2. Bottom-up approach 
The B.U. model describes the specific energy sectors‟ technology. The majority of 
these models employ optimization programs which find a solution for the most cost-effective 
                                                 
27
 If we log-linearize the following equation;         , the following equation is derived;  ̂  
 ̅
 ̅
 ̂  
 ̅
 ̅
 ̂  
where,  ̂  is a log-linearized variable indicating log-deviation form a steady state,     
  
 ̅
  and  ̅ is a steady-state 
variable respectively.  
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arrangement of energy technology given the demands, technical and political constraints. This 
approach provides an efficiency standard when the government introduces command and 
control type policies. However, the bottom-up model cannot explain the macroeconomic 
feedbacks such as consumer income and rebound effects, and interactions with energy inputs‟ 
prices and demand. The models are generally classified into two approaches; (i) accounting 
and simulation and (ii) optimization models.  
 
3.2.1.2.(a) Account and simulation model 
The first generation of bottom-up model, accounting methods have been used since the 
1970s. Most variables are mainly exogenous; price variables are not explicitly included in a 
static structure. Simulation models stem from the accounting method. The models simulate 
energy-consuming and converting technologies and the diffusion of specific technologies. The 
total amount of energy demand and supply are calculated by identity equations for a complex 
aggregation of data. Because of the clear structure and practical results, such models have 
been preferred by government agencies. In particular, Heaps‟ (2012) Long-range Energy 
Alternatives Planning System (LEAP) model has been used and updated for analysing energy 
and climate change related policies for developed and developing countries
28
. 
 
3.2.1.2.(b)  Optimization model 
The optimization model which typically adopts a linear programming method 
optimizes multiple objective functions subject to technical restrictions and energy-policy 
                                                 
28
 The LEAP applications are available at http://www.energycommunity.org/default.asp?action=45. 
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constraints. The model assumes that consumers or suppliers behave rationally under various 
constraints, and then choose a best option. This method has the best features to tackle 
questions on energy flow in the energy system, investment needs, possible energy savings, 
and the minimal discounted cost of producing energy subject to technical, economic and 
environmental constraints. For these reasons, commercial optimization models (typically 
MARKAL) have gained prominence and are widely used for analysing the effect of energy-
environmental policies on energy-intensive industries. While this method provides the least 
cost least solution among various current and future technology options, the result could bring 
overly radical solutions, since the model lacks micro-economic realities in terms of agents‟ 
decision making when choosing technologies; agents‟ pathway dependence or preferences are 
not considered in the model. 
 
3.2.1.3. Integration approach 
As explained in the introduction, in recent years, numerous studies have attempted to 
build up integrated models compensating for the limitations of the T.D. and B.U. approaches. 
According to Böhringer and Rutherford (2009), the integrated method could be classified into 
the three approaches, (i) combining between a reduced form version of the T.D. or B.U. 
model and the other one, (ii) integration in a single format, and (iii) linking independent T.D. 
and B.U. models.  
 
3.2.1.3.(a)  Integration between a reduced form and the other model 
The first approach dates back to Manne (1977). They provide the integration method 
to couple a technology-rich bottom-up model (MARKAL) with a single macroeconomic 
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neoclassical growth model which adopts a nested CES production function with three input 
factors: labour, capital, and aggregated energy. The aggregated energy demand and cost 
calculated from the bottom-up model are fed into the macro model. Using the first order 
conditions, the input factors demands are derived from the macro model, which in turn are 
passed back to the bottom-up model. This iteration proceeds until the convergence criteria of 
the difference between sequential values of the computed variables is fulfilled.  
 
3.2.1.3.(b)  Hard-link  
Böhringer (1998) provides the second approach, which integrated both T.U. and B.U. 
models in a single format, named as the completely integrated model or hard-link, which is 
based on the framework of mixed complementarity problems (MCP)
29
. The model is able to 
capture both the technological detail of a bottom-up energy system and the macro-economy 
through setting weak inequalities and complementarity conditions between decision variables 
and market equilibrium conditions in a single format. Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) 
suggest a decomposition technique in order to overcome the earlier literature‟s algebraic 
complexity and dimensionality. When it comes to strengths and weaknesses of the complete 
integration model, while the agents‟ behaviours are consistent in each model through a well-
defined linking approach, the modelling system is still complex and less flexible in terms of 
extension and compatibility compared to the other integrated methods. For those reasons, 
relatively little literature has attempted to use this approach for analysing climate change 
policy issues. Oh (2012) applied the method proposed by Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) to 
the Korean economy. The hybrid model links the electricity sector component and a 
                                                 
29
 See Dirkse and Ferris (1995), Rutherford (1995) for the algorithms of MCP.  
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conventional CGE model. Each technology has a Decreasing Returns to Scale production 
function in the electricity sector and the model allows the electricity generation mix to change 
endogenously. The results show that a carbon price of about 60$/tC would cause a GDP loss 
of 0.61 percent with an emission trading system. 
 
3.2.1.3.(c)  Soft-link  
The last approach, linking independently developed T.D. and B.U. models, often 
called „soft link‟, has been formulated in order to compensate for the simplicity of a single 
macroeconomic neoclassical growth model in the first approach, Manne (1977). Large scale 
macro-economic models such as an Input-Output, CGE, or macro-econometric model have 
been adopted in the T.D. model, which in turn are linked with a technologically detailed linear 
programming model in the B.U. model. After building the two different models, first run the 
T.D. model which provides energy prices and demand values to the B.U. model; secondly 
execute the B.U. model given these values and then pass optimal energy production and costs 
into the T.D. model. This process repeats until the convergence criteria of the energy demand 
and prices are reached. While the soft–link method has gained popularity with modellers as 
existing models are conveniently linked with each other, it is often criticised for 
inconsistencies in agents‟ behaviour assumptions between the two models. 
It is worthwhile to describe Labandeira et al.‟s work (2009), which is similar to our 
intention for modelling in terms of developing a more realistic electricity model. They analyse 
the effect of the EU-ETS on the Spanish economy in the period 2005~2012 by the soft-link 
method combining the CGE and the electricity engineering model taking into account the 
importance of the electricity sector. They point out that the soft-linking method is the most 
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flexible and effective method among the integration methods to capture the electricity output 
decisions for multiple periods. Furthermore, they deliver a solution for the consistent agent‟s 
behaviour by adopting the MCP framework, instead of a linear programming, for modelling 
the electricity market, which allows an electricity demand function to respond to electricity 
prices in both B.U. and T.D. models. The main results are summarised in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Results with and without integration 
 CGE alone without integration Integrated modelling framework 
Price of electricity +8.6% (+17.0%, +21.5%) 
GDP -0.7% -1.0% 
Welfare -0.3% -0.5% 
CPI +0.2% +0.2% 
       (Source: Labandeira et al., 2009) 
 
They found that the integrated approach yields different results of the real effect of the 
EU-ETS on electricity price, GDP, welfare, and CPI compared to the CGE-alone model. The 
CGE-alone method underestimated the effect of related policies on the economy, whereas the 
result from the integration method shows more realistic results. It implies that a top-down 
approach is likely to underestimate the effect of climate change policies on the economy.  
It is important to note that this finding; the effect on GDP in an integrated model is 
higher than one in a top-down model alone, may not always hold, particularly in the 
electricity market which has higher marginal abatement cost curves than many other 
industries, since power plants cannot substitute fuels as easily as the CGE model assumes.  
In other words, the results with an integrated model can be lower than CGE models 
that assume that there are no negative cost options, so that there is a real question of whether 
we can actually expect agents to adopt the negative cost options, because the integrated model 
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is able to reflect „negative cost‟ options which are assumed to be easily installed by agents 
using an optimization model in a supply-side module; however, in practice these options have 
already been available and are not taken up.  
To sum up, the integrated model is regarded as the most adequate method to reflect 
available technology options which have negative cost options and unique energy supply 
industries such as electricity in which power sources cannot be substituted easily.  
 
3.2.2. Inter-fuel substitution models 
This section overviews the econometric methods of inter-fuel substitution; translog 
cost function and logit cost share models, which measure the impact of relative price changes 
on energy demands empirically. The estimated cross-price elasticities which indicate 
substitution possibilities from more to less carbon-intensive energy sources is a key 
determinant of emission reductions when price instrument policies are introduced. There have 
been attempts to devise elaborate econometric models for analysing inter-fuel substitution. 
Typically, translog cost function and logit cost share models have been widely used recently. 
The following section begins by investigating the translog model.  
 
3.2.2.1. Translog cost function model 
Christensen et al. (1971, 1973) introduced the translog production function cost 
function. Then, numerous studies applied the translog cost function to empirical models 
estimating energy demand. Among those studies, Fuss (1977) provided the two-stage factor 
inputs model in which six energy elements are explicitly included in the set of factors of 
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production. Pindyck (1979a) modified the price of aggregated energy, called the energy index, 
by a homothetic translog cost function with constant returns to scale. We examine Fuss‟s 
(1977) two-stage translog model in detail. The production function can be assumed as 
               [                ] 
where   is gross output; L, M, and K are labour, materials, and capital input respectively;  , 
an aggregated energy input, is a function of   energy elements. The corresponding cost 
function can be represented by the translog second-order approximation, and has a non-
homothetic production form 
                    ∑      
 
       
 
 
∑∑           
  
 ∑          
 
 
 
 
        
  
where   is total cost and    or   ,             are factor prices. From Shephard‟s lemma 
implying          , the demand function is derived by differentiating the cost function 
with respect to the prices. Therefore, the cost share equation is given by               
        , or 
                  ∑       
 
         
The cost shares must add to 1, and the following parameter restrictions must be 
imposed to satisfy the properties of neoclassical production theory. 
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               ∑      ,                  (Identifiability of the distribution parameters constraint) 
           ∑      ∑         (Cournot aggregation constraint) 
               ∑                         (Engel aggregation constraint) 
                                ,       (Slutsky symmetry constraint).                            
 
To measure price responsiveness, the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution, 
    and the price elasticity of demand,     have been employed. These measures can be 
computed in the translog cost function 
                 
          
                
 
                      
                 
The price index of energy,    in the equation (3.2) is a unit of function consisting of N 
energy elements, which can be represented by the translog form 
                     ∑       
 
 
 
 
∑∑             
  
 
Diewert (1975) demonstrates that the Divisia index is exact for this aggregate function. 
The Divisia index is a weighted sum of growth rate, where the weights are the components‟ 
shares in total value. It has advantages over the Btu aggregation, in the sense that the Divisia 
index does not assume perfect substitution and equality of prices per Btu. Nguyen (1987) has 
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shown that the measures lead to different results of income and price elasticity to energy 
demand. 
The cost share functions for each energy elements can be derived as 
                   ∑        
 
 
Analogous to the set of constraints (3.4), the following restrictions are imposed as 
              ∑     
 
 
           ∑      
 
 
                                  
As for estimation, the two-stage procedure is needed. In the first stage, estimate the 
system equations (3.8) under the restrictions (3.9), and obtain an estimate of the aggregate 
price index,  ̂  by substituting the corresponding estimated parameters of the equations (3.8), 
which is entered into the energy price index,   , that is, it serves as an instrumental variable in 
the next states. Finally, using the instrumental variable,  ̂  for   , estimate the system 
equations (3.3) subject to the restrictions (3.4).   
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3.2.2.2.  Considine and Mount’s logit model 
3.2.2.2(a). Static logit model 
Considine and Mount (1984) introduced more elaborate linear logit models for a 
system of cost share equations, which are designed to satisfy three theoretical properties of the 
input-demand function derived from the producer‟s cost minimization assumption. The 
properties are (i) non-negativity of inputs, (ii) zero-degree homogeneous function in prices, 
and (iii) negative own-price along with symmetric cross-price effects. The non-negativity is 
automatically ensured by adopting exponential functions for cost shares. The other properties 
are guaranteed by imposing additional conditions. Firstly, a static model will be examined in 
the following section. A static linear logit model of cost share is given by 
             
    
 
  
       
∑        
 
   
                             
where    is the share of  
   input cost in total cost,    and    are the price and quantity of the 
    input respectively,   is the total cost, and    is a function of all input prices,   , and the 
level of output,  , which is as follows 
                  ∑             
 
   
                              
where   ,    ,   , and    are unknown parameters;     are random-error terms. The share 
elasticities with respect to prices and output under non-restriction are derived as 
               
     
     
     ∑  
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Using Shephard‟s Lemma and the share elasticities equation (3.12) and (3.13), the 
price elasticity for the     input and the cross-price elasticities are derived as 
                
     
     
                                     
                
     
     
                                   
The linear logit model of cost share satisfies the second property, zero-degree 
homogenous function in prices which implies that the sum of the N price elasticities should be 
zero.  Given the equations (3.14) and (3.15), this property is summarized in the following 
equation which means that the sum of the share elasticities should be zero;  
           ∑   
 
   
  ∑       
 
   
    ∑   
 
   
                          
Symmetry of the cross-price effects in the third property implies that 
                                                   
To satisfy these above equations, two constraints are imposed in the model. The first 
one is given by 
           ∑     
 
   
                            
where   is an arbitrary constant. Another constraint imposed is as follows: 
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The price coefficients are redefined as 
              
         
                             
where   
  is defined as the predicted shares for each observation to deal with an endogeneity 
problem in the stage of estimation. See the estimation part below for further information. 
Then, using the redefined equation (3.20) and imposing constraints (3.18) and (3.19), the 
linear logit function (3.11) can be rewritten as: 
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Adding an error term,    into each    and using logarithms for the share equation, (3.10) 
can be written as a linearized form for estimation: 
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where  
             
              ∑     
   
   
          30 
Three identifying restrictions,          , are required to identify the 
remaining coefficients for estimating the system of     equations. These normalizing 
constraints do not affect the estimates of the elasticities. Finally, using the symmetry 
condition (   
     
   and homogeneity condition (   
   ∑    
   
    
 
      the cross-price 
elasticities are derived as 
                 
     
                                   
and the own-price elasticities are as follows: 
                 
     
                                           
As for estimation methods, either the iterative Zellner‟s seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation or the full information maximum likelihood estimation can be 
implemented. 
                                                 
30
 The terms       are simply the predicted logarithmic share ratios which are obtained via estimating the 
equation (3.24). 
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3.2.3.2 (b) A dynamic linear logit model 
The above static linear logit model assumes that demand converges to long-run 
equilibrium immediately. However, the factor demand would be not flexible due to various 
constraints such as fixed factors for production, technological elements, and producers‟ 
rational expectations meaning that they respond to expected prices. Therefore, demands for 
input factors respond to price changes gradually.  For those reasons, Considine and Mount 
(1984) applied Tradeway‟s (1971) optimal path to adjustment process in the linear logit 
model, and called it the dynamic logit model. The optimal path equation is given by 
             ̇          [    ]        
where    is the stationary equilibrium, and         is an     matrix with elements that 
are functions of    and the discount rate, r.  
Substituting    
     
   
     , where the asterisk denotes the equilibrium level of the 
corresponding variable, into a logarithmic approximation of equation (3.27) gives a dynamic 
form of the linear logit model. Therefore, the     quantity change can be written as 
                        ∑   (     
      
               )
 
   
          
where     is an element of the matrix 
  in the equation (3.27), and     is the  
   element of   
in the equation (3.27). Given the equation (3.28), the quantity ratio can be derived as 
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Imposing conditions that       for     and       for all   in the equation (3.29) 
yields the following cost share ratio: 
           (
   
   
)     (
   
 
   
 )         (
   
   
)         (
   
   
)         (
     
     
) 
Using a linear logit model corresponding to the equation (3.10) and (3.11), the 
equilibrium share ratio can be defined as: 
            (
   
 
   
 )          ∑(       )
 
   
                  
where   ,    , and    are the parameters in the equilibrium state. Substituting the equation 
(3.31) and the equation (3.30) yields the following equations 
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The equations (3.32) are for estimation purposes, which corresponds to the following 
linear logit model for the     share 
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with 
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The dynamic model is distinguished by introducing a time subscript and the lagged 
quantity with partial adjustment coefficient,  . The short-run price elasticities are same as in 
the static model and the long-run price elasticities can be computed as  
               
      
                                        
where    
   is the short-rum elasticity given in the equations (3.25) and (3.26). If the partial 
coefficient,   is greater than 0, it guarantees the Le Chatelier principle that the short-run price 
elasticities can never be greater than the long-run price elasticities. 
As for estimation, a two-step iterative Zellner estimation is employed to estimate a 
system of implicit share equations. Note that the iterative Zellner estimation method provides 
the parameters which are invariant to the selection of the base input. Besides, the two-step 
iterative procedure handles an endogeneity problem of the cost shares variables. In the first 
step, using actual data for the endogenous variables   
  on the right side of the equations 
(3.23), estimate parameters in the equations (3.23) and compute predicted shares given by the 
equation (3.24). In the second step, these initial predicted shares from the first stage are used 
to re-estimate parameters in the equations and generate the predicted shares. Then, the 
predicted shares instead of the actual data are re-entered into the endogenous variables   
   in 
the first step. This iteration is repeated until the convergence criteria for the parameter 
changes between two steps, which is set at less than 0.1%, is reached. 
Overall, the logit model outperforms the translog model when the two models‟ 
estimation results are compared. According to Urga and Walters (2003)‟s work, the static 
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translog model has parameters that violate concavity conditions of the cost function. 
Furthermore, the residual of the model is serially correlated and has non-normal errors. 
Another study, Kim (2006), employing the translog model for analysing Korean industrial 
sectors‟ energy demand, observed that the translog model often yields non-negative price 
elasticities of energy demand. On the other hand, the logit model has superiorities; the model 
satisfies the non-negativity of the input share, and shows reasonable parameters for own- and 
cross-price elasticities. In the case of the dynamic logit model, the model guarantees the Le 
Chatelier principle by giving short-run elasticities that are less than their long-run 
counterparts. For those reasons, we adopt the dynamic logit model among inter-fuel 
substitution models for the energy demand block. 
 
3.2.3. The econometric methodology for behavioural equations  
This section is devoted to explaining the estimation method for behavioural equations. 
In particular, it explains the process of the bounds test for cointegration method adopted in 
this model. 
Most macroeconomic variables, for example GDP, consumption, export, and prices, 
are non-stationary time series, as they are trended. Terminologically, the non-stationary time-
series is said to be integrated. The order of integration is the minimum number of times the 
series needs to be differenced to make a stationary series. The problem of non-stationary, i.e. 
over I(1), which indicates integrated of order one, is that the standard Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression cannot be applied to estimate the non-stationary data, since the OLS 
estimation leads to the spurious regression problem: it is well-known that the    converge to 
functionals of Brownian motions, the t-ratios have a non-standard distribution, and the 
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Durbin-Watson statistic converges in probability to zero. Consequently, it certainly produces 
incorrect inferences
31
. Since then, testing and estimating the non-stationary time series has 
been one of the central issues in econometrics. As part of allowing for non-stationary data, the 
„cointegration‟ framework has been established and developed. If there may exist some linear 
combination in the level of two or more series individually integrated, then the series is said 
to be cointegrated, and the linear relationship in the level variables is interpreted as a long-run 
equilibrium.  
Several cointegration tests have been introduced: typically, Engle and Granger (1987) 
provides a residual based test, Hansen (1992) and Park‟s (1992) suggest an instability test and 
an added variables test respectively. In addition, fully efficient estimation methods have been 
invented:  while Fully Modified OLS (Phillips and Hansen 1990), Canonical Cointegrating 
Regression (Park 1992), and Dynamic OLS (Stock and Watson 1993) have been proposed to 
estimate a single equation cointegrating relationship, Johansen (1991, 1995) provides a 
system maximum likelihood approach for  multivariate cointegration. 
As a single cointegration approach, Pesaran et al. (2001) develop the bounds testing 
approach using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) framework. The bounds testing 
method has been widely used for analysing long-run relationships between non-stationary 
variables, as it has certain advantages over the other approaches. First, the bounds testing is 
valid regardless of whether the underlying variables are purely I(0), purely I(1), or fractionally 
integrated with each other. Second, under the ARDL framework, estimators are super-
consistent in small sample sizes.  Mah (2000) points out that the Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Johansen (1991, 1995) methods of cointegration are not robust for small sample sizes 
                                                 
31
 See Granger and Newbold (1974, 1977), Plosser and Schwert (1978), and Phillips (1986) for the details of the 
spurious regressions. 
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(Mah, 2000). Narayan (2005) also argues that bounds testing is far superior to the Johansen‟s 
multivariate cointegration method. Pesaran and Shin (1999) prove that the OLS estimators of 
the short-run parameters are consistent in the ARDL framework and estimators of the long-
run coefficients are super-consistent in small sample sizes. Third, unlike the Engle and 
Granger approach, the bounds test does not lead to an endogeneity problem. 
 The bounds testing procedure is as follows: Let          
    where    is a 
dependent variable and    is a vector of regressors. Note that the regressors are selected based 
on economic theories in order to give meaning to the estimated parameters on the variables in 
the equation. The first differenced variable     is modelled as an Unrestricted Error-
Correction Model (UECM) in order to test whether there exists at most one long-run 
equilibrium relationship between    and   , which is given by 
                                     ∑  
 
   
      ∑  
 
   
         
where   represents log-first-difference,      and     are long-run multipliers,    is a 
intercept coefficient and   is time trend,    and    are short-run dynamic coefficients on  the 
lagged values of     and current and lagged values of     respectively, and    is an error term. 
After the UECM equation above by the OLS, the existence of cointegration is tested by 
exclusion of the lagged level variables      and      in the equation above. That is, restrict 
all estimated coefficients of the lagged level variables by the null hypothesis    and 
alternative hypothesis    which are defined as: 
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The Wald test calculates an F-statistic in order to test these hypotheses in the above 
equation. Pesaran et al. (2001) provides asymptotic critical value bounds which consist of two 
sets: the lower bound when the regressors are I(0) and the upper bound when the regressors 
are I(1). If the computed F statistic is higher than the critical values of the upper bound, then 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected and it concludes that there exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables without any knowledge of the order of 
integration. On the other hand, if the F statistic is less than the critical values of the lower 
bound, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted. If, however, the F statistic 
falls between the critical values of the lower and the upper bound, then the relationship cannot 
be inferred conclusively. The critical value bounds are given in Table C1(v) in Pesaran et al. 
(2001) and in the footnote below
32
. 
As discussed earlier, a number of papers employ bounds testing when they have small 
sample sizes. In our case, fiscal and sector energy demands data are only available since 1990, 
which is subject to small sample problems when trying to find the long-run equilibrium 
relationship. Therefore, the bounds testing approach is adopted in order to estimate 
macroeconomic variables with non-stationary time series.  
After rejecting the null hypothesis, a behavioural equation is set up based on a partial 
adjustment model
33
 that includes a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory 
                                                 
32
      Table 3.2. The critical values  of lower and upper bound  
Significance 10% 5% 1% 
No. of variables FL FU FL FU FL FU 
2 4.19 5.06 4.87 5.85 6.34 7.52 
3 3.47 4.45 4.01 5.07 5.17 6.36 
4 3.03 4.06 3.47 4.57 4.40 5.72 
5 2.75 3.79 3.12 4.25 3.93 5.23 
          Source: Pesaran et al. (2001)      
 
33
 Fundamentally, choosing lag lengths of the model has the following process; the maximum of lags is set equal 
to 2, as Pesaran and Shin (1999) suggest for annual data. And then, we select lag order of the ARDL that 
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variables. The estimated parameters provide information on short-run and long-run elasticities, 
and the speed of adjustment from the short-run to long-run equilibrium. The partial 
adjustment specification is given by: 
                             ∑  
 
   
           
where the    is a constant. The    and     are coefficients of the lagged variable   and the set 
of explanatory variables,    respectively. Finally,    is an error term that is normally 
distributed with mean zero constant variance. If the equation cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
the equation is estimated in log first difference form after checking if the variable is stationary 
by the unit root test.   
It is important to note that having established the long-run equilibrium relationship by 
equation (3.38), the Error Correction Model (ECM) which models deviations from the long-
run relationships could be built up in this study, which is able to capture an agent‟s dynamic 
adjustment behaviour when a new policy is to be imposed. However, there is a trade-off 
between the ability to explain short-run dynamics and simulation performance. The errors 
caused from the coefficients on the short-run variables in the ECM equation pass through to 
all the other equations by the feedback mechanisms in the system model. Consequently, 
insignificant short-run coefficients in the ECM worsen the simulation results of the system 
model. For this reason, this study adopts the partial adjustment specification rather than the 
ECM model in order to obtain stability of the system model by isolating divergences of the 
simulated values of the differenced variables from their actual values. 
                                                                                                                                                        
minimises Schwarz criterion (SC) or Akaike Information criteria (AIC). Generally, the partial adjustment 
specification shows a minimum value of Schwarz criterion (SC) and Akaike Information criteria (AIC).  
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We report the estimation result of each equation in a table that consists of three parts, 
the first part, (a) describes estimated parameters on variables, standard error, t-value, and p-
value for testing significance of coefficient.  The second part (b) indicates the Bounds test for 
cointegration.         represents F-statistic of no-cointegration hypothesis, where Y is a 
dependent variable, and X are a vector of explanatory variables. If the F-statistic, denoted by 
       > the upper bound, FU, the null of no-cointegration can be rejected, IF        < the 
lower bound, FL, the null cannot be rejected, and thus no long-run relationship exists. If FL< 
       <FU, the inference in inconclusive. Diagnostic tests are described in the last part, (c). 
 ̅  represents adjusted R-squared,  ̂  and D.W. indicate standard error of regression and 
Durbin-Watson test statistic respectively.   is F statistic for overall significance of the model, 
where   and   are the number of variables and observation respectively. In addition, we 
implement four major diagnostic tests; the Ramsey Regressions Specification Error Test 
(RESET) for general misspecification (Ramsey, 1969), the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation in residuals (Breusch, 1978; and Godfrey, 1978), the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity in residuals (Breush and Pagan, 1979), and Jarque-Berra test for normality 
of residuals in order to guarantee robustness of the OLS estimators (Jarque and Berra, 1990). 
Notations for the diagnostic tests are summarised in Table 3.3. 
  Table 3.3. Lists of diagnostic tests  
Notation Definition Null hypothesis 
       F statistic of Ramsey RESET  Correct specification 
      F statistic of the Breusch-Godfrey test  No serial correlation in residuals 
        F statistic of the Breusch-Pagan test   No heteroskedasticity in residuals 
     
     statistic of Jarque-Berra test  Normality of residuals  
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3.3. MODEL FORMULATION 
3.3.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
The integrated model consists of three modules; macroeconomic, electricity market, 
and integration modules.  The macroeconomic module represents a national economy by 
adopting a top-down approach: the macro-econometric model described here. The electricity 
market module models the power generation sector based on a bottom-up approach: the MCP 
model built in chapter two. The macroeconomic and electricity market modules are combined 
by the integration module. Figure 3.1 shows the basic structure of the integrated model and 
depicts how variables in the modules interact with each other.  
The macro-econometric model uses annual data rather than quarterly in order to 
analyse medium-term impacts of carbon tax policies and link efficiently to the electricity 
module which uses an annual load duration curve (LDC). 
The macro-econometric model consists of seven blocks: supply side, demand side, 
prices and wage, fiscal and monetary, finance, foreign trade, and energy and environment 
blocks. The total number of equations is 148 in which 57 behavioural equations and 91 
identities exist. In terms of variables, there are 148 endogenous variables and 58 exogenous 
variables.  
Potential GDP, investment, labour demand, the rate of operation, and the 
unemployment rate are dealt with in the supply block. The potential GDP, estimated by a two 
input Cobb-Douglas production function in which natural labour and capital are employed as 
input factors and energy is also included indirectly, serves as a supply side factor affecting 
inflation. This acts to complement the way in which traditional Keynesian macroeconomic 
models are demand-driven. Investment and labour demand are estimated using the first order 
conditions (F.O.C.) of profit maximisation for the Cobb-Douglas function.  
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   Figure 3.1. The structure of the integrated model 
   Note: italic letters denote exogenous variables.  
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The demand side block determines private consumption and government‟s final 
consumption expenditure. The private consumption function is built up based on Keynes‟ 
absolute income hypothesis. The reasons for this choice, and other modelling decisions, are 
discussed below. The government‟s consumption function is derived from the government 
budget constraint. 
The price and wage block estimates producer prices, consumer prices, wage, export 
and import prices. The producer price is estimated by the imported raw materials‟ price index 
and the energy price index. The consumer export price is mainly determined by the producer 
price, the GDP gap defined as the log difference between actual GDP and potential GDP in 
this model, and the energy price index facing households. The export price measured in 
dollars is a function of the producer price, and the import price measured in dollars is a 
function of the exchange rate and foreign prices treated as an exogenous variable.  
The fiscal and monetary block covers tax revenue and money supply. The tax revenue 
is a function of GDP, which decides the disposal income and government consumption. The 
money supply, modelled based on liquidity preference theory, affects the yield of corporate 
bonds in this model. 
The finance block deals with the yield of corporate bonds and the exchange rate which 
play an important role in determining investment and foreign trade respectively. An official 
interest rate decided from the central bank is a main explanatory variable for the yield of 
corporate bonds function. The exchange rate is determined by the difference between the 
foreign and domestic interest rates. 
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Export supply and import demand are determined in the foreign trade block. Based on 
the elasticity approach, exports and imports are estimated using relative prices and economic 
activity variables. 
The energy and environment block estimates the demands and prices of energy, 
measures CO2 emissions, and implements a carbon price. Energy demands are divided into 
final energy demand of industry, transport, commerce and the public sector, and households, 
the “other” energy demands, and energy input needs of energy transformation sectors such as 
the city-gas and heat sectors. Using identities and IPCC (1996)‟s carbon emission factors, the 
block calculates CO2 emissions from energy use and models a carbon pricing policy.  
The electricity market module models the power generation sector explicitly using the 
MCP framework. The electricity demand estimated in the macroeconomic module is 
transfomed into load duration cruves. Electricity supply and input sources are calcuated in the 
electricity market module. 
The integration module links the macoeconomic module and the electricity market 
module by the soft-link method. Electricity demand and input energy prices from the 
macroeconomic module are fed into the electricity market module. In turn, the quantity of 
input energy and the total cost of power generation computed in the electricity market module 
is transmitted to the macroeconomic module. These iteration is repeated until the convergence 
criteria on the electricity demand is reached. 
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3.3.2. Macroeconomic module  
It important to note that building up a macro-econometric model is, to a large extent, 
determined by the data. The reason is well summarised in Harrison et al.‟s description of the 
Bank of England Quarterly Model (2005); 
“Models with a high degree of theoretical coherence are helpful for analysing 
economic issues but are unlikely to match the data as well as purely statistical models 
that have been designed to maximise coherence with the data. Such theoretical models 
might have many parameters but these would be chosen purely on the basis of 
statistical ﬁt and would be hard to relate to the underlying economics of how agents 
and markets behave. So macroeconomic modellers face an inherent trade-off, even 
among „state of the art‟ models, between achieving theoretical consistency and 
coherence with the data” (Harrison et al. (2005), page 21) 
Besides, a practical way for modelling is suggested as follows; 
“One approach to matching movements in the data, commonly used for 
macroeconomic models, is to treat the theory as a guide to the economic variables 
that appear in econometric regressions” (ibid, page 13) 
Therefore, the model specification was selected for the final equation in which 
estimated parameters do not violate the standard decision theories among possible behavioural 
functions in this thesis. We also consider goodness of fit and its stability for simulation. All 
equations in this model are derived carefully based on existing literature and available data 
before the empirical tests. 
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This model of this chapter refers to the Bank of Korea‟s quarterly macro-econometric 
model, BOK04 (Hwang et al. 2004) which is designed for forecasting economy and policy 
analysis, including the effects of the change in foreign economies on Korea, a typical small 
open economy. As for equations in the fiscal and monetary, finance, and foreign trade blocks 
and data selection, taking into account the current System of National Accounts (SNA) in 
Korea published in Bank of Korea which serve as a main source of data for existing macro-
econometric models. 
This model also refers to Hervé et al.‟s OECD model (2010) in order to cover a 
limitation of a traditional macro-econometric model. They provide a model which is able to 
make up for a demand-driven structure regarded as the weak point of  macro-econometric 
models by combining short-term Keynesian-type dynamics with a consistent neo-classical 
supply-side in the long run. For example, nominal rigidities in wage- and price-setting serve 
to slow the processes of adjustment to external events. A representative firm is assumed to 
have a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, with the demand for 
labour and capital derived from the first-order condition for profit maximisation. Therefore, 
the output is, by and large, demand-driven in the short term, but supply driven in the long run. 
In this model, demand side expenditure variables such as private consumption, 
government‟s final consumption expenditure, investment, export and import determine output 
in the short-term by the GDP identity from the expenditure side. The potential output and 
input factors; capital and labour are determined by the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The prices and wages are designed to have rigidities; adjust slowly to reduce the gap between 
actual and potential output in both product and labour markets. Consequently, output is 
mainly demand-driven in the short run, but supply-driven in the longer run.  
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In addition to this fundamental structure, agents‟ inter-fuel substitution behaviors are 
modeled in the energy block. Aggregated energy price indices determined by energy mix 
serve to have impact on both supply and demand sides. The following sub-section describes 
the structure and estimation results of the major behavioural equations. All behavioural 
equations, identities, and data sources are described in Appendix 3.  
Note that dummy variables are used in the behaviour equations. A main role of a 
dummy variable is to account for data outliers. The dummy variables were primarily used for 
the outliers incurred by the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and global financial crisis in 
2007~08. However, it is natural in some cases to have outliers incurred from suspicious 
measurement errors, incidents, and unknown policy actions. In these cases, dummies are used 
if this improves the statistics of diagnostics and does not change the value of the coefficient 
significantly. Additionally, given the purpose of all macro-econometric models constructed 
for forecasting and policy evaluation, dummies are retained if they improve the system 
model‟s stability for simulation performance by reducing the divergence of the simulated 
values from actual values which makes the model unable to capture the larger picture, the 
overall dynamic structure of the model.  
 
3.3.2.1. The supply side block 
The supply block determines potential GDP, investment, labour demand, and the rate 
of operation by estimated behaviours equations. The other variables such as gross fixed 
capital accumulation and the unemployment rate are calculated by a bridge and an identity 
equation respectively. A Cobb-Douglas production function with labour and capital inputs is 
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employed to derive investment and labour demand and estimate the potential GDP in this 
block. 
 
3.3.2.1.(a) Investment and labour  
Firstly, the long-run relationship between capital, output and the user cost of capital is 
derived from the first order condition (F.O.C.), which is that the value of the marginal product 
of capital is equal to the price of capital, with respect to capital from a profit-maximising firm.   
                                        
where    denotes the capital stock,    GDP,   the output elasticity of capital,    the real 
capital cost.  According to Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the real capital cost can be defined as: 
           
    
          
where   
  corresponds to the price of capital goods,    the real interest rate, and    the 
depreciation rate. 
The investment variable is not observed yet, so that an additional specification for the 
relationship between capital and investment is imposed using the capital accumulation 
identity, which is as follows:  
                         
where    denotes the capital stock and    investment expenditure. Taking natural logarithms 
in the capital accumulation identity implies in the steady state, 
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where   corresponds to the rate of depreciation,    the growth rate of capital. Substituting 
equation (3.42) into (3.41) yields the desired level of investment in the long-run, which is as 
follows: 
              
                          
   
As we assumed earlier, firms might not adjust the actual investment completely to 
obtain the desired level in any given period. Thus, the adjustment process can be expressed as: 
                             
           
where   is the adjustment coefficient. Rearranging the two equations for investment yields the 
following equation
34
: 
                                                               
   
Note that the capital cost includes the real interest rate in equation (3.44), thus the 
investment is a function of the real interest rate. 
In the same manner as with the investment decision, modelling labour employment 
adopts a partial adjustment mechanism based on two assumptions: the actual increase in 
labour employment is related to the discrepancy between the desired level and the previous 
labour employment. Second, the firm chooses the desired level of labour inputs so as to 
maximize its profits. Thus, the desired level of labour employment is derived from the first 
order condition (F.O.C.) for profit maximization, which is given by: 
               
               
  
  
            
                                                 
34
        and           can be reduced, as they are assumed to be constant, which does not affect the 
estimation of equation xx. 
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where    represents the desired level of the labour employment,   and 
 
  
 indicate the GDP 
and real wage respectively. As we assumed earlier, employers might not adjust the actual 
employment completely to obtain the desired level in any given period. Thus, the adjustment 
process can be expressed as: 
                                
           
where   is the adjustment coefficient. Rearranging the two equations for   yields the labour 
employment equation as follows
35
: 
                                (           
  
  
 )                   
   
Table 3.4 provides the comparison of estimation results for the investment equation 
(3.45) and labour equation (3.48) correspondingly. The calculated F statistics for the ARDL 
bounds testing, which are higher than the upper bound critical value at 10% level, indicate 
that a long term equilibrium relationship exists between dependent and explanatory variables 
in both equations (3.45) and (3.48).  
The coefficients on the lagged and desired level of investment are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign. The coefficient of the independent variables can be 
interpreted as the value of elasticity in the short-run. The coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is regarded as the speed of adjustment from the short-rum equilibrium to the long-run 
equilibrium. The lagged variable of the investment and labour equation shows that around 48% 
and 15% of the adjustment to the long-run desired level take place in each year respectively.  
                                                 
35
 The output elasticity,          can be reduced, as it is a constant which does not affect the estimation of 
equation (3.45). 
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The results show that investment is more responsive to the output and cost than labour 
in the short-run; the F.O.C. short-run elasticity of investment and labour are 1.251 and 0.086 
respectively.  While the F.O.C long-run elasticity
36
 of investment, 2.156, is higher than unity 
in the specification of Cobb-Douglas function, the labour elasticity, 1.037, is found to be 
consistent with the Cobb-Douglas function. These results are verified by a set of diagnostic 
tests indicated in Table 3.4; no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term, and 
no problem with normality of the error term and functional formation. 
     Table 3.4. Estimation of investment and labour equations 
Parameter Investment (sample: 1987~2011) Labour (sample: 1970~2011) 
   (Constant)  
-18.026
**
 
 (0.04) 
-0.756 
(0.045) 
   (Lagged variable) 
  0.420
*** 
 (0.001) 
 0.915
*** 
(0.000) 
   (F.O.C.) 
  1.251
*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.086
***
 
(0.008) 
Bounds test  5.545
*
 5.493
*
 
Diagnostic tests   
 ̅  0.977 0.998 
     1.604 2.241 
      0.859 (0.367) 0.405 (0.528) 
     
  0.633 (0.729) 0.733 (0.693) 
       1.614 (0.125) 1.254 (0.270) 
        2.232 (0.104) 0.885 (0.483) 
      Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
             The investment estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 1988, and 1990 
             The labour estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 1984, and 1998 
             AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the investment model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
3.3.2.1.(b) Potential GDP 
This model employs a production function approach for the potential GDP estimation. 
The production function approach requires estimating a production function. We adopt the 
                                                 
36
 The long elasticity can be computed by dividing the short-run elasticity by one minus the coefficient of one 
lagged dependent variable. 
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Cobb-Douglas function with two input factors; natural labour and capital and under the 
assumption of Hicks neutral technological progress. Note that we do not include an energy 
variable, since the preliminary estimation result of the Cobb-Douglas with energy input yields 
an insignificant and negative elasticity coefficient, which is caused by the simplicity of 
substitution elasticity assumed in the Cobb-Douglas function. Therefore, the model adopts an 
alternative approach based on the Bank Of Korea‟s macro-econometric model (Hwang et al. 
2004) in which the potential GDP is indirectly determined by the energy variable by means of 
the rate of operation which is set up as a function of energy prices. This is more reasonable 
given the purpose of this study which gives priority to analyse impacts of increases in energy 
prices rather than energy supply disturbances. The Cobb-Douglas function is given by: 
               
    
         
  
where   denotes GDP,    capital stock,   labour, and   total factor productivity     the rate 
of technology progress. The parameters       and   are the output elasticity of labour and 
capital respectively. The parameter   is the rate of operation. Given the assumption of 
constant returns to scale (CRTS), the production function is normalised by the labour factor to 
satisfy CRTS, and then taking natural logarithm on both sides of equation (3.49) yields: 
            
  
  
                 
    
  
  
The process for calculating the potential GDP is as follows; firstly estimate equation 
(3.50). And then substitute natural labour inputs;    and    into the corresponding input 
factor in the estimated parameters   ̂  ̂  ̂  in the production function. The natural labour and 
capital inputs are as follows: 
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where   
  is the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) and       is 
economically active population.   
  is the natural rate of operation
37
.  
Table 3.5 describes the estimation result for equation (3.50). All of the coefficients on 
variables have the expected sign. The rate of technological progress is found to equal 0.014, 
and the output elasticity of capital 0.306. As seen in the cointegration, a long-run relationship 
between the variables exists. The equation passes a set of diagnostic tests. 
    Table 3.5. Estimation of the Cobb-Douglas function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :  log        Sample : 1980 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant 11.416 0.944 12.092 0.139 
     0.014*** 0.005 3.125 0.005 
               0.306
***
 0.005 5.879 0.000 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
          The estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 1997~1999 
          AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
 
(b) Cointegration test :              = 15.364
***
 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999      = 1.823 
 ̂ = 0.012          = 812.291 (0.000)  
      = 0.021 (0.886)      
  =  0.218 (0.897) 
      = 1.174 (0.290)        =  0.932 (0.477)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Based on “Putty-Clay” hypothesis  
 
   is derived as:    
  [     
         ]  
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3.3.2.1.(c) The rate of operation 
The rate of operation is assumed to be a function of the lagged dependent variable, the 
gap between the actual and the natural rate of unemployment  
 
  
 , GDP, and the industrial 
energy price index    
  . The rate of operation function is given by: 
                                       
  
  
                       
      
The estimation result is described in Table 3.6. The F statistics for the ARDL bounds 
testing shows that it is higher than the upper bound critical value at 1% level, which implies 
that a long term equilibrium relationship exists between dependent and explanatory variables 
in equations (3.45). All the coefficients on variables have the expected sign; the 
unemployment and energy price have a negative impact and GDP has a positive impact on the 
rate of operation, which are all statistically significant.  
Table 3.6. Estimation of the rate of operation  
(a) Regression model (sample: 1989~2011)  
      Dependent Variable :                                                      Sample : 1989 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant 2.072 1.237 1.675 0.116 
            -0.503
***
 0.091 -5.533 0.000 
         
      -0.118*** 0.016 -7.535 0.000 
           0.165
***
 0.045 3.675 0.003 
        
   -0.090** 0.033 -2.702 0.017 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
           The estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 2004~2011 
(b) Cointegration test :       
 
  
     
   = 10.059*** 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.897      = 2.421 
 ̂ = 0.002          = 27.216 (0.000)  
      =  1.359 (0.264)      
  = 3.389 (0.184) 
      =  2.467 (0.140)        = 0.400 (0.887)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
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3.3.2.2. The demand side block 
The demand side block covers private consumption and government‟s final 
consumption expenditure. This block determines GDP by the GDP expenditure identity 
condition given inventory levels treated exogenously, and exports and imports which are 
estimated in the foreign trade block
38
. The private and government consumption are based on 
the Keynes‟ absolute income hypothesis and the government budget constraint models 
respectively. 
 
3.3.2.2.(a) Private consumption 
The private consumption function in this model is fundamentally based on Keynes‟ 
absolute income hypothesis (1967) in which the real consumption is a function of the real 
disposable income. The linear function of the consumption in the absolute income hypothesis 
provides three principles:  first, the marginal propensity to consume has a value between zero 
and one. Second, the average propensity to consume decreases as income increases. Last, 
current income determines consumption, since the interest rate is regarded as an ineffective 
variable.  
 While the Keynesian consumption function has been proven to work successfully in 
the short term periods, empirical estimation of the long term periods contradicted the second 
principle of the absolute hypothesis by showing that the average propensity to consume is 
constant over long periods of time (Kuznets, 1942). In other words, the result shows the 
conflict between the consumer‟s behaviour in the short run and the long run, which is called 
                                                 
38
 The use of chained indices in the national account has a non additivity problem, as weights are changed over 
time. This study uses an error term,    defined as the difference between real GDP and the sum of GDP 
expenditure components such as                    for calculating the real GDP. 
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the Kuznets paradox. This empirical result of long time-series has facilitated the development 
of alternative consumption functions.  
Two prominent alternative hypotheses have been proposed in the 1950s. The life-cycle 
hypothesis proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1968) emphasize consumption smoothing 
by supplementing the current income regarded as the unique determinant of consumption in 
the Keynesian consumption function with the present value of lifetime earnings which is 
called wealth. The permanent income hypothesis as proposed by Friedman (1957) also 
explains a constant ratio of consumption to income in the long term by suggesting that 
consumption is mainly determined by permanent income.  
Both models are based on Irving Fisher‟s intertemporal optimization approach (1930) 
in which the forward-looking consumers make decisions on their current income and expected 
income in the future. These theories provide the modern macroeconomist with a foundation. 
The intertemporal utility maximization method has been applied to dynamic mathematical 
methods, which is called the Euler equation approach, in the modern consumption theories 
and the models have been extended to deal with uncertainty and expectations.  
Although it is desirable to include the wealth variable in the consumption function in 
view of the importance of wealth pointed out in the literature, this model does not include the 
wealth variable in the behavioural equation of private consumption for the sake of simplicity 
and unavailable data in this version. Modelling wealth is relatively difficult, since few 
economic theories explaining the relationship between wealth and other economic variables 
exist. In addition, creating the wealth series requires modelling the prices of real estate and 
financial assets variables and the quantity of them consumers hold. Such stock price indices 
have considerable volatility. Several papers simply use a stock price index as a proxy for 
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wealth. However, the error from endogenously modelling such a volatile index would worsen 
the results of the simulation. If the wealth variable is treated exogenously, it requires an 
additional assumption for simulation. Besides, the current System of National Accounts (SNA) 
published in Bank of Korea does not provide the „wealth‟ data and so official data is not 
available.  
For those reasons, we stick to the fundamental consumption function, „absolute 
income‟ hypothesis which is defined as a function of real disposable income and price of the 
category in this model. The consumption function is given by: 
                                           
                  
where    is the real consumption. The lagged real consumption expenditure,       is 
included to measure the habit persistence which indicates the effect of the previous period‟s 
consumption on the current consumption as Brown (1952) suggested.    is the consumer 
price index.    represents the real disposal income.  
Table 3.7. Estimation of the private consumption function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1970 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -0.233 0.547 -0.427 0.672 
                0.654
***
 0.070 9.290 0.000 
              0.358
***
 0.067 5.300 0.000 
      
      -0.051*** 0.017 -3.007 0.005 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
           The estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 1998 and 2001~2011. 
(b) Cointegration test :              
   = 8.155*** 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999      = 1.487 
 ̂ = 0.018          = 13193.10 (0.000)  
      = 2.035 (0.163)      
  = 1.593 (0.451) 
      = 0.043 (0.837)        = 0.934 (0.471)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
- 107 - 
The result of a log-linear form for estimation is described in Table 3.7. We confirm 
that there is a long-run relationship between consumption and disposable income and 
consumer price index by the ARDL bounds testing; the calculated F statistic is higher than the 
upper bound critical value at 5% significance level. All of the coefficients on variables are 
significant and have the expected sign; the coefficient of disposable income is positive and the 
coefficient of consumer price index is negative. The lagged variable indicates that around 35% 
of the adjustment process to the desirable level in long-run takes place in the first year. The 
result shows that the short-run and long-run elasticity of disposable income are 0.358 and 
1.032 respectively, meaning that a 1% increase in disposable income raises consumption by 
approximately 0.36% and 1% in the short term and long term respectively. The short-run and 
long-run own-price elasticity are -0.051 and -0.146 correspondingly. The marginal propensity 
to consume (MPC) is 0.250 in the short-run and 0.721 in the long-run
39
.   
 
 3.3.2.2.(b) Government consumption 
The government consumption on goods and service belongs to this component of GDP. 
The consumption is chosen by the fiscal policy that determines taxes and spending.  
Normally, fiscal and government spending areas in macro-econometrics models 
generally build up a fiscal reaction function based on the government budget constraint 
condition as mentioned earlier. It is desirable in that the government is assumed to retain a 
specific robust fiscal rule, which is regarded as best practice, in order to examine unexpected 
shocks of the fiscal policy (and monetary policies) on agents‟ behaviour; this should be 
modelled based on micro-foundations such as preferences and resource constraints rather than 
                                                 
39
 We calculate the MPC by multiplying the income elasticity by the average ratio of consumption to disposable 
income for the period 1970~2011. 
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simple parameters estimated entirely on the basis of relationships observed in historical data 
to represent the agent‟s prediction for the change in policy (Lucas, 1976).  
When it comes to modelling the government consumption in the system model, it is 
often modelled by an exogenous variable of government expenditure to analyse the ripple 
effect of fiscal policy on the economy. However, the disadvantage of the external fiscal policy 
approach for simulation is that it requires an additional assumption for the fiscal policy 
decision when the policy experiment is conducted in the model. An arbitrary assumption for 
the government spending could underrate or exaggerate the effect of the policy experiment on 
output in the simulation analysis. Therefore, we build up a behavioural equation for 
government consumption that is able to respond to external conditions properly.  
The model follows the assumption from Harrison et al.‟s BEQM model (2005) for the 
government consumption function; the government has targets for spending, so that it would 
not generally follow a balanced budget each period. Moreover, spending is allowed to vary 
temporarily from target levels following a shock. The target level is defined as the 
relationship between spending and tax revenues in this model. The model specification refers 
to the Government Budget Constraint by Barro (1974) and Sargent and Wallace (1981)
 40
.  
The equation is built up in order to evaluate the effect of the change in tax revenues on the 
government consumption based on these theoretical relationships. 
According to the government budget constraint (GBC), the government consumption 
is equal to the total tax revenue at a point in time and across time. We check the long-run 
relationship between the government final consumption expenditure (  ) and real tax revenue 
                                                 
40
 The intertemporal equation of the GBC was firstly applied by Barro (1974). The modern application of the 
GBC has been developed from Sargent and Wallace (1981). Overall, the intertemporal GBC contributes to the 
development of theoretical works in monetary and fiscal policy studies.   
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(
   
  
) by the cointegration test, and then the government consumption expenditure is modelled 
as follows:  
                                          
    
  
      
     Table 3.8. Estimation of the government consumption function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1971 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant 1.522
*** 
0.473 3.219 0.001 
           0.891
*** 
0.041 21.334 0.000 
           
       0.063** 0.027 2.430 0.025 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          The estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 1990 
 
(b) Cointegration test :             
   = 5.444** 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999      = 1.610 
 ̂ = 0.017          = 18005.75 (0.000)  
      = 1.516 (0.226)      
  = 1.306 (0.757) 
      = 2.597 (0.116)        = 1.119 (0.354)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
Table 3.8 summarises the estimation result of government consumption. We found a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between government consumption and the tax revenue, 
meaning that the government‟s plan for consumption has not been made in isolation from the 
tax revenue. The coefficient on the lagged government consumption variable has a high value 
which is close to one, implying that the government‟s consumption is subject to substantial 
inertia meaning the adjustment process to the long run equilibrium relationship is slow. The 
short-run and long-run elasticity of real tax revenue are 0.063 and 0.578, which means that the 
government gradually increases consumption as the tax revenue rises for the long-run.  
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3.3.2.3. Prices and Wage block 
The prices and wage block consists of consumer prices, producer prices, GDP deflator, 
export and import prices, and the wage. The model reflects demand-pull and cost-push 
inflation by estimating the consumer price using demand and cost factors. In view of the 
impact of international commodity price shocks, imported raw material price index and 
energy price index for industry are included as explanatory variables for the producer price. 
The wage estimated by the labour productivity and unemployment rate is also included to 
capture the impact the unit cost of labour on the producer price. The export and import prices 
are mainly determined by the producer price adjusted by the exchange rate and foreign prices 
respectively. The GDP deflator measuring the general price level is modelled as a bridge 
equation using the consumer and capital prices. 
 
3.3.2.3.(a) Consumer prices 
The consumer price      is mainly determined by demand and cost factors. Namely, 
excess demand or supply caused from the gap between actual GDP and potential GDP  
 
  
  is 
regarded as the demand factor, and the producer price     and the household energy price 
index    
 ) are considered as the cost factors. The consumer price function is as follows: 
               
                 
          
  
   
           
              
     41 
where the household energy price,   
  is a quantity-weighted index generated by adding the 
prices of individual final energy multiplied by the value of quantity share in the index.  
                                                 
41
 Note that import prices fed in through the producer price indirectly affect the consumer price. The model 
specification was chosen to avoid the phenomena of multicollinearity   
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Table 3.9 presents estimated parameters, cointegration and diagnostic tests. There 
exists a long run equilibrium relationship between these variables. The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable indicates that the rate of adjustment is about 43% in the first year. 
The output gap and cost factors affect the consumer price positively. The producer prices have 
the largest elasticity, followed by the aggregate energy prices of households and the output 
gap. 
     Table 3.9. Estimation of the consumer price function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
   Sample : 1990 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -0.600
**
 0.243 -2.472 0.024 
        
     0.572*** 0.080 7.112 0.000 
             0.121
*
 0.052 2.341 0.032 
      
    0.244** 0.101 2.418 0.027 
        
     0.206*** 0.068 3.023 0.008 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
 
(b) Cointegration test :      
  
 
  
      
   = 4.437* 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999        = 1.470 
 ̂ = 0.001           = 3810.530 (0.000)  
       = 1.637 (0.219)      
   = 3.702 (0.157) 
       = 0.322 (0.578)         = 1.509 (0.244)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.3.(b) Producer prices 
We assume that a firm adds a constant percentage to the full cost of a good in 
imperfect competition. Then, the desired level of the firm‟s price, based on mark-up pricing, 
can be written as 
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                    ∑    
 
     
where   
   is the desired level of price,    is the cost of intermediate goods,  is the wage.   , 
  are weighting coefficients with respect to the intermediate goods and wage respectively.  
is the mark-up rate. Based on the mark-up pricing, the producer price function is assumed to 
be: 
            
                 
             
               
  
     
           
      
where    is the producer price,   
  is the industry energy price representing energy input 
costs derived from a quantity weighted method as the households, and 
 
   
 is the unit cost of 
labour. In addition, taking into account the effect of international raw material prices on the 
export-centered Korean economy, the raw material index      with exchange rate     is 
included as an explanatory variable in the producer price function. 
The estimation result for producer prices is presented in Table 3.10. The small and 
insignificant adjustment coefficient explains that the dynamic response of the produce prices 
in reaching long-run equilibrium level is almost instantaneous, which is in contrast to the 
consumer prices. These results are conceivable given the historical movement of the producer 
and consumer prices. Costs factors such as energy prices, raw material prices with the 
exchange rate, and the unit cost of labour have positive impacts on producer prices, with the 
largest elasticity being for the unit cost of labour. The smallest elasticity, 0.034 is found in 
imported raw material prices adjusted by the exchange rate, which is relatively much lower 
than the other factors in the short-run.  
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     Table 3.10. Estimation of the producer price function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
   Sample : 1990 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant    1.869
***
 0.506 3.693 0.002 
        
   0.104 0.162 0.644 0.529 
       
          0.034
**
 0.016 2.159 0.048 
                   0.202
***
 0.055 3.672 0.002 
        
      0.183*** 0.049 3.702 0.002 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 1999 and 2011. 
 
(b) Cointegration test :      
               
            = 10.766***  
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.996      = 2.118 
 ̂ = 0.003          = 592.345 (0.000)  
      = 0.169 (0.687)      
  = 0.136 (0.935) 
      = 0.150 (0.705)        = 1.302 (0.315)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.3.(c) Export and Import prices 
The export price measured in dollars is predominantly determined by the domestic 
producer price and exchange rate. It reflects that exporting firms set the export prices based 
on the corresponding domestic producer prices adjusted for the exchange rate. The import 
price is influenced by the foreign price of products. The export and import price functions are 
given by: 
               
                  
             
                  
               
             (    
  )            
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where     is the export price,    is the producer price, and    is the exchange rate. The 
import price,     is set as a function of the main imported goods‟ prices, oil         and raw 
materials       . 
Table 3.11. Estimation of the export price function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
    Sample : 1972 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant  2.612
***
 0.409  6.382 0.000 
        
     0.773*** 0.050  15.415 0.000 
      
    0.222*** 0.045  4.907 0.000 
         -0.369
***
 0.066 -5.606 0.000 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 2009 
 
(b) Cointegration test :       
          = 6.513** 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.962      = 1.613 
 ̂ = 0.086          = 68.240 (0.000)  
      = 1.005 (0.323)      
   = 0.671 (0.715) 
      = 0.412 (0.525)         = 0.399 (0.808)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
As seen in Table 3.11, the export prices equation has the expected sign for all 
coefficients. As the export price measured in dollars stems from the producer price along with 
the exchange rate, the export price is positively related to the export price and negatively 
correlated to the exchange rate. It appears that the export price is more sensitive to the 
exchange rate than producer prices in the international trade market. The adjustment rate is 
relatively slow; approximately 23% of the adjustment between the short and long run takes 
place in the first year.  
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Table 3.12 provides the estimation results for import prices. Major commodity prices 
affect the import price positively. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable shows a 
more rapid rate of adjustment, about 61%, than the export price one. 
     Table 3.12. Estimation of the import price function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
    Sample : 1980 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant  1.300
***
 0.343  3.792 0.000 
        
     0.412*** 0.108  3.814 0.000 
       
      0.041* 0.022  1.876 0.072 
       
     0.274*** 0.055  6.752 0.000 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 2009 
 
(b) Cointegration test :       
                  = 4.704* 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.961      = 1.668 
 ̂ = 0.042         = 192.689 (0.000)  
             = 0.696 (0.412)      
     = 0.894 (0.639) 
             = 0.098 (0.757)               = 1.446 (0.246)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.3.(d) Wages 
This model adopts the real wage index which is the average nominal wage deflated by 
the consumer price index denoted by 
 
   
. The explanatory variables are labour productivity 
which is measured by the GDP divided by the labour supply, i.e. 
 
 
 and the gap between the 
actual and the natural rate of unemployment, denoted by 
 
  
 which represents the gap between 
the labour demand and supply in the labour market. The real wage function can be written as: 
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The real wage is expected to be positively related to labour productivity, since higher 
output per worker leads to an increase in labour compensation unless the labour supply curve 
is perfectly elastic. Several empirical studies (Lavi and Sussman, 2001; Strauss and Wohar, 
2004; Kumar et al., 2009) support a long-term co-integrating relationship between the real 
wage and labour productivity. On the other hand, the gap between the actual and the natural 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU), (
 
  
) is expected to negatively affect the real wage, because 
an increasing gap (high unemployment) between labour demand and supply decreases the 
equilibrium real wage. The unemployment rate is also interpreted as a sign of bargaining 
power (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). High unemployment above the NAIRU reduces 
workers‟ bargaining power, therefore forcing lower real wages.  
      Table 3.13. Estimation of the wage function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           
   Sample : 1971 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -2.182
**
 0.900 -2.426 0.020 
             
     0.748*** 0.069 10.863 0.000 
             0.270
***
 0.090 2.982 0.005 
         
     -0.140*** 0.027 -5.274 0.000 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 1999 
 
(b) Cointegration test :          
        
 
  
  = 4.874* 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.997      = 1.559 
 ̂ = 0.053          = 3839.151 (0.000)  
      = 1.584 (0.217)      
  = 1.387 (0.500) 
      = 1.817 (0.757)        = 1.460 (0.235)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
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The estimation results for wages are provided in Table 3.13. The model yields 
significant coefficients on variables and expected signs. The adjustment process is relatively 
slow; approximately 25% takes place in the first year. The wage is positively related to labour 
productivity. We also found an inverse relationship between the real wage and the gap 
between the actual and natural unemployment rates.  
 
3.3.2.3.(e) Capital goods prices 
The price of capital goods which determines investment is modelled as a function of 
the lagged dependent variable, imported metal prices, and the exchange rate, which is as 
follows: 
               
            (    
 )            
                   
      Table 3.14. Estimation of the capital good price function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
   Sample : 1990 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -0.174 0.215 -0.809 0.429 
        
       0.754*** 0.056 13.490 0.000 
       
        0.075*** 0.021 3.629 0.002 
            0.140
**
 0.051 2.763 0.013 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
 
(b) Cointegration test :      
             = 5.882** 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.992        = 1.687 
 ̂ = 0.008           = 922.329 (0.000)  
       = 0.381 (0.545)      
   = 0.294 (0.863) 
       = 0.226 (0.641)         = 0.441 (0.726)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
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The estimation result is given in Table 3.14. Overall, the capital goods‟ price model 
fits the data well and passes a set of diagnostic tests, which indicates that the price of capital 
goods are strongly related to the imported raw material prices and the exchange rate. 
 
3.3.2.3.(f) GDP deflator 
The GDP deflator measures the general price level in the economy. The nominal fiscal 
and monetary variables are often converted into real variables by utilising the GDP deflator. 
We estimate the GDP deflator by the consumer price      and the price of capital goods     . 
The function for the GDP deflator      is as follows: 
               
                 
            
            
      
     Table 3.15. Estimation of the GDP deflator function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :        
   Sample : 1970 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant    0.820
**
 0.381 2.154 0.038 
        
   0.153 0.094 1.630 0.112 
      
       0.477*** 0.118 4.047 0.000 
      
     0.196** 0.080 2.440 0.020 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes a dummy variable equal to unity for the period 1978 
          AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
(b) Cointegration test :      
         = 4.486* 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999        = 1.459 
 ̂ = 0.008           = 24856.080 (0.000)  
       = 2.595 (0.117)      
   = 0.123 (0.940) 
       = 1.128 (0.296)         = 0.730 (0.578)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
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As seen in Table 3.15, the combination of consumer prices and capital goods price 
provides a robust estimation result
42
 and it captures the GDP deflator‟s movement very well.  
 
3.3.2.4. Fiscal and Monetary policy block 
The fiscal and monetary policy block determines tax revenue and money supply. The 
tax which is a main source of the government‟s spending has an impact on disposable income. 
The central bank controls liquidity through determining money supply and an official interest 
rate which are a function of the yield of corporate bonds.  
 
3.3.2.4.(a) Tax revenue 
The aggregated nominal tax revenue which determines the disposable income is 
assumed to be a function of the lagged dependent variable and nominal GDP (YP), which is as 
follows: 
                                                    
The estimation result is described in Table 3.16. As seen in the calculated F statistics, 
each tax has a long-run equilibrium relationship with the determinant variables which are 
found to be positively related to the taxes. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
shows a rapid rate of adjustment, around 77%, and the coefficient of the nominal GDP 
indicates an elasticity of the nominal GDP of 0.799. 
 
                                                 
42
 The combination with other consumer prices, such as producer prices often created a multicollinearity problem. 
- 120 - 
     Table 3.16. Estimation of the tax function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :            Sample : 1970 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant   -2.332
**
 0.996 -2.343 0.025 
            0.232 0.142 1.631 0.112 
           0.799
**
 0.162 4.930 0.000 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
(b) Cointegration test :              = 6.873
**
 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999        = 1.759 
 ̂   = 0.036           = 18226.39 (0.000)  
       = 1.339 (0.256)      
   = 0.989 (0.610) 
       = 1.222 (0.277)         = 0.199 (0.937)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.4.(b) Money supply 
Based on the quantity theory of money suggested by Irving Fisher (1911), nominal 
money supply      is modelled as a function of the lagged dependent variable        , and 
nominal GDP in this model. The money supply function is given by: 
                                                  
Table 3.17 provides the estimation results for money supply. We establish a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the money supply and nominal GDP variables, which 
indicates that money growth is in proportion to the economic activity. The statistically 
significant coefficient on lagged variables indicates that the rate of adjustment is 
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approximately 26 % in each year. The short-run and long-run nominal output elasticities are 
found to be around 0.29 and 1.098 respectively
43
.  
Table 3.17. Estimation of the money supply function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1987 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -0.713 1.365 -0.523 0.607 
               0.736
***
 0.084 8.746 0.000 
           0.290
**
 0.124 2.346 0.029 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
(b) Cointegration test :            = 6.020
**
 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999        = 1.757 
 ̂   = 0.007           = 18324.580 (0.000)  
       = 0.729 (0.404)      
   = 1.363 (0.506) 
       = 0.036 (0.852)         = 1.730 (0.202)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.5. Finance block 
The finance block covers the yield of corporate bonds and the exchange rate. The yield 
on corporate bonds is determined by an official interest rate by a central bank, which allows 
the model to analyse the effects of the current monetary policy utilising an official interest 
rate on the real sector of the economy. The exchange rate determined by the difference 
between foreign and domestic interest rates has impacts on exports and imports in the foreign 
trade block. 
                                                 
43
 It is important to note that the GDP variable on the right hand side is an independent variable, so that the GDP 
is not designed to be affected by the money supply in this model. Thus, we do not need to impose any 
restrictions on the coefficient in order to satisfy a theory of neutrality of money. 
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3.3.2.5.(a) Yield of corporate bonds 
Determining the official interest rate by an independent central bank is the main 
monetary instrument to control inflation and stabilize output in the short-term.  In practice, the 
call rate is the key interest rate that Bank of Korea charges commercial banks for secured 
overnight lending. The mechanism that transmits central bank policy actions to the real sector 
is as follows: a change in the official interest rate is transmitted to market interest rates, the 
exchange rate and asset prices. These changes in turn affect individual and firms‟ behaviours 
in terms of consumption, production, saving, and investment.  
However, the transmission channel is somewhat complex, since the indirect effects 
can take various forms depending on macroeconomic aspects, financial market structure, and 
the regulatory framework. Numerous studies have attempted to explain how changes in 
central banks‟ policy rates transmit to market-determined rates (Dodds and Ford, 1972; 
Diebold and Li, 2006; Diebold et al., 2006; Hoffmeister et al., 2010). A common reduced 
form is that the interest rate is a function of the official interest rate (CALL) and 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP (Y) and money supply (M3) representing the demand 
of fund and total liquidity in a nation respectively.  
                                                                             
 
The estimation results for the yield of corporate bonds are described in Table 3.18. 
The calculated F statistics shows that a long-run equilibrium relationship among variables 
exists. The coefficients on explanatory variables have all right sign; the yield of corporate 
bonds is positively related to output and negatively affected by liquidity, but are statistically 
significant only for the lagged dependent variable and the official rate. Even though the 
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historical relationships between the output and liquidity are not solid, the model retains the 
variables for simulation, since the sign and magnitude of coefficients does not violate 
macroeconomic theory. 
     Table 3.18. Estimation of the yields corporate bonds function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :            Sample : 1971 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant -15.017 16.536 -0.908 0.379 
                0.474
***
 0.137 3.451 0.004 
               0.525
***
 0.070 7.475 0.000 
         -0.162 0.254 -0.638 0.534 
        0.605 0.731 0.828 0.422 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 2000 and 2009. 
 
(b) Cointegration test :                     = 4.982
**
 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.970        = 2.227 
 ̂   = 0.097           = 110.004 (0.000)  
       = 0.929 (0.353)      
   = 0.048 (0.976) 
       = 0.610 (0.449)         = 0.716 (0.643)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.5.(b) Exchange rate 
This model uses the nominal exchange rate of Korean won to U.S. dollar for two 
reasons; first, the U.S. dollar is the key currency, so that the majority of international trade in 
Korea is settled by the U.S. dollar. Second, an official Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(REER)
44
 is not readily available in the current SNA system.  
                                                 
44
 REER is weighted average of a country's currency relative to a basket of other major currencies adjusted for 
the effects of inflation 
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As for model specification, given a major factor, the U.S.‟s interest rate in a small 
open economy, most macro-econometric models published in the bank of Korea and national 
economic institutes in Korea model the exchange rate equation by the difference between 
domestic and foreign interest rates. It is consistent with the theory of the Uncovered Interest-
Rate Parity (UIP). 
The nominal exchange rate (    is modelled by the ratio of the domestic interest rate 
and the foreign interest rate. The exchange rate function is given by: 
                                          
    
  
       
where the official interest rate        is adopted as the domestic interest rate and United 
States‟ government bond yield for 10 year is employed as the foreign interest rate.  
Note that a difference between equation (3.67) and the UIP is whether the expected 
future spot exchange rate is included or not. The traditional macro-econometric model has a 
limited ability to model the expectation variable (the expected future spot exchange rate at 
time, t+k) contained in the UIP. It can be estimated under the assumption of perfect foresight 
(using real data at t+k). But it cannot be solved for simulation in a system model as it contains 
a future variable. Overall, the model has to consider both the theoretical and practical aspects 
of the problem 
The estimation result for the log linearized form of equation (3.67) is presented in 
Table 3.19. The short-run and long-run elasticity of exchange rate with respect to the ratio of 
the domestic interest rate and the foreign interest rate are -0.076 and -0.123 respectively. 
Although the coefficient on the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates is not 
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statically significant, the coefficients have the right sign; an increase in the domestic interest 
rate decreases the exchange rate (i.e. the domestic currency appreciates). 
Table 3.19. Estimation of the exchange rate function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1990 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant    2.461
**
 1.136 2.167 0.047 
               0.644
***
 0.163 3.959 0.001 
            
    -0.076 0.083 -0.914 0.375 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 2001 and 2008. 
 
(b) Cointegration test :              
    = 8.614*** 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.937      = 1.756 
 ̂   = 0.042          = 52.810 (0.000)  
      = 0.139 (0.715)      
  = 6.226 (0.044) 
      = 0.027 (0.871)        = 0.573 (0.720)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
3.3.2.5. Foreign trade block 
The foreign trade block estimates exports and imports which are components of the 
GDP expenditure side.  The models for exports and imports have a symmetric structure in 
which foreign and domestic economic activity and relative prices are adopted as explanatory 
variables.  
 
3.3.2.5.(a) Exports and Imports 
The traditional empirical formulation of import demand and export supply functions, 
often called the elasticity approach, has a symmetric structure. The demand function of 
- 126 - 
imports has determinant variables such as domestic economic activity and the ratio of the 
prices of imported goods to domestic substitutes. Correspondingly, the export supply function 
is determined by the economic activity of the rest of the world and the ratio of the export price 
to foreign substitutes‟ prices. 
In the empirical literature, Khan (1974), Warner and Kreinin (1983), and Bahmani-
Oskooee (1986) modified the trade formulation and analysed trade policy issues; typically 
investigating the effect of devaluation of a country‟s currency on the trade balance. Later 
studies, Bahmani-Oskooee and Niroomand (1998) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1998) firstly 
estimated the export and import demand functions using Johansen (1988) and Johansen-
Juselius (1990) cointegration analyses in order to overcome spurious results.  
Following the related empirical studies, the function for the export supply (  ) 
employs the traditional formulation in which the price of exports relative to foreign prices (
   
   
 ) 
and the rest of the world‟s GDP (  ) are adopted for explanatory variables. The import 
demand (  ) function includes the relative price of foreign goods adjusted by the real 
exchange rate and domestic price (
     
  
  
     
  
) and the relevant domestic activity variables 
such as GDP. The export and import functions are as follows: 
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     Table 3.20. Estimation of the export function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1970 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant  6.081
***
 1.044 5.825 0.000 
            0.670
***
 0.066 10.164 0.000 
          1.059
***
 0.279 3.795 0.001 
      
    -0.230*** 0.079 -2.909 0.006 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 1971 and 2001.  
 
(b) Cointegration test :            
    = 8.572** 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.998      = 1.944 
 ̂   = 0.066         = 3698.320 (0.000)  
      = 0.010 (0.919)      
  = 0.120 (0.942) 
      = 0.381 (0.541)        = 1.340 (0.271)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
The results of exports and imports estimation are provided in Table 3.20 and 3.21. In 
terms of the bounds cointegration test, the calculated F-statistics are higher than the upper 
bound. Thus, the null hypotheses of no cointegration are rejected, implying that there exists a 
long-run relationship amongst the variables. All the coefficients on variables in exports and 
imports are statistically significant in equation (3.68) and (3.69), and they have the right sign; 
the prices have a negative impact and economic activity affects the dependent variables 
positively. Finally, the diagnostic tests results for exports and imports indicate that the 
relationships between variables estimated in these equations are robust.  
Based on our model estimates presented in Table 3.20, the short-run elasticity of 
exports with respect to foreign GDP and export prices are 1.059 and -0.230 correspondingly. 
The long-run elasticity of exports with respect to foreign GDP and export prices can be 
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computed as 3.211 and -0.697 respectively. The relatively high foreign GDP elasticity of 
exports indicates that the export-centred economy has been sensitive to the foreign trade. On 
the other hand, the low export price elasticity of exports can be interpreted as high export 
competitiveness on non-price factors.   
Table 3.21. Estimation of the import function  
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :           Sample : 1980 ~ 2011 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Constant     -59.917
***
 8.768 -6.834 0.000 
             0.045 0.075 0.598 0.556 
             2.689
***
 0.241 11.165 0.000 
         (
  
  
    )      -0.179
*
 0.104 -1.728 0.097 
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. 
          Estimation includes dummy variables equal to unity for the period 2001, 2002 and 2009.  
          AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the model for serial correlation in the error term 
 
(b) Cointegration test :            
   (  
  
    )      = 4.851* 
 
(c) Diagnostic tests 
 ̅  = 0.999      = 2.257 
 ̂   = 0.033    = 3131.713 (0.000)  
       = 0.901 (0.353)      
  = 0.994 (0.608) 
       = 3.624 (0.070)        = 2.992 (0.810)  
       Note: the right-hand side value in parentheses indicates p-value  
 
Table 3.21 indicates that the short-run elasticities of imports with respect to domestic 
GDP and relative import prices are 2.689 and -0.179 correspondingly. The long-run elasticity 
of imports with respect to the domestic GDP and to import prices can be derived as 2.816 and 
-0.188 respectively.  
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3.4.2.7. Energy and environment block 
This section explains the properties of the energy system flow and methods for 
estimating energy demands and prices by sources and sector. First of all, energy is classified 
into primary energy and secondary energy. According to United Nations (1982), primary 
energy is defined as; 
 “Primary energy should be used to designate those sources that only involve extraction 
or capture, with or without separation from contiguous material, cleaning or grading, 
before the energy embodied in that source can be converted into heat or mechanical 
work.”  
On the other hand, secondary energy is defined as;  
“Secondary energy should be used to designate all sources of energy that results from 
transformation of primary sources.”   
For example, secondary energy consists of electricity and heat energy generated from 
several input energy sources, city-gas transformed from LNG or LPG, refined petroleum 
products, and renewable energy. The secondary energy is the type of final products that are 
transformed from the primary energy and then consumed by each sector‟s consumers. Final 
energy demand is defined as the energy used by final user such as households and firms 
outside the energy sector, i.e. the energy which is not being used for transformation process.  
The transformation process normally involves a significant amount of energy loss 
incurred by low conversion efficiency. Therefore, the total amount of energy supply should be 
larger than the total amount of energy demand. The total energy supply refers to Total 
- 130 - 
Primary Energy Supply (TPES)
45
 that is the sum of all primary energy sources before losses 
in the conversion process occurs.  
In order to capture the properties of energy processes, the energy module describes 
two sectors individually; the final energy demand of various sectors and the energy 
transformation sector‟s energy demand. In the final energy demand, it estimates final energy 
demand by source and sector. The final energy demand is classified into coal, petroleum, 
electricity, and city-gas. The sectors are divided into industry, transportation, commerce and 
public administration (hereafter, commerce and public), and households. Each sector‟s final 
demand is estimated by the econometric method; the cost share logit model as one of the 
inter-fuel substitution methods explained in the literature review. We use an aggregated 
estimate of the other final energy demands of each sector that account for relatively minor 
portions, and then divide the aggregated energy demand into each sector‟s demand using 
share ratio coefficients. 
 
        Figure 3.2. Energy sector’s classification  
 
The transformation sector consists of power generation, city-gas, and heat energy. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the power generation sector is modelled by the bottom-up 
                                                 
45
 The TPES provide a more suitable measure than total final energy demand (electricity, city-gas, heat, and 
refined petroleum products) in measuring carbon emissions.  
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approach taking into account the importance of the sector in the impact of carbon-related 
energy policy. City-gas and heat energy‟s demand for input energy sources are derived by 
identities that reflect supply factors such as own use and loss, conversion efficiency, and share 
ratio of energy sources in order to fulfil the demand for final energy which is taken from the 
final energy demand sector. Finally, TPES is measured by summing up the final energy and 
transformation sectors‟ demands of coal, petroleum, and LNG. The whole process of 
estimating energy demands is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Lastly, this block measures CO2 emissions from energy use and models the impact of 
a carbon pricing policy using identities. The model adopts the IPCC (1996)‟s carbon emission 
factor for each fuel with the fraction of fuel combustion factor. The carbon pricing policy is 
modelled by increasing the level of energy prices in proportion to a carbon tax rate. 
 
3.4.2.7.(a) Final energy demand  
The final energy demands of industry, commerce and public, and household sectors 
are estimated for the following energy products; bituminous coal, aggregated energy 
petroleum goods, city-gas, and electricity by Considine and Mount (1984)‟s dynamic linear 
logit model in order to examine inter-fuel substitution possibilities in the energy demand 
block triggered by the carbon tax policy.  It is important to note that Considine (1989) and 
Urga and Walters (2003) point out that including non-energy data in inter-fuel substitution 
models can lead to no sensible own- or cross-price elasticties, since fuels used for non-energy 
reasons in industry sectors have few substitutes so that their prices may have almost no effect 
on their non-energy demand. Therefore, non-energy fuel use needs to be excluded from the 
aggregated energy source.  To deal with this issue, we exclude non energy oil such as asphalt, 
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naphtha, and the other petroleum products (lubricant, petroleum coke, solvent, other products) 
from aggregated petroleum products that comprise gasoline, kerosene, diesel, heavy oil, 
propane, and butane. In addition, coking coal is taken out from the bituminous coal. As 
explained in the literature review, the cost share equations of four energy sources are given by: 
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where     is the cost share of the  
   input.    is the energy price of    the  
   input, the 
subscript numbers; from one to four represent  oil, city-gas, electricity, and coal respectively, 
and   ,    ,   are parameters to be estimated. As explained earlier, we adopt the two-step 
iterative Zellner estimation method in order to estimate the system of input share equations 
(3.70). For the convenience of estimation, a normalizing constant       is imposed on the 
system of equations. Note this constant does not affect the estimated elasticities (Considine 
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and Mount, 1984). Error terms         are assumed to follow a normal distribution. After 
estimation, own- and cross-price elasticities are computed by equations (3.25) and (3.26) as 
explained in the literature review. Table 3.22 summarises the sectors‟ energy demands in the 
cost share logit model. These final energy demands account for the majority of the sectors‟ 
energy expenditure. In the case of the transportation sector, petroleum products, city-gas, and 
electricity are used. Even though electricity and city-gas are used in subway trains and CNG 
buses respectively, they represent a minute fraction. Among the petroleum products, gasoline, 
diesel, and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) for vehicles are mostly consumed in the 
transportation sector. LPG can be seen as a substitute for gasoline and diesel. Therefore, the 
model focuses on the major energy products consumed in vehicles; Gasoline and diesel are 
aggregated into one petroleum good, which is assumed to have a competitive relationship 
with LPG in the cost share logit model. 
Table 3.22. Sectors’ final energy demands in the logit model 
 Sector  Final energy products (cost share of the     input) 
Industry 1. Petroleum 2.Electricity 3. City-gas 4.Bituminous coal 
Commerce and Public 1. Petroleum 2.City-gas 3.Electricity 
Households 1. Petroleum 2.Electricity 3. City-gas 4.Anthracite coal 
 
1) Industry 
Table 3.23 provides parameter estimates and goodness of fit of the dynamic logit 
model for industry. Overall the model has a good measurement of fit as seen by high R
2
 and 8 
of 10 significant coefficients in Table 3.23. The estimated lambda indicates that the rate of 
adjustment in attaining the long-run desired level is approximate by 20% in the first year. 
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Given the estimated parameters, price and substitution elasticities are derived as seen in Table 
3.24. Own price elasticities of all energy sources are negative. All of the own price elasticities 
in the short-run are less than one. The most elastic demand with respect to price in the long-
run is for city-gas, whereas the other energy sources have still inelastic demands in the long-
run. We found positive cross-price elasticities in most cases, the largest being petroleum with 
respect to the price of city-gas.  
Table 3.23. The estimation of the dynamic logit model for the industry sector 
 
Table 3.24. Price and substitution elasticities of the industry sector 
Price 
Demand      
Petroleum City-Gas Electricity Coal 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Petroleum -0.2057 -1.0398 0.0840 0.4246 0.1223 0.6182 -0.0006 -0.0030 
City-Gas 0.1915 0.9682 -0.2266 -1.1459 0.0488 0.2466 -0.0136 -0.0689 
Electricity 0.0348 0.1759 0.0061 0.0308 -0.0464 -0.2347 0.0055 0.0280 
Coal -0.0030 -0.0151 -0.0299 -0.1514 0.0975 0.4930 -0.0646 -0.3266 
 
On the other hand, complementarity relationships exist between coal and petroleum and 
between coal and city-gas, but the values of these negative elasticities are negligible in 
magnitude in the short-run. This implies that a small amount of coal can be substituted with 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-value 
  
    0.288 0.108   2.676 
   -0.103 0.109  -0.939 
  
    0.355 0.101   3.519 
    -0.013 0.213  -0.062 
   
    -0.821 0.026 -31.189 
   
    -1.015 0.079 -12.853 
   
    -0.928 0.118  -7.836 
   
    -1.352 0.389  -3.478 
   
    -0.857 0.064 -13.482 
     0.802 0.039   20.600 
   
        0.959 
        0.995 
        0.961 
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the other inputs in industry. But, the relationship between coal and city-gas is hardly 
conceivable given engineering properties and historical trends. For the sake of a realistic 
simulation, this model sets the cross price elasticity equal to zero through calibrating the 
coefficients. 
 
2) Commerce and Public administration 
The estimation results for the commerce and public administration sector are presented 
in Table 3.25 The model yields significant coefficients. The adjustment coefficient shows the 
long-run response is slower than industry‟s.  
Table 3.25. The estimation of the dynamic logit model for the commerce and public sector 
 
Table 3.26. Price and substitution elasticities of the commerce and public sector 
Price 
Demand      
Petroleum City-Gas Electricity 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Petroleum -0.201 -1.234 0.028 0.172 0.173 1.062 
City-Gas 0.046 0.282 -0.308 -1.889 0.262 1.607 
Electricity 0.032 0.194 0.029 0.178 -0.061 -0.372 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-value 
  
    -0.293 0.089 -3.274 
  
    -0.504 0.192 -2.633 
   
   -0.674 0.268 -2.514 
   
    -0.776 0.141 -5.521 
   
    -0.661 0.166 -3.971 
      0.837 0.094  8.898 
   
        0.880 
        0.936 
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All input demands have negative own-price elasticities as seen in Table 3.26, in which 
electricity has been found to be the most inelastic, and have positive cross price elasticities 
and the largest own-price elasticity of the demand for city-gas in commerce and public sector. 
 
3) Households 
Finally, households‟ estimation result and price elasticities are provided in Table 3.27 
and 3.28. 10 of 12 parameters are statistically significant. Similar to the other sectors, the 
adjustment coefficient is relatively slow; 11% of adjustment process occurs in the first year.  
Table 3.27. The estimation of the dynamic logit model for the household sector 
 
 All four energy products have negative own price elasticities and positive cross price 
elasticities. A relatively large own price elasticity and cross price elasticities with respect to 
the other energy are found in coal demand, which reflects the high substitution possibilities in 
the household sector. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard error t-value 
  
     1.280 0.239  5.355 
  
     1.342 0.220  6.101 
  
     1.385 0.249  5.552 
   
    -0.899 0.174 -5.162 
   
    -0.829 0.067 -12.373 
   
    -0.483 0.204 -2.368 
   
    -0.834 0.128 -6.500 
    -0.231 0.246 -0.936 
    -0.301 0.190 -1.587 
      0.889 0.024 37.808 
   
        0.968 
        0.994 
        0.979 
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   Table 3.28. Price and substitution elasticities of the household sector 
Price 
Demand      
Petroleum City-Gas Electricity Coal 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Petroleum -0.129 -1.165 0.027 0.241 0.072 0.649 0.031 0.275 
City-Gas 0.026 0.233 -0.141 -1.272 0.070 0.629 0.045 0.410 
Electricity 0.044 0.394 0.044 0.396 -0.129 -1.162 0.041 0.372 
Coal 0.132 1.190 0.204 1.836 0.294 2.651 -0.630 -5.677 
 
The cost share of the energy product, i is estimated by equation (3.70). The demand 
for each input energy source can be computed in two ways; firstly, estimate the cost share of 
the     input by the inter-fuel substitution model and the total energy cost directly using an 
energy price index and sector‟s GDP variables when the quantity of the     demand is derived 
by following an identity equation: 
            
     
  
 
Secondly, based on Harvey and Pablo (1991), the quantity of the     demand can be 
computed as follows: 
STEP 1. Estimate the cost share of the     input by the inter-fuel substitution model 
STEP 2. Compute the aggregate energy price index (    with the equation below 
             ∑    
 
 
where    is the share in total quantity and    is the price of final energy i. 
STEP 3. Estimate the total demand for energy (    using a long-run equilibrium model 
- 138 - 
STEP 4. Compute the total cost of energy using the equation below 
                   
STEP 5. Finally, equation (3.71) gives the individual input demand of that energy source. 
The first method, the direct estimation of the total cost has limitations; the aggregate 
energy price index may have negative or positive effects on nominal expenditure on energy. 
Thus, the direct impact of the carbon tax on total demand for energy cannot be observed. 
Therefore, we employ the second method provided by Harvey and Pablo (1991).  
When it comes to the estimation of sectors‟ total main energy demand     , the 
equations for each sector‟s total main energy demand adopt the following form: 
                      =   +  ×            +  ×        
  +  ×       +  ×        +             
where subscript j denotes the sector: industry, commerce and public, and households. the 
aggregate energy price index computed by equation, the weather variable      summing up 
Heating Degree Days (HDD) and Cooling Degree Days (CDD) representing temperature‟s 
effect on energy demand, and GDP (Ω) indicating economic activity are adopted as 
explanatory variables for industry and commerce and public‟s energy demand. In the case of 
households‟ energy demand, disposable income (YD) is used rather than GDP. Finally,    is 
the error term assumed to be normally distributed.  
In the first step, calculated F-statistics presented in Table 3.29 in each sector are 
higher than the upper bound critical value. Thus, there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between variables. Once, we confirmed that a long-run equilibrium exists, equation 3.66 is 
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estimated by the OLS method. Estimation results for these sectors‟ energy demand with 
diagnostic tests are summarised in Table 3.29.   
Table 3.29. Estimation of the total energy demand function 
Dependent Variable :             Sample : 1991 ~ 2011 
Regressor Industry Commerce & Public Households 
Constant 
-8.580
*** 
(0.000) 
-12.080
***
 
(0.000) 
 -1.928 
  (0.858) 
             
 0.587 
(0.556) 
 0.428
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.241
*
 
(0.075) 
        
   
-0.195
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.256
***
 
(0.006) 
  -0.658
***
 
  (0.001) 
        
 0.429
*
 
(0.097) 
 0.730
***
 
(0.000) 
  N.A. 
           N.A.   N.A. 
   0.587
*
 
  (0.082) 
         
 0.447
***
 
(0.000) 
  N.A. 
   0.438
**
 
  (0.039) 
Dummy periods (year) 2004 1991,1997,1999 2004,2005,2008 
Bounds test 14.389
***
 4.657
*
 4.383
*
 
Diagnostic tests    
 ̅  0.982 0.989 0.930 
     2.578 2.724 2.004 
      2.578 (0.131) 2.821 (0.117) 0.021 (0.887) 
     
  1.103 (0.576) 2.713 (0.258) 3.715 (0.156) 
       0.628 (0.544) 1.754 (0.103) 0.903 (0.388) 
        0.251 (0.933) 0.893 (0.526) 0.650 (0.709) 
     Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
              AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the households model for serial correlation in the error term. 
 
All of the coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant; the 
demand for energy is positively related to economic activity and weather variables, and on the 
other hand, negatively related to its own price. However, the weather variable in commerce 
and public sector neither had the right sign and nor was statistically significant, so that we 
rule out the weather variable in the commerce and public sector‟s equations. The households‟ 
price elasticity of energy has the highest value: -0.496 in short and -1.332 long-run, which 
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follows commerce and public; -0.205 and -0.802, and industry; -0.196 and -0.474. This gives 
implications for energy policy related price regulations; energy price regulations or taxes 
could offer a potentially cost-effective means for demand control or reducing emissions in the 
households and commerce and public sector. In addition, it is worthy to mention that the GDP 
elasticity of industry is higher than the commerce and public‟s one, which implies that 
shrinkage of economic activity such as consumption and exports decreases industry‟s energy 
demands more than the other sectors‟, since energy is directly used to produce goods as a 
input factor in the industry sector. 
 
4) Transportation 
The transport sector is the second largest sector accounting for 19.1% of Korea‟s final 
energy demand in 2010. In view of the importance of the sector, modelling individual energy 
products is desirable in order to evaluate emissions accurately. Energy demands in the 
transportation sector are very closely related to the number of motor vehicles, trains, ships, 
airplanes, and other conveyances. These transport assets generally use one particular fuel for 
their lifespan. In other words, the demand for a specific energy product is mainly determined 
by the number and usage of the type of conveyance that run on that product. Thus, we set up a 
dependent variable as demand for a specific fuel relative to the scale of conveyances (the 
number of vehicles and trains or tonnes of ships), and estimate this dependent variable using 
economic activity and the fuel‟s price. We treat the conveyance variable exogenously. It is 
important to note that modelling endogenous choice of the conveyance along with efficiency 
would be better, since the type of conveyance is an important factor determining fuel demands 
and emissions in long run. However, modelling this as an endogenous choice remains a 
question for further research, given the relatively short simulation period available to date.   
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As for the type of conveyance (CV), this is broadly classified into three types; general, 
freight, and commercial vehicles. Each sector‟s energy demand is assumed to be a function of 
the quantity of the main type of conveyance, for example, gasoline, diesel, and LPG are used 
in general, freight, and commercial vehicles respectively, thus the total number of 
corresponding vehicles are adopted as explanatory variables. In the case of heavy-oil and 
electricity in the transportation sector, the total tons of ships and trains are employed as a 
determinant. The conveyance‟s energy demand function is follows: 
                
    
     
 =   +  ×    
      
       
 +  ×        
    +  ×       +             
Table 3.30. Estimation of the transport energy demand function 
Dependent Variable :      
    
     
   
Regressor 
Gasoline 
(Sample: 1990~2011) 
Diesel 
(Sample: 1990~2011) 
Heavy-oil 
(Sample: 1990~2011) 
Butane 
(Sample: 1990~2011) 
Electricity 
(Sample: 1990~2011) 
Constant 
-5.914* 
(0.072) 
 -12.688** 
  (0.013) 
 1.646*** 
(0.000) 
 3.633*** 
(0.000) 
 2.513* 
(0.097) 
    
      
       
  
 0.817*** 
(0.000) 
   0.836*** 
  (0.000) 
 0.943*** 
(0.000) 
 0.609*** 
(0.000) 
 0.916*** 
(0.000) 
        
     
-0.341*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.189*** 
  (0.006) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
-0.190*** 
(0.001) 
-0.098* 
(0.064) 
        
 0.312*** 
(0.008) 
   0.452*** 
  (0.010) 
   N.A.    N.A.    N.A. 
Dummy periods 
(year) 
1999, 2000 1998 2006, 2007 
1998-99, 2002, 
2010, 2011 
 
Bounds test 5.799
**
 9.092
***
 8.810
***
 10.891
***
 5.446
**
 
Diagnostic tests      
 ̅   0.999 0.978 0.977 0.990 0.966 
      1.811 1.717 2.177 2.046 2.323 
       4.470 (0.876) 0.374 (0.551) 0.228 (0.640) 0.003 (0.954) 0.002 (0.361) 
     
   3.416 (0.119) 3.742 (0.154) 0.090 (0.956) 0.954 (0.621) 4.448 (0.590) 
        4.092 (0.857) 0.144 (0.888) 0.141 (0.712) 1.727 (0.145) 2.918 (0.159) 
         0.323 (0.922) 0.205 (0.932) 1.052 (0.412) 1.219 (0.408) 0.923 (0.511) 
   Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
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Table 3.30 provides a comparison of the estimation results of energy products in 
transportation. Firstly, the calculated F statistics confirm that there exists a long run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables. We drop the GDP variable indicating 
economic activity in the demand for heavy-oil and butane, since they are neither significant, 
nor have the expected sign. Overall, gasoline has the most price elastic demand among 
petroleum products. These results are robust to the diagnostic tests. 
 
5) The other final energy demands 
In the case of the other energy sources representing a relatively small share, we 
aggregate all sectors‟ energy demand such as non-energy petroleum product in the industry, 
commerce and public, and household sectors, coking coal in the industry sector, anthracite 
coal in the industry and commerce and public sectors, Jet Fuel JA-1 (JA) in the transportation 
and commerce and public sectors, heat energy in the commerce and public and household 
sectors, the transportation sector‟s demand for electricity and the other petroleum products 
and then estimate using a long-run equilibrium model directly in which energy prices, weather 
(HDD and CDD), and GDP variables are related to the demand for energy. Finally, we 
allocate the estimated energy demands into each sector using the share ratio of sectors which 
is treated as exogenous. The equation for the other energy demand is given by: 
                     =   +  ×           +  ×        
  +  ×       +  ×        +             
Note that renewable energy, city-gas in transportation, and AVI-G (petroleum) are 
modelled exogenously. Renewable energy is being developed as an alternative to fossil fuels 
from the government policy. Modelling the supply of renewable energy endogenously often 
faces difficulties due to the intermittency of renewable energy. As for city-gas in 
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transportation, a CNG bus using city-gas has been introduced only from 2001 so that there is 
not enough time-series data for estimation. AVI-G comprises only small part of energy 
expenditure. For those reasons, they are treated as exogenous. Table 3.31 summarises the 
other energy demands in corresponding sectors.  
Table 3.31. The other final energy demands in sectors 
Final energy product (i) Sector (s) Variable 
Non-energy petroleum Industry, Commerce and Public, Household Endogenous 
Coking coal Industry Endogenous 
Anthracite coal Industry, Commerce and Public Endogenous 
JA Transportation, Commerce and Public Endogenous 
Heat energy Commerce and Public, Household Endogenous 
Renewable energy Industry, Commerce and Public, Household Exogenous 
City-gas Transportation Exogenous 
AVI-G Transportation Exogenous 
 
Table 3.32 provides a comparison of estimation results for the other demand energy. 
First of all, we established that a long-run cointegration relationship exists amongst the 
variables in each energy product. In general, demand for the other energy products does not 
react to weather conditions and price.  
The price elasticity was not statistically significant for coking coal, JA, or anthracite 
coal
46
. Non-energy petroleum‟s price elasticity is relatively very low, -0.033 in the short run 
and -0.122 in the long run. The weather variable is statistically insignificant in each equation. 
Thus, we removed the weather variable.  
 
 
                                                 
46
 Note that the result of the price elasticity of anthracite coal demand should be interpreted with caution, since 
the price of anthracite coal has been under price control from the government.    
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  Table 3.32. Estimation of the other energy demand function 
(a) Regression model   
      Dependent Variable :             
Regressor 
N.E. Petroleum 
(Sample: 1982~2011) 
Coking Coal 
(Sample: 1991~2011) 
Anthracite Coal 
(Sample: 1979~2011) 
JA 
(Sample: 1991~2011) 
HEAT 
(Sample: 1991~2011) 
Constant 
-2.957 
(0.104) 
 -3.761** 
 (0.027) 
 -9.776*** 
 (0.001) 
-13.913*** 
 (0.003) 
 -15.063*** 
  (0.000) 
            
 0.723*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.156 
 (0.480) 
  0.846*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.354* 
 (0.073) 
   0.462*** 
  (0.000) 
        
   
-0.033** 
(0.028) 
   N.A.    N.A. 
 -0.058 
 (0.263) 
 -0.093 
 (0.159) 
        
 0.223*** 
(0.003) 
  0.663*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.354*** 
(0.001) 
  0.698*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.617*** 
 (0.000) 
            N.A.    N.A.    N.A.    N.A. 
  0.339*** 
 (0.000) 
Dummy periods 
(year) 
1981-90, 
1992,1997 
2008, 2010 1990, 1997  1991, 1992, 1994 
Bounds test 5.029
*
 6.224
**
 5.321
**
 7.121
***
 4.705
*
 
Diagnostic tests      
 ̅  0.999 0.962 0.977 0.961 0.999 
     2.239 2.129 1.976 1.891 1.811 
      0.560 (0.229) 0.318 (0.581) 0.001 (0.975) 0.037 (0.834) 0.025 (0.876) 
     
  4.574 (0.948) 2.407 (0.300) 0.768 (0.681) 0.622 (0.747) 0.265 (0.876) 
       0.000 (0.783) 0.823 (0.379) 0.067 (0.797) 0.007 (0.908) 0.184 (0.857) 
        6.914 (0.179) 1.914 (0.149) 1.618 (0.198) 0.243 (0.751) 0.338 (0.922) 
   Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
 
3.4.2.7.(b) Energy transformation  
It is necessary to derive input energy sources in an energy transformation sector along 
with final energy demand in order to estimate total primary energy. Input energy sources in 
the transformation sector means energy materials for producing final energy products such as 
electricity, city-gas, and heat energy. According to the current statistical system for energy 
supply in Korea, the energy transformation sector is classified into three sectors; electric 
generation, gas manufacture, and district heating. Note that the electricity power generation 
sector is modelled explicitly by the electricity module. Therefore, this section covers the input 
energy sources of the city-gas and heat sectors. We take account of each energy conversion 
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process of final energy products meaning that city-gas and heat energy are modelled 
individually. Using the method proposed by Park (2004), final energy demand estimated from 
the econometric method is treated as an exogenous variable, and we then derive input energy 
sources in the transformation sector which is needed to meet the final energy demand. In the 
conversion process, the total supply of input sources are derived reflecting own use, loss, and 
conversion efficiency factors. 
 
1) City-gas 
First of all, it is necessary to estimate total city-gas demand in order to derive the 
quantity of input energy for city-gas. Total city-gas demand is calculated by summing up all 
sectors‟ demand for city-gas derived from the econometric method in the final energy demand 
section and the co-generation sector‟s input demand for producing heat. Then, considering an 
own use and loss factor, the total quantity of city-gas supply is calculated given the total city-
gas demand. After the total supply of city-gas is determined, the total quantity of energy 
sources is derived using a conversion efficiency factor. Finally, we allocate the total quantity 
of energy input into each input fuel such as LPG and LNG using the share ratio of energy. 
Figure 3.3 represents the process of producing city-gas. 
 
           Figure 3.3. The process of city-gas production 
            Source: Park (2004) 
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2) Heat 
In the same manner as for city-gas, the quantity of input energy for heat energy is 
determined through estimating heat energy. Total heat energy demand is determined by the 
econometric method. Taking into consideration an own use and loss factor, total heat supply 
is calculated given the total heat energy demand. The total heat supply comes from two 
sources; power generation (waste heat recovery power generation from combined heat and 
power, CHP) and district heating. The waste heat recovery power generation from CHP 
should be ruled out in order to calculate the input energy for heat energy, since input energy 
for the generation is collected in generation sectors, which yields the problem of double 
counting.  Using a share ratio of power and heating, the supply of district heating is calculated, 
and then the total quantity of input energy sources is computed from dividing supply of 
district heating by a conversion efficiency factor. Finally, the inputs of petroleum, LNG, and 
city-gas are derived using share ratios of input energy.  
 
  Figure 3.4. The process of heat energy production 
  Source: Park (2004) 
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3.4.2.7.(c) Energy prices
47
 
The purpose of modelling energy prices is to utilise them as determinant variables for 
estimating energy demands. Energy prices are classified by sources and sectors corresponding 
to energy demands. Energy supply in Korea is mostly dependent on imported energy sources 
such as crude oil, bituminous coal, and LNG from foreign countries, which means prices of 
international primary energy and the exchange rate have a major impact on the prices of final 
energy. In particular, the price of crude oil plays a key role in determining the other prices of 
imported primary energy, since most contracts are linked with the oil price in international 
energy markets. The pricing mechanism of individual energy types are modelled as follows: 
 
1) Coal 
All bituminous coals in Korea are imported from foreign countries. Therefore, the 
price of imported bituminous coal is modelled as a function of the international coal price 
index (   
    ) and the exchange rate, which is as follows: 
                    
     =   +  ×          
     +  ×       
     +  ×        +             
where the subscript, j indicates a sector that includes industry and power generation denoted 
by i and pg respectively. Note that the prices of domestic anthracite coal and briquette are set 
exogenously, since the products have been under price control of the government; the prices 
have been maintained at a constant level for a long time. 
                                                 
47
 Time-series data for the fuel prices of power generation is available only from 2001. Consequently, fuel prices 
for power generation and electricity prices estimation could be biased due to the short horizon of data. However, 
the estimation results are reasonable compared to the other energy sources and pass all diagnostic tests. So, we 
adhere to these equations for the simulation analysis. 
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      Table 3.33. Estimation of coal price function 
Dependent Variable :          
        
Regressor 
Industry 
(Sample: 1989~2011) 
Power Generation 
(Sample: 2001~2011) 
Constant 
 2.212
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.704
 
(0.828) 
          
       
 0.039
**
 
(0.333) 
 0.215 
(0.322) 
       
       
 0.784
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.603
***
 
(0.005) 
         
 0.811
***
 
(0.000) 
 1.031
***
 
(0.057) 
Dummy periods (year) 2005, 2006  
Bounds test 13.741
***
 8.717
***
 
Diagnostic tests   
 ̅  0.996 0.944 
     1.518 2.922 
      1.327 (0.269) 0.599 (0.224) 
     
  0.752 (0.687) 1.920 (0.674) 
       1.405 (0.182) 0.316 (0.783) 
        0.994 (0.452) 0.727 (0.236) 
        Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
        AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the industry‟s coal model for serial correlation in the error term. 
 
The estimations results for bituminous coals for industry and power generation are 
provided in Table 3.33. The variables in both equations have a long-run equilibrium 
relationship according to computed F-statistics. The adjustment coefficients are relatively low, 
and power generation‟s coefficient is statistically insignificant, which implies that importers 
immediately pass through the purchase cost and exchange rate into final prices. The elasticity 
of the exchange rate on imported coal prices is larger than the elasticity of the production cost 
in power generation.  
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2) Petroleum 
As the model uses aggregated petroleum for energy use by a sector, the prices of 
energy-petroleum are classified into industry (i), commerce and public (cp), households (h), 
and transportation (tr). In addition, heavy oil for power generation, JA, LPG for transport and 
aggregated petroleum for non-energy use are modelled explicitly. These refined petroleum 
products are modelled as a function of the international crude oil price and the exchange rate, 
which is as follows: 
                    
      =   +  ×          
      +  ×       
    +  ×        +             
Table 3.34 summarises the estimation results of aggregated petroleum prices for these 
sectors. We found that there is a long-run cointegration relationship between the petroleum 
product‟s price and explanatory variables in each equation. All of coefficients on explanatory 
variables have the expected signs; the final prices are positively related to cost factors. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable values are in a range approximately from 0.005 to 
0.2, indicating that a relatively instant adjustment process takes place in each period. 
The estimation results for individual refined petroleum products are provided in Table 
3.35. Each equation has a long-run equilibrium relationship between a petroleum product 
price and cost factors; imported unit price of crude oil and exchange rate. The results of 
petroleum prices show common properties in the adjustment coefficient; approximately 
30~50% of the adjustment between the short-run and long-run level takes place in each year. 
It is interesting to mention that the elasticity of the exchange rate in the short-run has a wide 
range of estimated values; 0.332~1.282. It is reasonable, since large amount of domestic 
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refined petroleum products are produced, and even exported to foreign countries
48
. But 
industries depend on several products such as NAPHTHA (Non-energy petroleum), LPG, and 
heavy-oil, which have relatively high elasticities of the exchange rate in their equations.   
     Table 3.34. Estimation of aggregated petroleum price function 
Dependent Variable :          
       Sample : 1991 ~ 2011 
Regressor Industry Commerce & Public Households 
Constant 
10.650
 
(0.495) 
 6.591
** 
(0.035) 
 3.004
* 
(0.073) 
          
       
-0.215 
(0.236) 
-0.005 
(0.976) 
-0.041 
(0.757) 
       
     
 0.458
***
 
(0.003) 
 0.523
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.644
***
 
(0.000) 
         
 1.226
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.785
***
 
(0.000) 
 1.257
***
 
(0.000) 
Dummy periods (year)  1998  
Bounds test 4.587
*
 5.396
**
 4.860
*
 
Diagnostic tests    
 ̅  0.992  0.996 0.998 
     1.464  2.018 1.746 
      0.195 (0.668)  0.331 (0.575) 0.043 (0.839) 
     
  0.234 (0.889)  0.644 (0.725) 1.407 (0.495) 
       1.090 (0.299)  1.035 (0.319) 0.145 (0.887) 
        1.391 (0.289)  1.508 (0.250) 0.254 (0.857) 
       Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
       AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust all models for serial correlation in the error term. 
 
Except for heavy oil used for power generation, one or two dummies are imposed on 
each equation to capture outliers in Asian financial crisis of 1998 and global financial crisis of 
2007~08. A few other dummies are imposed for unknown incidents and better simulation 
performance.
                                                 
48
 It was recorded at total 49,020  nominal U.S. dollar export, total 27,050 nominal U.S. dollar import in 2011 
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      Table 3.35. Estimation of petroleum product price function 
Dependent Variable :          
    
Regressor 
Gasoline 
(Sample: 1983~2011) 
Diesel 
(Sample: 1983~2011) 
Heavy-oil for 
P.G. 
 (Sample: 2001~2011) 
Heavy-oil 
(Sample: 1982~2011) 
LPG 
(Sample: 1982~2011)  
JA 
(Sample: 1982~2011) 
Non Energy 
(Sample: 1982~2011) 
Constant 
 0.289
 
(0.000)
 
-1.400
 
(0.356)
 
-1.303
 
(0.441)
 
-2.079
 
(0.324)
 
-0.606
*** 
(0.001)
 
-1.980
*** 
(0.004)
 
-6.774
*** 
(0.000)
 
          
   
-0.593
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.539
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.149
* 
(0.269) 
 0.594
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.699
*** 
(0.000)
 
 0.576
*** 
(0.000)
 
 0.553
*** 
(0.000) 
       
     
 0.191
*** 
(0.001) 
 0.353
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.843
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.384
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.229
*** 
(0.000)
 
 0.444
*** 
(0.000)
 
 0.428
*** 
(0.000) 
         
 0.693
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.925
*** 
(0.000) 
 1.282
*** 
(0.005) 
 0.854
*** 
(0.000) 
 0.569
** 
(0.005)
 
 0.332
*** 
(0.002)
 
 1.054
*** 
(0.000) 
Dummy periods       
      (year) 
1998, 2009 2009  1995, 2007 2009, 2011 2009 1985 
Bounds test 8.264 5.428 12.410 5.947 19.486 5.723 9.719 
Diagnostic tests        
 ̅  0.989  0.972  0.988  0.990  0.974  0.976 0.991 
     1.279  2.083  2.314  2.096  2.114  2.591 1.570 
      2.845 (0.107)  0.308 (0.585)  0.266 (0.625)  0.622 (0.439)  0.020 (0.892)  0.260 (0.380) 1.044 (0.317) 
     
  0578 (0.749)  2.554 (0.279)  0.962 (0.618)  3.523 (0.171)  0.017 (0.992)  0.202 (0.729) 3.146 (0.207) 
       1.295 (0.209)  1.543 (0.137)  1.413 (0.208)  1.623 (0.118)   1.031 (0.350)   0.957 (0.580) 0.291 (0.774) 
        0.620 (0.686)  0.607 (0.662)  0.134 (0.937)  1.140 (0.367)  1.657 (0.277)  1.395 (0.420) 0.317 (0.864) 
         Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
                   AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust gasoline and diesel models for serial correlation in the error term. 
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3) LNG 
As explained earlier, the price of international crude oil has an impact on the price of 
LNG in Korea. Therefore, the prices of LNG for power generation and city-gas are modelled 
as a function of the international oil price index and exchange rate.  
                    
    =   +  ×          
    +  ×       
    +  ×        +             
Table 3.36 provides the estimation results of equation (3.77) for power generation and 
city-gas. As expected, the price of LNG is positively related to the price of crude oil and the 
exchange rate; both coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables are statistically insignificant, meaning that the adjustment process 
instantaneously occurs in each period. 
          Table 3.36. Estimation of LNG price function 
Dependent Variable :          
      
Regressor 
Industry 
(Sample: 1989~2011) 
Power Generation 
(Sample: 2001~2011) 
Constant 
 3.840
*** 
(0.005) 
 2.548
 
(0.108) 
          
     
-0.482
**
 
(0.016) 
 0.111 
(0.449) 
       
     
 0.238
***
 
(0.002) 
 0.610
***
 
(0.001) 
         
 0.287 
(0.175) 
 0.939
**
 
(0.015) 
Dummy periods (year) 1998, 2001  
Bounds test 21.527
***
 6.050
**
 
Diagnostic tests   
 ̅  0.960 0.981 
     2.248 1.866 
      2.141 (0.163) 0.008 (0.930) 
     
  2.017 (0.365) 1.139 (0.566) 
       0.324 (0.750) 0.875 (0.422) 
        0.832 (0.545) 0.775 (0.549) 
            Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
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4) City-gas 
LNG is the main source of city-gas. Thus, the prices of city-gas for industry, 
commerce and public, and households can be modelled as a function of the LNG price as 
following: 
                    
     =   +  ×          
     +  ×      
    +             
As seen in equation (3.78), the price of LNG is a key determinant of the price of city-
gas. The estimation results of equation (3.78) are provided in Table 3.37. The coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable and the price elasticity of LNG show different aspects 
depending on the sector; the adjustment process takes about one year to be completed for 
households, but occurs over about two years in the commerce and public and industry sectors.  
     Table 3.37. Estimation of city-gas price function 
Dependent Variable :          
      Sample : 1991 ~ 2011 
Regressor Industry Commerce & Public Households 
Constant 
-3.107
*** 
(0.001) 
 0.116 
(0.711) 
 1.110
***
 
(0.000) 
          
      
 0.573
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.508
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.131
***
 
(0.000) 
        
     
 0.660
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.490
***
 
(0.000) 
 0.771
***
 
(0.000) 
Dummy periods (year) 1990, 1999, 2002 1998, 1999, 2002 1989, 2000-11 
Bounds test 7.823
***
 5.350
*
 5.853
**
 
Diagnostic tests    
 ̅  0.994  0.992 0.999 
     1.505  1.553 2.431 
      1.376 (0.260)  0.917 (0.352) 0.958 (0.341) 
     
  1.980 (0.372)  0.245 (0.885) 0.128 (0.938) 
       0.762 (0.459)  1.138 (0.892) 0.906 (0.378) 
        0.153 (0.976)  1.737 (0.180) 1.573 (0.224) 
       Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
                 AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the industry model for serial correlation in the error term. 
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5) Electricity 
The prices of electricity for industry, commerce and public, and households can be a 
function of the total cost in power generation sector, which is computed in the electricity 
module. In other words, the generation cost is passed on to customers. 
                    
     =   +  ×          
     +  ×       
     +             
where     
     is the price of electricity for sector j and         is the wholesale price index 
computed in the power generation module endogenously.  
Table 3.38 summarises the estimation results for each sector. All coefficients are 
statistically significant and have the expected magnitude and sign; the relatively slow 
adjustment process and positive coefficient of the total cost variable represent the current 
electricity pricing under government control. 
     Table 3.38. Estimation of electricity price function 
Dependent Variable :          
      Sample : 2001 ~ 2011 
Regressor Industry Commerce & Public Households 
Constant 
 5.524
** 
(0.028) 
 4.203 
(0.153) 
 5.106
**
 
(0.012) 
          
      
 0.418
**
 
(0.042) 
 0.638
**
 
(0.012) 
 0.490
***
 
(0.007) 
       
      
 0.078
***
 
(0.009) 
 0.028
**
 
(0.042) 
 0.067
***
 
(0.002) 
Dummy periods (year) 2009-11 2001, 2009 2002, 2009 
Bounds test 23.948
***
 90.071
***
 897.44
***
 
Diagnostic tests    
 ̅  0.985  0.909 0.980 
     2.554  2.644 2.365 
      0.812 (0.409)  1.742 (0.257) 0.304 (0.605) 
     
  0.924 (0.630)  0.284 (0.867) 0.253 (0.881) 
       1.410 (0.218)  0.804 (0.467) 0.626 (0.559) 
        0.573 (0.693)  2.503 (0.151) 0.641 (0.653) 
        Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively. The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
                 AR(1) Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is conducted to adjust the cp model for serial correlation in the error term. 
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3.4.2.7.(d) CO2 emissions 
This model uses identities to measure total carbon dioxide (CO2)  emissions from 
energy use which represent the highest share of GHG emissions sources; approximately 85.3% 
in 2010. To focus on the energy use related issues, we estimate CO2 emissions from energy 
use, but the other GHG sources are not considered in this model yet. To measure the CO2 
emissions from energy use, this study adopts the carbon emission factor for each fossil fuel 
proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines (1996, 2006). 
The identity for measuring CO2 emissions by specific energy consumption is as follows: 
              
           
where     is a carbon emission factor of energy i (tC/TOE) which follows IPCC‟s coefficients 
which are provided in appendix
49
.    is a conversion factor from carbon to carbon dioxide 
(tCO2/tC). 
 
3.4.2.7.(e) Carbon pricing 
To perform a carbon tax policy simulation, carbon pricing is modelled by increasing 
the level of energy prices under the assumption that firms are assumed to completely pass 
through the cost of the carbon tax to consumers. The introduction of carbon taxation can be 
written as follows: 
              
    
             
                                                 
49
 According to IPCC (1996), carbon emissions are calculated by the following equation: 
                  
    where    denotes a fraction of carbon oxidized factor and    a fraction of carbon sequestered factor.  
   Note that we assume perfect combustion (i.e.     ) as the faction of incomplete oxidization is relatively 
small, which means excluding the fraction of carbon sequestered factor as in IPCC (2006). 
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where    
  is the final price of energy i  (won/TOE),   
  is the original price of energy i which 
reflects the pre-existing taxes (won/TOE), i.e. the after tax price and          is the rate of 
carbon tax (won/TOE) in which       is carbon tax (won/TC).  
 
3.4.3. Electricity module 
The electricity module adopts the MCP electricity model built in Chapter Two. The 
model covers all technology‟s power output, including nuclear, bituminous and anthracite 
coal, heavy-oil, gas-turbine, and CCGT power plants. Hydro, pumped storage and renewable 
energy are treated exogenously, as they account for a minor share of generation mix (see 
Figure 2.27 in Chapter Two). The power generation sector is much better captured in the 
MCP model than econometric methods in that the MCP model incorporates each technology‟s 
engineering properties with capacity constraints and output decisions for multiple periods (the 
electricity module sets 14 sub-periods in each year in view of the level of electricity demand). 
Aggregated power output estimated by the econometric method using annual data is not 
adequate to compute the amount of input energy needed for power generation due to the 
complexity of power generation, thereby giving misleading estimates of total generation costs 
and emissions in the power generation sector. For these reasons, this study adopts the MCP 
model for the electricity market.    
The electricity demand adjusted by a factor for transmission losses and prices of input 
energy sources which were estimated in the macro-econometric module are fed into the MCP 
electricity module. Then, the electricity module calculates the total electricity output, cost of 
power generation, and input energy demands for nuclear, coal, heavy oil, and LNG using 
exogenous capacity variables in this study.  
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As explained in chapter two, currently the electricity market has been operated under 
the Cost Based Pool (CBP) system since 2001 in Korea. Under the CBP system, the marginal 
price is determined by the merit order system in which each generation unit is ranked 
according to bids based on its variable cost. The generation unit with the lowest variable cost 
among all the units is firstly granted a purchase order for electricity. The generation unit with 
the highest variable cost which is lastly chosen in the merit order to meet electricity demand 
in each period determines the marginal price. Such a system can be modelled suitably by 
perfect competition which assumes that all firms are price takers and no one influences the 
price of the product. Therefore, we adopt the perfect competition model rather than the 
Cournot model used in Chapter Two, because the Cournot model yields very high equilibrium 
prices by dominant firms‟ market power.  
This chapter replaces the objective function equation (2.2) with the following new 
objective function for a carbon tax policy to be simulated in next chapter, which is given by: 
 (3.84)     
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tax
tC  defines a carbon tax rate (won/tCO2). As a consequence, the corresponding 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition (2.13) should be substituted by the following equation based 
on the perfectly competitive equilibrium;  
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3.4.4. Integration module 
The model adopts the soft-link method which provides the best solution among the 
other integration methods for linking the electricity engineering model and the top-down 
model in terms of capturing multiple periods‟ output and consistency in agent‟s behavior. The 
soft-link method starts with a top-down model, and then the results will be fed into the 
bottom-up model. The iteration process stops when a convergence criterion is fulfilled. 
Convergence between the two models is defined in terms of the electricity demand.  The 
process is as follows: 
Step 1: Run the macro-economic module and provide information as below:  
- Electricity demand (MWh), fuel prices (coal, oil, and LNG), which will be fed into the MCP 
model in the electricity market module. Aggregated electricity demand (MWh) from the 
macro-economic module will be transferred into the load duration curve.   
Step 2: Run the MCP model in the electricity market module and generate a data set as below:  
- The electricity price and each technology plant‟s fuel demand 
 Step 3: Re-run the macro-economic module given the data set from the electricity market 
module  
- The information will be re-entered into the electricity market module. 
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until a convergence criterion of the electricity demand is reached. 
The model set the convergence criterion at a 3 percent change between the values generated 
by the two models in the last year. The value of convergence criteria was chosen as a 
compromise between precision and the amount of time needed to perform each model run; it 
should be noted that the convergence was much closer for most years within each run. Many 
published studies do not disclose their convergence criteria and so no community standard 
exists. 
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3.5. SIMULATION AND MODEL EVALUATION 
This section performs an ex post (historical) simulation in order to evaluate the 
model‟s predictive performance. The simulation methodology is well documented in Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1997). The ex-post simulation starts in year T1 (see Figure 3.5) and goes 
forward until year T2. Historical values in year T1 are provided as initial conditions for the 
endogenous variables and historical series beginning in T1 and ending T2 are used for the 
exogenous variables. The endogenous variables are not reinitialized; the simulation solution 
determines the values of the endogenous variables after year T1. A comparison between the 
original data series and the simulated series of endogenous variables provides a test of the 
validity of the model, which is a main purpose of this section. The ex-post simulation also can 
be used for policy analysis by letting exogenous policy follow different time paths in order to 
examine what might have happened as a result of alternative policies, which will be 
implemented in chapter 4. 
 
Figure 3.5. Simulation time horizons (source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1997) 
 
Forecasting is a type of simulation in which endogenous variables are generated 
forward in time beyond the estimation period, which requires a set of assumptions about the 
exogenous variables. An ex-post forecast beginning at the end of the estimation period is 
performed to test the forecasting accuracy of a model by comparing the results with available 
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data. An ex-ante forecast begins the simulation in the current year and extends it into the 
future, which can be used for predictive purposes and for sensitivity and policy analysis. 
The ex-post simulation for evaluation of the model covers the time period from 2005 
to 2011. To measure the predictive accuracy of the model, we adopt the Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error (MAPE) method among the quantitative measures which examine how close 
simulated variables follow their corresponding actual values. The MAPE is defined as follows: 
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where,     
  and     
  are the simulated and actual value of     variable in period t, and   is the 
number of periods in the simulation. The MAPE indicates the extent to which the simulated 
values are far from the actual values. In general, the value of MAPE less than 3 per cent is 
considered excellent for the predicative accuracy, less than 5 per cent is assessed as good, and 
more than 8 per cent is regarded as not acceptable (Bu, 2003).   
Table 3.39 reports the values of the MAPE for main macroeconomic and energy 
variables in the macro-econometric module and main output variables in the electricity 
module. Overall, the MAPE of most variables are below 8%, which implies that the model is 
stable. While the macroeconomic variables‟ statistics show a good performance for predictive 
power, they are below 3%, finance variables such as exchange rate and yield of corporate 
bonds exceed 5% respectively, but these are regarded as reasonable levels, given the high 
volatility of the time series.  The MAPE of price variables in the energy module are within 7 
per cent. As seen in Table 3.39, the dynamic logit model generally provides acceptable levels 
of the statistic for the three sectors‟ individual energy demands.   
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Table 3.39. The MAPE of major variables 
(a) Main macroeconomic variables 
Variable MAPE (%) Variable MAPE (%) 
GDP 0.96 Producer price index 0.84 
Private consumption 1.11 GDP deflator 1.43 
Government consumption 1.04 Exchange rate 5.70 
Investment 2.42 Yield of corporate bonds 5.16 
Export 3.26 Money supply 1.45 
Import 3.09 Labour employment 0.36 
Consumer price index 0.52 Wage 2.23 
 
(b) Main energy variables 
 
(b.1) Price 
 
Bituminous Coal 4.70 City-gas for industry 6.43 
LNG 5.50 City-gas for commerce and public 4.27 
Non-energy petroleum  5.64 City-gas for households 4.04 
Aggregated oil for industry 4.57 Electricity for industry 1.00 
Aggregated oil for commerce and public 4.70 Electricity for commerce and public 0.86 
Aggregated oil for households 5.38 Electricity for households 0.77 
 
(b.2) Demand 
 
Anthracite coal  3.94 Industry‟s city-gas  2.59 
Industry‟s bituminous coal 5.73 Commerce and public‟s city-gas 5.66 
Non-energy petroleum  2.49 Households‟ city-gas  2.38 
Industry‟s aggregated oil 2.49 Industry‟s electricity   2.59 
Commerce and public‟s aggregated oil  8.30 Commerce and public‟s electricity  2.42 
Households „ aggregated oil   6.42 Households‟ electricity  2.11 
 
Figures 3.6~3.8 compare the actual and corresponding simulated values for the main 
endogenous variables in order to provide a general picture of the predictive performance of 
the model. Table A.3.3 in the appendix to this chapter presents all variables‟ MAPE and the 
percentage distribution of the results. Broadly, the values of simulated variables show similar 
trends to the actual values and closely track the actual values well despite some deviations. 
Therefore, this section reaches the conclusion that the model‟s predictive ability is satisfactory, 
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so that this model can be used to perform policy simulation such as the imposition of a carbon 
tax which will be analysed in the next chapter. 
 
    Figure 3.6. Main macroeconomic variables 
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    Figure 3.6. (continued) 
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    Figure 3.7. Main energy price variables  
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    Figure 3.7. (continued) 
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    Figure 3.8.  Main energy demand variables 
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    Figure 3.8. (continued)  
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
Taking into account the importance of the electricity sector, this chapter builds up an 
integrated model that combines a top-down macro-econometric and a bottom-up electricity 
model in order to provide a tool for assessing the effect of climate change policies on the 
Korean economy.  
For the top-down model representing a national economy, a macro-econometric model 
is employed rather than the CGE model to obtain robust parameters on variables in each 
behavioural equation, as confirmed by the ARDL bounds testing and the standard 
specification tests, leading to more objective results for macroeconomic policy experiments. 
The macro-econometric model follows the OECD model‟s (Hervé et al, 2010) fundamental 
structure in which output is determined by the demand side consistent with Keynesian views, 
but by the supply side in the long-term according to a neo-classical perspective on growth 
modelling. The macro-econometric model has seven blocks; supply side, demand side, prices 
and wage, fiscal and monetary, finance, foreign trade, and energy and environment blocks. In 
the energy block, the economy is classified into four sectors: industry, transport, commerce 
and public, and households. This study employs the dynamic logit cost share model which 
satisfies the neo-classical theoretical properties of the input-demand function in order to 
measure the sectors‟ cross-price elasticities which determines fuel-switching effects when 
relative energy prices change.  
In the case of the bottom-up electricity model, the Mixed Complementarity Problem 
(MCP) framework is adopted in view of the complexity of the power generation sector and 
the largest share of emissions. The MCP electricity model employs the perfect competition 
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theory to obtain realistic results for output and costs given the current CBP system in the 
power generation market.  
These two models are integrated via the soft-link method which adopts an iteration 
process that repeats the two models subsequently sharing information on input energy prices, 
generation cost, and demand variables until the value of the electricity demand variable is laid 
within convergence criteria. The soft link method is the most suitable method to support the 
integrated model consisting of two separate models through according an agent‟s behaviour 
and representing the multiple periods‟ power generation subject to technology constraints 
using the electricity model. 
The last section performs an ex-post simulation to test the validity of the integrated 
model. The result shows that the model‟s predictive ability is satisfactory, as most variables 
have acceptable levels of statistical standard errors. Therefore, the next step, performing 
policy simulation experiments, can be carried out in the following chapter. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 A.3.1 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
This section describes all variables in the macro-econometric model, designed for use with the 
model specification in appendix a.3.2. The following tables list variables alphabetically and 
include type designation, source, and unit of each variable. In terms of the type designation, 
the following classification is used: 
1. EN(B): Endogenous variable estimated by a behavioural equation  
2. EN(I): Endogenous variable estimated by an identity equation 
3. EX: Exogenous variable 
The database used in this study is obtained from six external sources:  
1. BOK: Bank of Korea, economic statistics system (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
2.   SK: Statistics Korea, Korean statistical information service (http://kosis.kr) 
3.   KPX: Korea Power Exchange, electric power statistics information system 
                (http://epsis.kpx.or.kr) 
4.   KITA: Korea International Trade Association (http://kita.net) 
5.   KEEI: Korean Energy Economic Institute, Korea energy statistics information system  
                 (http://kesis.net), KEEI (2012)  
6.   IMF: International Financial Statistics (2013) 
7.   C: author‟s calibration 
 
In the cases of data that were not directly available, data are derived from calibration of data 
within the fundamental data base, which is denoted by a “C/fundamental source” in the source 
column. In particular, each energy price (won/TOE) is derived using energy conversion 
factors/oil equivalent denoted by the Energy Use Rationalization Act, which is available in 
KEEI (2012).  
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Table A.3.1. List of variables definitions  
Notation Type Definition Unit Source 
       EX Carbon emission factor of anthracite coal tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
       EX Carbon emission factor of bituminous coal tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
      EX Carbon emission factor of briquette  tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
        EX Carbon emission factor of diesel tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
          EX Carbon emission factor of gasoline tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
        EX Carbon emission factor of heavy oil tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
     EX Carbon emission factor of LNG tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
     EX Carbon emission factor of LPG tCO2/TOE  IPCC 
   
     
 EX Carbon emission factor of aggregated petro. in com.&public tCO2/TOE  C/KEEI 
  
     
 EX Carbon emission factor of aggregated petro. in households tCO2/TOE  C/KEEI 
  
     
 EX Carbon emission factor of aggregated petro. in industry tCO2/TOE  C/KEEI 
CALL EX Call interest rate  % BOK 
CDD EX Cooling degree day Num. KEEI 
CG EN(B) Government consumption  2005 ₩ BOK 
   EN(I) Capital cost index BOK 
CO2
coal
 EX CO2 emissions by coal use tCO2 N.A. 
CO2
e
 EX CO2 emissions in electricity sector tCO2 N.A. 
CO2
petro
 EN(I) CO2 emissions by petroleum use tCO2 N.A. 
CO2
gas
 EN(I) CO2 emissions by natural gas tCO2 N.A. 
CO2 EN(I) Total CO2 emissions from energy use tCO2 N.A. 
CP EN(B) Private consumption  2005 ₩ BOK 
        EX Total tons of train  Tons SK 
           EX Total number of freight vehicles for diesel Num. KEEI 
           EX Total number of general vehicles for gasoline Num. KEEI 
       EX Total number of commercial vehicles for LPG Num. KEEI 
       EX Total tons of ships Tons SK 
CTAX EX Carbon tax rate  Current ₩/tCO2 - 
EPOP EX Economically active population Person BOK 
ER EN(B) Exchange rate Current ₩/$ BOK 
EX EN(B) Exports 2005 ₩ BOK 
FY EX Foreign countries (advanced economies)‟ GDP 2005=100 IMF 
FP
coal
 EX Coal Australia price index 2005=100 IMF 
FP
rm 
EX
 
Raw material price index 2005=100 IMF 
FP
oil
 EX Petroleum Dubai spot price  $/Barrel IMF 
HDD EX Heating degree day Num. KEEI 
I EN(B) Investment (Gross fixed capital accumulation) 2005 ₩ BOK 
IM EN(B) Imports 2005 ₩ BOK 
INVD EN(B) Inventory 2005 ₩ BOK 
K EN(B) Tangible fixed asset Current ₩ SK 
L EN(B) Employment Person BOK 
L
*
 EN(I) Natural employment Person C/BOK 
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Table A.3.1. (continued)  
Notation Type Definition Unit Source 
LNSR1cp EN(B) Cost share log ratio of petro. to elec. in commerce & public - C/KEEI 
LNSR1h EN(B) Cost share log ratio of petro. to acoal in households - C/KEEI 
LNSR1i EN(B) Cost share log ratio of petro. to bcoal in industry - C/KEEI 
LNSR2cp EN(B) Cost share log ratio of city-gas to elec. in commerce & public - C/KEEI 
LNSR2h EN(B) Cost share log ratio of city-gas to acoal in households - C/KEEI 
LNSR2i EN(B) Cost share log ratio of city-gas to bcoal in industry - C/KEEI 
LNSR3h EN(B) Cost share log ratio of elec. to acoal in households - C/KEEI 
LNSR3i EN(B) Cost share log ratio of elec. to bcoal in industry - C/KEEI 
M3 EN(B) Money supply 2005 ₩ BOK 
   
      EX Price of anthracite coal for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
      EX Price of anthracite coal for power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KPX 
   
      EN(B) Price of bituminous coal for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
      EN(B) Price of bituminous coal for power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KPX 
      EX Price of briquette  Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
       EN(B) Price of butane for transport Current ₩ /TOE BOK 
   EN(B) Domestic consumer price index 2005=100 BOK 
   
  EX U.S. consumer price index  1982-84=100 BOK 
   
    
 EN(B) Price of city-gas for commerce and public sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
    
 EN(B) Price of city-gas for household sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
    
 EN(B) Price of city-gas for industry sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
    
 EX Price of city-gas for transport sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   EN(B) GDP deflator  2005=100 BOK 
        EN(B) Price of diesel Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
     EN(B) Price of electricity for commerce and public sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
     EN(B) Price of electricity for household sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
     EN(B) Price of electricity for industry sector Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
    EN(B) Export price  2005=100 ($) BOK 
   
  EN(I) Aggregated energy price index of commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
  EN(I) Aggregated energy price index of households Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
  EN(I) Aggregated energy price index of industry Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
          EN(B) Price of gasoline Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
      
 EN(B) Price of heavy-oil for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
      
 EN(B) Price of heavy-oil for power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KPX 
   EN(B) Investment price (Gross fixed capital accumulation deflator) 2005=100 BOK 
    EN(B) Import price index 2005=100 ($) BOK 
    EN(B) Price of JA 2005=100 BOK 
   
    EN(B) Price of LNG for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   
    EN(B) Price of LNG for power  Current ₩ /TOE C/KPX 
        EN(B) Price index of non-energy petroleum 2005=100 C/BOK 
   
     
 EN(B) Price of aggregated petroleum for commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
  
     
 EN(B) Price of aggregated petroleum for households Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
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Table A.3.1. (continued) 
Notation Type Definition Unit Source 
  
     
 EN(B) Price of aggregated petroleum for commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE C/KEEI 
   EN(B) Producer price index  2005=100 BOK 
    
      EN(I) Price of anthracite coal for non-power after carbon tax Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
      EN(I) Price of anthracite coal for power after carbon tax Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
      EN(I) Price of bituminous coal for non-power after carbon tax Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
      EN(I) Price of bituminous coal for power after carbon tax Current ₩ /TOE - 
       EN(I) Price of briquette after carbon tax  Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
       EN(I) Price of butane for transport Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
    
 EN(I) Price of city-gas after carbon tax for commerce and public  Current ₩ /TOE - 
   
    
 EN(I) Price of city-gas after carbon tax for households  Current ₩ /TOE - 
   
    
 EN(I) Price of city-gas after carbon tax for industry  Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
    
 EN(I) Price of city-gas after carbon tax for transport  Current ₩ /TOE - 
         EN(I) Price of diesel Current ₩ /TOE - 
           EN(I) Price of gasoline Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
      
 EN(I) Price of heavy-oil for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
      
 EN(I) Price of heavy-oil for power  Current ₩ /TOE - 
     EN(I) Price of JA Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
    EN(I) Price of LNG for non-power  Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
    EN(I) Price of LNG for power  Current ₩ /TOE - 
         EN(I) Price index of non-energy petroleum Current ₩ /TOE - 
    
     
 EN(I) Price of aggregated petroleum for commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE - 
   
     
 EN(I) Price of aggregated petroleum for commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE - 
   
     
 EN(I) Price of aggregated petroleum for commerce and public Current ₩ /TOE - 
PY EN(I) Potential GDP  Current ₩ BOK 
   
      EN(I) Anthracite coal demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
     
      EX
*
 Anthracite coal demand by power generation TOE KEEI 
  
      EN(I) Anthracite coal demand by households TOE KEEI 
  
      EN(I) Anthracite coal demand by industry TOE KEEI 
   
      EN(I) Anthracite coal demand by non-households TOE KEEI 
      EX AVI-G demand  TOE KEEI 
      EN(B) Coke coal demand TOE KEEI 
  
      EN(I) Bituminous coal demand by industry TOE KEEI 
   
    
 EN(I) City-gas demand by commerce and public  TOE KEEI 
     
    
 EN(I) City-gas input demand by heat energy TOE KEEI 
  
    
 EN(I) City-gas demand by households  TOE KEEI 
  
    
 EN(I) City-gas demand by industry TOE KEEI 
   
    
 EX City-gas demand by transport TOE KEEI 
   
       EN(B) Diesel demand by transport TOE KEEI 
   
     EN(I) Electricity demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
  
     EN(I) Electricity demand by households TOE KEEI 
  
     EN(I) Electricity demand by industry TOE KEEI 
   Note: EX
*
 is determined in the electricity module. 
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Table A.3.1. (continued) 
Notation Type Definition Unit Source 
   
     EN(B) Electricity demand by transport TOE KEEI 
   
        
 EN(B) Gasoline demand by transport TOE KEEI 
   
      
 EN(B) Heavy-oil demand by transport TOE KEEI 
      EN(B) Total heat energy demand  TOE KEEI 
    EN(B) Total JA demand TOE KEEI 
   
  
 EN(I) JA demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
   
  
 EN(I) JA demand by transport TOE KEEI 
     
    EN(I) City-gas sector demand for LNG by City-gas TOE KEEI 
     
    EX
*
 LNG demand by power generation TOE KEEI 
     
    EN(I) LNG demand by Heat energy TOE KEEI 
   
    EN(B) LPG demand by transport TOE KEEI 
        EN(B) Total non-energy petroleum demand TOE KEEI 
   
      
 EN(I) Non-energy petroleum demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
  
      
 EN(I) Non-energy petroleum demand by households TOE KEEI 
  
      
 EN(I) Non-energy petroleum demand by industry TOE KEEI 
   
     
 EN(I) Aggregated oil demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
     
     
 EN(I) Petroleum demand by City-gas TOE KEEI 
     
     
 EX
*
 Petroleum demand by power generation TOE KEEI 
     
     
 EN(I) Petroleum demand by Heat energy TOE KEEI 
  
     
 EN(I) Aggregated oil demand by households TOE KEEI 
  
     
 EN(I) Aggregated oil demand by industry TOE KEEI 
    EX U.S. Long-term government bond yields (10year) Rate IMF 
   
      EX Commerce and public‟s anthracite coal share  - C/KEEI 
  
      EX Industry‟s anthracite coal share - C/KEEI 
   
  
 EX Commerce and public‟s JA share - C/KEEI 
   
  
 EX Transport‟s JA share - C/KEEI 
   
      
 EX Commerce and public‟s non-energy petroleum share - C/KEEI 
  
      
 EX Households‟ non-energy petroleum share - C/KEEI 
  
      
 EX Industry‟s non-petroleum share - C/KEEI 
     
  
 EX Non-power‟s share in heat energy‟s input energy - C/KEEI 
     
     
 EX Petro. share in non-power input energy for heat - C/KEEI 
     
    
 EX City-gas share in non-power input energy for heat - C/KEEI 
     
    EX LNG share in non-power input energy for heat - C/KEEI 
     
     
 EX Petro. share in city-gas input energy - C/KEEI 
     
    EX LNG share in city-gas input energy - C/KEEI 
     EX Trend - - 
    EN(B) Tax revenue  Current ₩ BOK 
     EN(I) Total main energy cost Current ₩ C/KEEI 
       EX
*
 Total cost of power generation Current ₩ C/KPX 
    EN(I) Total main energy cost Current ₩ C/KEEI 
    EN(I) Total main energy cost Current ₩ C/KEEI 
   Note: EX
*
 is determined in the electricity module. 
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Table A.3.1. (continued) 
Notation Type Definition Unit Source 
        EN(I) Total anthracite coal demand TOE KEEI 
        EN(I) Total bituminous coal demand TOE KEEI 
       EN(I) Total city-gas demand TOE KEEI 
   
  EN(I) Aggregated main energy demand by households  TOE KEEI 
   
  EN(I) Aggregated main energy demand by households  TOE KEEI 
    
  EN(I) Aggregated main energy demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
       EN(I) Total electricity demands TOE KEEI 
     EN(I) Total final energy demands TOE KEEI 
        EN(I) Total petroleum energy demand TOE KEEI 
    
     
 EN(I) Total petroleum energy demand by commerce and public TOE KEEI 
   
     
 EN(I) Total petroleum energy demand by households TOE KEEI 
   
     
 EN(I) Total petroleum energy demand by industry TOE KEEI 
    
     
 EN(I) Total petroleum energy demand by transport TOE KEEI 
       EN(I) Total City-gas supply TOE KEEI 
       EN(I) Total power generation supply TOE KEEI 
       EN(I) Total heat energy supply TOE KEEI 
     EN(I) Total primary energy supply TOE KEEI 
        EX Total hydro and renewable energy supply TOE KEEI 
  EN(B) Nominal average wage Current ₩ BOK 
  
      EN(I) Cost share of anthracite coal by households - C/KEEI 
  
      EN(I) Cost share of bituminous coal by industry - C/KEEI 
   
     EN(I) Cost share of electricity by commerce and public - C/KEEI 
   
    
 EN(I) Cost share of City-gas by commerce and public - C/KEEI 
  
    
 EN(I) Cost share of City-gas by households - C/KEEI 
  
    
 EN(I) Cost share of City-gas by industry - C/KEEI 
  
     EN(I) Cost share of electricity by households - C/KEEI 
  
     EN(I) Cost share of electricity by industry - C/KEEI 
   
     
 EN(I) Cost share of aggregated oil by commerce and public - C/KEEI 
  
     
 EN(I) Cost share of aggregated oil by households - C/KEEI 
  
     
 EN(I) Cost share of aggregated oil by industry - C/KEEI 
  EN(I) Unemployment rate % BOK 
u
*
 EN(I) Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment % C/BOK 
Y EN(I) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2005 ₩ BOK 
YCB EN(b) Yields of corporates bonds (OTC, 3year, AA-) Rate BOK 
   EN(I) Disposable income 2005 ₩ C/BOK 
   EN(I) Nominal GDP Current ₩ BOK 
   EX Error term in the sum of GDP expenditure 2005 ₩ C/BOK 
      EX Conversion factor of electricity - C/BOK 
      EX Conversion factor of city-gas - C/BOK 
      EX Conversion factor of heat energy - C/BOK 
  EN(B) Rate of operation % SK 
   EN(I) Natural rate of operation % C/SK 
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A.3.2. MDOEL SPECIFICATION 
1. Supply side block 
1.1. Investment 
        = -18.026 + 0.420×           + 1.251×                
  ) - 0.253×     
                                      (0.038)    (0.009)                     (0.000)                                    (0.153)          
           
                                    - 0.041×    
                                     (0.185) 
 
                                          = 0.722×     +        
 
 ̅  0.977      1.604  ̂ 0.   0. 
      0.367      
  0.729        0.125         0.104 
 
1.2. Labour employment 
        = -0.792 + 0.904×           + 0.100×              
  
  
    - 0.041×     
                                      (0.041)   (0.000)                     (0.001)                                    (0.001)          
           
                                    - 0.081×    
                                     (0.000) 
 
 ̅  0.998      2.241  ̂ 0.010   0.000 
      0.405      
  0.733        1.254         0.885 
 
1.3. Rate of operation 
        =       -0.503×           -0.118×     
  
  
   +0.165×        -0.090×         
   
                                     (0.116) (0.000)                  (0.000)                (0.003)             (0.017) 
 
                                    - 0.026×      - 0.026×    - 0.026×    
                                     (0.046)             (0.081)         (0.000) 
 
 ̅  0.897      2.421  ̂ 0.002   0.000 
      0.264      
  0.184        1.140         0.887 
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1.4. Capital accumulation 
        = 0.158 + 0.910×           + 0.092×         – 0.039×     – 0.048×     
                                     (0.921)   (0.000)                     (0.000)                 (0.000)          (0.000)  
 
                   + 0.039×     – 0.048×     
                                        (0.921)           (0.000)  
  
                                          = 0.385×     +        
 
 ̅  0.999      2.005  ̂ 0.007   0.000 
      0.980      
  0.270        0.724         0.097 
 
1.5. Potential GDP 
                                    
    
  
     
  
 
1.6. Unemployment rate 
   = (     -   ) /        ×  100  
 
1.7. Natural employment 
  
     
  
 
   
     
 
1.8. Natural rate of operation 
  
  [     
         ]  
 
2. Demand side block 
2.1. Private Consumption Expenditure 
         = - 0.233 + 0.654×            + 0.358×           - 0.051×       
   - 0.060×     
                     (0.672)   (0.000)                          (0.000)                    (0.005)                 (0.005) 
 
                                       - 0.033×      
                      (0.000)        
                    
 ̅  0.999      1.487  ̂ 0.018   0.000 
      0.163      
  0.451        0.837         0.471 
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2.2. Government Consumption Expenditure 
         = 1.522 + 0.891×            + 0.063×     
    
  
        - 0.042×      
                                       (0.001)   (0.000)                        (0.025)                               (0.020)                 
    
 ̅  0.999      1.610  ̂ 0.017   0.000 
      0.226      
  0.757        0.116         0.354 
                
2.3. Real GDP 
                             
  
 
2.4. Nominal GDP 
         
      
 
2.5. Disposable income 
        
    
  
     
 
3. Prices and Wage block 
3.1. Consumer price  
      
   = - 0.600 + 0.572×         
   + 0.121×     
  
   
  + 0.244×       
   + 0.206×         
   
                    (0.024)   (0.000)                     (0.032)                     (0.027)                    (0.008)                 
                   
 ̅  0.999      1.470  ̂ 0.001   0.000 
      0.219      
  0.157        0.578         0.244 
 
3.2. Producer price 
      
   = 1.869 + 0.104×         
   + 0.034×        
       + 0.202×      
  
       
  
                   (0.002)  (0.529)                       (0.048)                                   (0.002)                 
                   
                   + 0.183×         
   + 0.045×     + 0.055×     
                     (0.002)                     (0.061)           (0.000)                                     
 
 ̅  0.996      2.118  ̂ 0.003   0.000 
      0.687      
  0.935        0.705         0.315 
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3.3. Export price 
      
    = 2.612 + 0.773×         
    + 0.222×       
   – 0.369×           - 0.128×      
                    (0.000)  (0.000)                      (0.000)                    (0.002)                      (0.017)                
 
 ̅  0.962      1.613  ̂ 0.086   0.000 
      0.323      
  0.935        0.705         0.315 
 
3.4. Import price 
      
    = 1.300 + 0.412×         
    + 0.041×        
     + 0.274×        
    - 0.132×     
                     (0.001)  (0.001)                      (0.072)                         (0.000)                        (0.025)                             
 
 ̅  0.961      1.668  ̂ 0.042   0.000 
      0.412      
  0.639        0.757         0.246 
 
3.5. Wage 
     
  
  
   = -2.182+ 0.748    (
    
    
 ) + 0.270     
  
  
  – 0.140     
  
  
   + 0.109×     
                   (0.000)  (0.000)                        (0.005)                  (0.000)                   (0.019)                 
 
 ̅  0.997      1.559  ̂ 0.053   0.000 
      0.217      
  0.500        0.757         0.235 
 
3.6. Capital goods price 
      
   = - 0.174 + 0.754×         
   + 0.075×        
    + 0.140×          
                   (0.429)  (0.000)                        (0.002)                         (0.013)                 
 
 ̅  0.992      1.687  ̂ 0.008   0.000 
      0.545      
  0.863        0.641         0.726 
 
3.7. GDP deflator 
      
   = 0.820 + 0.153×         
   + 0.477×       
   + 0.196×       
    + 0.031×     
                  (0.000)  (0.000)                       (0.005)                   (0.000)                   (0.019)                 
 
                                          = 0.902×     +        
 
 ̅  0.999      1.459  ̂ 0.008   0.000 
      0.117      
  0.940        0.296         0.578 
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3.8. Inflation 
  
    
          
 
 
4. Fiscal and Monetary policy block 
4.1. Tax revenue 
          = 0.820 + 0.153×             + 0.477×          - 0.148×     - 0.137×       
                       (0.026)  (0.109)                            (0.000)                    (0.000)          (0.005)                                 
 
                                              = 0.614×     +        
 
 ̅  0.999      1.759  ̂ 0.056   0.000 
      0.256      
  0.610        0.277         0.937 
 
4.2. Money supply 
             = -0.713 + 0.736×            + 0.290×          
                          (0.607)  (0.000)                          (0.029)                     
 
                               = 0.403×      +        
        
 ̅  0.999      1.757  ̂ 0.007   0.000 
      0.404      
  0.506        0.852         0.202 
 
 
5. Finance block 
5.1. Yield of corporate bonds 
          = - 15.017 + 0.447×             + 0.525×            - 0.162×          
                          (0.379)   (0.004)                             (0.000)                         (0.534)           
 
              + 1.527×        + 0.140×    + 0.242×    
                            (0.422)               (0.014)          (0.011)                                           
 
 ̅  0.970      2.227  ̂ 0.097   0.000 
      0.353      
  0.976        0.449         0.643 
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5.2. Exchange rate 
         = 2.461 + 0.644×            - 0.076×     
     
  
    + 0.449×     + 0.173×     
                    (0.047)   (0.001)                        (0.375)                       (0.000)           (0.028)           
 
                     + 0.166×     
                       (0.033) 
 
 ̅  0.937      1.756  ̂ 0.042   0.000 
      0.139      
  0.044        0.871         0.720 
 
 
6. Foreign trade block 
6.1. Exports 
         = 6.081 + 0.670×            + 1.059×          - 0.230×     
  
  
     
   – 0.180×      
                    (0.047)   (0.001)                        (0.375)                     (0.000)                      (0.028)           
 
                   – 0.174×     
                    (0.047)    
 
 ̅  0.998      1.944  ̂ 0.066   0.000 
      0.010      
  0.120        0.381         0.271 
 
6.2. Imports 
         = -59.917 + 0.045×            + 2.689×         - 0.179×     
  
    
   
  
      
  
      
                      (0.000)   (0.556)                          (0.000)                (0.097)                                 
 
                   – 0.090×     – 0.085×     – 0.050×     
                     (0.005)          (0.007)            (0.071)    
 
                         = 0.933×      +        
 
 ̅  0.999      2.257  ̂ 0.033   0.000 
      0.353      
  0.608        0.070         0.810 
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7. Energy and environment block 
 a) Demands 
7.1. Aggregated main energy demand by industry 
         
   = - 8.580 + 0.587×              - 0.195×    (    
 ) + 0.429×          
                         (0.000)   (0.556)                         (0.000)                    (0.097)                                 
 
                       + 0.447×                - 0.067×      
                         (0.000)                                         (0.556)                          
 
 ̅  0.982      2.578  ̂ 0.022   0.000 
      0.131      
  0.576        0.540         0.933 
 
7.2. Aggregated main energy demand by commerce and public 
          
   = - 12.080 + 0.428×               - 0.256×    (     
 ) + 0.730×         - 0.110×     
                            (0.000)    (0.000)                             (0.006)                       (0.000)                 (0.016)                             
 
                        + 0.096×     - 0.113×         
                            (0.017)        (0.006)                              
 
 ̅  0.989      2.724  ̂ 0.033   0.000 
      0.117      
  0.258        0.103         0.526 
 
7.3. Aggregated main energy demand by households 
         
   = - 1.928 + 0.241×              - 0.658×    (    
 ) + 0.587×           
                          (0.858)   (0.075)                         (0.001)                    (0.082)                                 
 
                       + 0.438×                - 0.029×     - 0.029×     - 0.057×     
                         (0.039)                                        (0.458)           (0.313)        (0.051)                          
 
                         = 0.822×      +        
 
 ̅  0.930      2.004  ̂ 0.031   0.000 
      0.887      
  0.156        0.388         0.709 
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7.4. Total non-energy petroleum product demand 
      
        = -2.957 + 0.723×         
        - 0.033×    (  
      ) + 0.223×          
                            (0.104)   (0.000)                           (0.028)                            (0.003)                                 
 
                                             - 0.288×      - 0.178×    + 0.235×    
                             (0.000)           (0.000)          (0.000)                             
 
 ̅  0.999      2.239  ̂ 0.036   0.000 
      0.229      
  0.948        0.783         0.179 
 
7.5. Coking coal demand 
      
      = -3.761 - 0.156×         
      + 0.663×         - 0.254×     + 0.331×     
                         (0.027) (0.480)                         (0.000)                (0.002)           (0.000)                                 
 
 ̅  0.962      2.129  ̂ 0.046   0.000 
      0.581      
  0.300        0.379         0.149 
 
7.6. Anthracite coal demand by non-households 
         
       = -9.776 + 0.846×            
       + 0.354×         - 0.566×     - 0.769×     
                          (0.001)  (0.000)                             (0.001)                (0.010)          (0.001)            
 
 ̅  0.977      1.976  ̂ 0.196   0.000 
      0.975      
  0.681        0.797         0.198 
 
7.7. Total JA demand 
      
    = -13.913 + 0.345×         
    - 0.058×    (  
  ) + 0.698×          
                       (0.003)  (0.073)                       (0.263)                     (0.001)                      
 
 ̅  0.961      1.891  ̂ 0.054   0.000 
      0.834      
  0.747        0.908         0.751 
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7.8. Total heat energy demand 
      
      = -15.063 + 0.462×         
      - 0.093×    (    
   ) + 0.617×          
                          (0.000)  (0.000)                           (0.159)                      (0.000)                      
 
                          + 0.339×           - 1.128×     - 0.587×     - 0.587×     
                            (0.000)                         (0.041)         (0.000)          (0.000)                            
 
 ̅  0.999      1.811  ̂ 0.036   0.000 
      0.876      
  0.876        0.857         0.922 
 
7.9. Gasoline demand by transportation 
    
     
        
            
  = -5.914 + 0.817×     
       
        
              
  - 0.341×    (  
        ) + 0.312×          
                                  (0.072)  (0.000)                                   (0.000)                               (0.008)                      
 
                                 + 0.150×     + 0.066×     
                                    (0.000)           (0.026)                                     
 
 ̅  0.999      1.811  ̂ 0.036   0.000 
      0.876      
  0.876        0.857         0.922 
 
7.10. Diesel demand by transportation 
    
     
      
            
  = -12.688 + 0.836×     
       
      
              
  - 0.189×    (  
      ) + 0.452×          
                                  (0.013)  (0.000)                                    (0.006)                           (0.010)                      
 
                                 - 0.145×      
                                  (0.002)                                               
 
 ̅  0.978      1.717  ̂ 0.028   0.000 
      0.551      
  0.154        0.888         0.932 
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7.10. Heavy-oil demand by transportation 
    
     
      
        
  = 1.646 + 0.943×     
       
      
          
  - 0.141×    (     
      ) + 0.228×      - 0.228×       
                           (0.000)  (0.000)                            (0.000)                            (0.008)            (0.005)                      
 
 ̅  0.977      2.177  ̂ 0.068   0.000 
      0.640      
  0.956        0.712         0.412 
 
7.11. LPG demand by transportation 
    
     
   
        
  = 3.633 + 0.609×     
       
   
          
  - 0.190×       
        - 0.167×        - 0.056×       
                          (0.000)  (0.000)                             (0.001)                            (0.037)            (0.037)                      
 
                          - 0.052×      - 0.192×     
                            (0.050)          (0.000)                              
 
 ̅  0.990      2.046  ̂ 0.017   0.000 
      0.954      
  0.621        0.145         0.408 
 
7.12. Electricity demand by transportation 
    
     
    
         
  = 2.513 + 0.916×     
       
    
           
  - 0.098×    (    
    )  
                          (0.097)  (0.000)                             (0.064)                          
 
 ̅  0.966      2.323  ̂ 0.053   0.000 
      0.361      
  0.590        0.159         0.511 
 
7.13. Bituminous coal demand by industry 
    
            
      
           
      
 
7.14. Anthracite coal demand by households 
    
            
      
           
    
 
 
7.15. Aggregated petroleum demand by industry 
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7.16. Aggregated petroleum demand by commerce and public 
     
             
       
            
     
 
 
7.17. Aggregated petroleum demand by households 
    
            
      
           
     
 
 
7.18. City-gas demand by industry 
    
           
      
          
    
 
 
7.19. City-gas demand by commerce and public 
     
            
       
           
    
 
 
7.20. City-gas demand by households 
    
           
      
          
    
 
 
7.21. Electricity demand by industry 
    
           
      
          
     
 
7.22. Electricity demand by commerce and public 
     
            
       
           
     
 
7.23. Electricity demand by commerce and public 
    
           
      
          
     
 
7.24. Anthracite coal demand by industry 
    
           
        
      
 
7.25. Anthracite coal demand by commerce and public 
     
           
           
      
 
7.26. Non-energy petroleum demand by industry 
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7.27. Non-energy petroleum demand by commerce and public 
     
         
            
      
 
 
7.28. Non-energy petroleum demand by households 
    
         
           
      
 
 
7.29. JA demand by commerce and public 
     
     
        
  
 
 
7.30. JA demand by transport 
     
     
        
  
 
 
7.31. Petroleum demand by heat energy 
       
          
          
               
     
 
 
7.32. LNG demand by heat energy 
       
        
          
               
    
 
7.33. City-gas demand by heat energy 
       
         
          
               
    
 
 
7.34. Petroleum demand by city-gas 
       
          
                 
     
 
 
7.35. LNG demand by city-gas 
       
        
                 
    
 
7.36. Total final energy demand of anthracite coal  
   
          
           
          
      
 
7.37. Total final energy demand of bituminous coal  
   
          
        
     
 
- 188 - 
7.38. Total petroleum demand by industry 
     
          
          
      
 
 
7.39. Total petroleum demand by commerce and public 
      
           
           
            
  
 
 
7.40. Total petroleum demand by households 
     
          
          
      
 
 
7.41. Total petroleum demand by transport 
      
           
              
            
            
         
  
 
 
7.42. Total final energy demand of petroleum   
   
           
            
           
            
     
 
 
7.43. Total city-gas demand  
   
          
           
          
           
    
 
 
7.44. Total electricity demand  
   
          
           
          
           
     
 
7.45. Total electricity supply  
   
        
           
 
 7.46. Total city-gas supply  
   
        
           
 
76.47. Total city-gas supply  
   
        
           
 
7.48. Total final energy demand  
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7.49. Total primary energy supply 
   
      
             
             
             
         
             
         
      
                   
             
           
      
      
 
b) Prices 
7.50. Bituminous coal price for non-power 
         
       = 2.212 + 0.039×            
       + 0.784×        
      + 0.811×           
                         (0.002)  (0.333)                            (0.000)                          (0.000)             
 
                        + 0.192×     - 0.139×     
                           (0.000)          (0.000)                            
 
                               = 0.759×      +        
    
 ̅  0.996      1.518  ̂ 0.035   0.000 
      0.269      
  0.687        0.182         0.452 
 
7.51. Bituminous coal price for power generation  
         
       = - 0.704 + 0.215×            
       + 0.603×        
      + 1.031×           
                           (0.828)  (0.322)                           (0.005)                            (0.057)             
 
 ̅  0.944      2.922  ̂ 0.133   0.000 
      0.224      
  0.674        0.783         0.236 
 
7.52. Aggregated petroleum price for industry 
        
       = 4.003  -  0.202×           
       + 0.576×    (   
   ) + 0.682×            
                          (0.052)  (0.091)                         (0.000)                         (0.000)                       
 
                         - 0.053×     - 0.171×     - 0.351×     
                          (0.088)         (0.000)          (0.000)   
 
                           = 0.894×      +        
 
 ̅  0.999      2.244  ̂ 0.037   0.000 
      0.668      
  0.890        0.299         0.289 
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7.53. Aggregated petroleum price for commerce and public 
         
       = 6.591 - 0.005×            
       + 0.523×    (   
   ) + 0.785×          - 0.215×     
                         (0.035) (0.976)                         (0.000)                          (0.000)                     (0.007)             
 
                           = 0.910×      +        
 
 ̅  0.996      2.018  ̂ 0.050   0.000 
      0.575      
  0.725        0.319         0.250 
 
7.54. Aggregated petroleum price for households 
        
       = 3.004 - 0.041×           
       + 0.644×    (   
   ) + 1.257×           
                         (0.073) (0.757)                          (0.000)                        (0.000)                               
 
                           = 0.673×      +        
 
 ̅  0.988      1.746  ̂ 0.071   0.000 
      0.839      
  0.495        0.887         0.857 
 
7.55. Gasoline price 
      
          = 0.289 - 0.593×         
          + 0.191×    (   
   ) + 0.693×                  
                              (0.817)(0.000)                               (0.001)                         (0.000)               
 
                              +0.150×     - 0.132×     
                               (0.006)            (0.020) 
               
                                   = 0.617×      +        
 
 ̅  0.989      1.279  ̂ 0.059   0.000 
      0.107      
  0.749        0.209         0.686 
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7.56. Diesel price  
      
        = -1.400 - 0.539×         
        + 0.353×    (   
   ) + 0.925×                  
                           (0.324)(0.000)                           (0.000)                         (0.000)               
 
                            - 0.208×     
                             (0.000)           
               
                                   = 0.730×      +        
 
 ̅  0.992      2.083  ̂ 0.079   0.000 
      0.585      
  0.279        0.137         0.662 
 
7.57. Heavy-oil price for non-power 
         
        = -2.079 - 0.594×            
        + 0.384×    (   
   ) + 0.854×                  
                             (0.324) (0.000)                             (0.000)                         (0.000)               
 
                            - 0.208×     - 0.208×     
                              (0.000)          (0.000)  
 
 ̅  0.990      2.096  ̂ 0.082   0.000 
      0.439      
  0.171        0.118         0.367 
 
7.58. Heavy-oil price for power generation 
         
        = -1.303 - 0.149×            
        + 0.843×    (   
   ) + 1.282×                  
                             (0.441) (0.269)                             (0.000)                         (0.005)               
 
 ̅  0.988      2.314  ̂ 0.062   0.000 
      0.625      
  0.618        0.208         0.937 
 
7.59. LPG price  
      
        = -0.606 + 0.699×         
        + 0.229×    (   
   ) + 0.569×                  
                              (0.001) (0.000)                             (0.000)                         (0.005)      
 
                             - 0.322×     - 0.603×     
                               (0.017)          (0.000)           
 
 ̅  0.974      2.114  ̂ 0.069   0.000 
      0.892      
  0.992        0.350         0.277 
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7.60. JA price 
      
    = -1.980 + 0.576×         
    + 0.444×    (   
   ) + 0.332×          - 0.385×     
                      (0.004) (0.000)                       (0.000)                        (0.002)                    (0.003) 
 
 ̅  0.976      2.591  ̂ 0.099   0.000 
      0.380      
  0.729        0.580         0.420 
 
7.61. Non-energy petroleum price 
      
        = -6.774 + 0.553×         
        + 0.428×    (   
   ) + 1.054×           
                             (0.000) (0.000)                             (0.000)                        (0.000)                   
 
                           + 0.368×      
                              (0.000) 
 
 ̅  0.991      1.570  ̂ 0.084   0.000 
      0.317      
  0.207        0.774         0.864 
 
7.62. LNG price for non-power 
         
     = 3.840 - 0.482×            
     + 0.238×    (   
   ) + 0.287×                  
                      (0.005) (0.016)                           (0.002)                         (0.175)               
 
                       - 0.383×     - 0.136×     
                         (0.003)         (0.211)  
 
 ̅  0.960      2.248  ̂ 0.0.83   0.000 
      0.163      
  0.365        0.750         0.545 
 
7.63. LNG price for power generation 
         
     = 2.548 - 0.111×            
     + 0.610×    (   
   ) + 0.939×                  
                       (0.108)(0.449)                           (0.000)                         (0.015)               
 
 ̅  0.981      1.866  ̂ 0.054   0.000 
      0.930      
  0.566        0.422         0.549 
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7.64. City-gas price for industry 
        
      = - 3.017 + 0.573×           
      + 0.660×    (     
   ) - 0.353×     - 0.321×     
                          (0.001)  (0.000)                        (0.000)                      (0.010)          (0.290)                
 
                         - 0.321×     
                          (0.001) 
    
                              = 0.521×      +        
 
 ̅  0.994      1.505  ̂ 0.042   0.000 
      0.260      
  0.372        0.459         0.976 
                                                          
7.65. City-gas price for commerce and public 
         
      = 0.116 + 0.508×            
      + 0.490×    (     
   ) - 0.180×     - 0.355×     
                       (0.711)   (0.000)                          (0.000)                      (0.000)          (0.000)    
 
                       - 0.111×     
                        (0.006)    
 
 ̅  0.992      1.553  ̂ 0.034   0.000 
      0.352      
  0.885        0.892         0.180 
 
7.66. City-gas price for households 
        
      = 1.110 + 0.131×           
      + 0.771×    (     
   ) - 0.758×     - 0.296×       
                       (0.000)   (0.000)                        (0.000)                      (0.000)          (0.000)    
 
 ̅  0.999      2.431  ̂ 0.018   0.000 
      0.341      
  0.938        0.378         0.224 
 
7.67. Electricity price for industry 
        
      = 5.524 + 0.418×           
      + 0.078×        
      - 0.055×     - 0.084×       
                      (0.028)   (0.042)                       (0.009)                         (0.035)          (0.016)   
 
 ̅  0.985      2.554  ̂ 0.017   0.000 
      0.409      
  0.630        0.218         0.693 
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7.68. Electricity price for commerce and public 
         
      = 4.203 + 0.638×            
      + 0.028×        
      + 0.089×     - 0.037×     
                       (0.153)  (0.012)                          (0.042)                          (0.037)           (0.087)    
 
                              = -0.305×      +        
 
 ̅  0.909      2.644  ̂ 0.016   0.000 
      0.257      
  0.867        0.467         0.151 
 
7.69. Electricity price for households 
        
      = 5.106 + 0.490×           
      + 0.067×        
      - 0.032×     - 0.025×     
                       (0.012) (0.007)                          (0.002)                         (0.056)          (0.091)    
 
 ̅  0.980      2.365  ̂ 0.011   0.000 
      0.605      
  0.881        0.559         0.653 
 
7.70. Total main energy cost by industry 
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7.75. Aggregated energy price for households 
    
  
 
   
    
          
        
         
       
         
       
          
      
 
7.76. Cost share log ratio of petroleum to bituminous coal in industry 
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7.77. Cost share log ratio of city-gas to bituminous coal in industry 
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7.78. Cost share log ratio of electricity to bituminous coal in industry 
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7.79. Cost share log ratio of petroleum to electricity in commerce and pubic 
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7.80. Cost share log ratio of city-gas to electricity in commerce and pubic 
                             
            (     
          
    )       
     
    
     
       
                                         
         
     
     
     
                
       
     
       
      
  
- 196 - 
7.81. Cost share log ratio of petroleum to anthracite coal in households 
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7.82. Cost share log ratio of city-gas to anthracite coal in households 
                           
                
           (    
         
     )  
                       
    
     
  
                         
          
    
     
  
                     
                       
         
    
    
  
                
      
    
      
       
 
7.83. Cost share log ratio of electricity to anthracite coal in households 
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7.84. Cost share of petroleum in industry 
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7.85. Cost share of city-gas industry 
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7.86. Cost share of electricity industry 
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7.87. Cost share of bituminous industry 
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7.88. Cost share of petroleum in commerce and public 
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7.89. Cost share of city-gas in commerce and public 
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7.90. Cost share of electricity in commerce and public 
     
            
           
    
 
 
7.91. Cost share of petroleum in households 
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7.92. Cost share of city-gas in households 
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7.93. Cost share of electricity in households 
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7.94. Cost share of anthracite coal in households 
    
            
          
         
     
 
 
c) Environment  
7.95. CO2 Emissions by petroleum products 
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7.96. CO2 Emissions by bituminous coal 
    
        
                
             
 
7.97. CO2 Emissions by natural gas 
    
      
                  
         
 
7.98. Total CO2 Emissions  
         
          
         
        
     
 
 
7.99~119. Carbon pricing 
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A.3.3. CARBON EMISSION FACTORS 
Table A.3.2. Carbon emission factors 
` 
Carbon Emission Factor 
C kg/GJ C Ton/TOE 
Liquid 
Fossil 
Primary fuels 
Crude oil 20.00 0.829 
Natural Gas Liquids 17.20 0.630 
Secondary fuels 
Gasoline 18.90 0.783 
Avi-gasoline 18.90 0.783 
Other Keroseone 19.50 0.812 
Jet Kerosene 19.60 0.808 
Diesel Oil 20.20 0.837 
Heavy Oil 21.10 0.875 
LPG 17.20 0.713 
Naphtha 20.00 0.829 
Bitumen 22.00 0.912 
Lubricants 20.00 0.829 
Petroleum Coke 27.50 1.140 
Refinery Feedstock 20.00 0.829 
Soild Fossil 
Primary fuels 
Anthracite 26.80 1.100 
Cocking coal 25.80 1.059 
Other Bituminous Coal 25.80 1.059 
Lignite 27.60 1.132 
Peat 28.90 1.186 
Secondary fuels 
BKB & Patent Fuel 25.80 1.059 
Coke Oven 29.50 1.210 
Gaseous Fossil Natural Gas (Dry) 15.30 0.637 
Biomass 
Solid Biomass 29.90 1.252 
Liquild Biomass 20.00 0.837 
Gas Biomass 30.60 1.281 
Source: IPCC (1996)  
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A.3.4. RESULT OF THE EX-POST SIMULATION 
Table A.3.3. Ex-post simulation errors 
Notation MAPE Notation MAPE Notation MAPE 
CG 1.04     4.79     2.34 
CP 1.11    
   
 5.50      2.14 
ER 5.70    
   
 5.87     1.62 
EX 3.26         5.64     1.06 
I 2.42    
     
 4.70         3.41 
IM 3.09   
     
 5.38         5.44 
K 0.91   
     
 4.57   
    
 2.57 
L 0.36    0.84    
  1.40 
L
*
 0.36 PY 1.17    
  0.96 
LNSR1cp 7.08    
     
 0.00     
  2.36 
LNSR1h 4.08   
     
 15.72        1.75 
LNSR1i 6.24   
     
 3.94      1.52 
LNSR2cp 4.05    
     
 5.59         1.40 
LNSR2h 3.63  
    
 6.54     
     
 6.58 
LNSR2i 12.43  
    
 3.60    
     
 6.35 
LNSR3h 3.74   
     
 5.73    
     
 1.44 
LNSR3i 4.90    
    
 5.66     
     
 1.37 
M3 1.45      
    
 2.07   
    
 4.68 
   
     
 4.70   
    
 2.38        1.99 
   
     
 6.79   
    
 2.59        5.60 
  
      
 5.10    
    
 2.54      0.88 
   0.52    
    
 2.38   2.23 
   
    
 4.27  
 
    
 2.59   
      12.66 
  
    
 4.04  
 
    
 2.54   
      14.44 
  
    
 6.43    
    
 2.84         2.04 
   1.43    
        
 2.13    
    
 8.26 
        4.14    
      
 2.34   
    
 4.28 
   
    
 0.86       3.11   
    
 6.19 
  
    
 0.77  
  
 2.05   
     3.52 
  
    
 1.00    
  
 2.05   
     2.52 
    0.33    
  
 2.05    
      7.39 
   
 
 0.52    
   
 1.35   
      5.13 
  
 
 0.50         2.49   
      3.79 
  
 
 3.53    
      
 2.49   13.32 
          4.94   
      
 2.49 Y 0.96 
   
      
 5.42   
      
 2.49 YCB 5.16 
   
      
 7.45    
     
 8.30    1.40 
   1.51   
     
 6.42    1.92 
    4.29   
     
 4.41   1.98 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EFFECT OF RESTRUCTURING THE CURRENT 
ENERGY TAXES AND ELECTRICITY PRICING SYSTEM 
WITH THE CARBON TAX POLICY ON THE ECONOMY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the Korean government set a national goal to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emissions by 30 per cent compared to Business As Usual (BAU) by 2020, introducing a 
carbon tax has been considered as a cost-effective policy, since the carbon tax internalizes the 
externality of GHG emissions of fossil fuels through levying taxes on the carbon contents of 
fossil fuels and the government takes new revenue from the carbon tax which can be re-
distributed in various ways. In particular, the revenue can be used to reduce pre-existing 
distortionary taxes
50
.  
However, the concern has been raised as to whether the carbon tax policy would put a 
heavier burden on the economy through pushing up products‟ prices, thereby weakening 
industrial competiveness in a highly carbon-emitting country. Therefore, a number of studies 
have attempted to explore the effects of the carbon policy on the economy using general 
                                                 
50
 While the carbon tax will encourage firms and consumers to use more efficient and consume less carbon 
intensive products and the carbon tax raises revenues that can be redistributed in several ways such as 
subsidising green technology or reducing existing taxes, the cost of administrating the tax may be expensive and 
it is difficult to estimate the level of external cost and how much the carbon tax should be charged. 
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equilibrium models in recent years. In particular, they have paid attention to the effects of 
various carbon tax recycling methods. But, fewer studies have attempted to examine the 
effects of restructuring current inefficient taxes on energy products and the regulated 
electricity pricing structure when a carbon tax is introduced.  
Hoeller and Coppel (1992a, b) point out that distortions in pre-existing taxes on 
energy would be worsened when a country adopts a carbon tax policy without adjustment. 
Their simulation results confirm that reforming pre-existing energy taxes reduce the economic 
costs of the carbon tax. 
The current tax system of Korea has been imposed on energy products to obtain 
revenues regardless of managing the externality of environmental pollution caused from 
consuming the energy products. For example, while relatively high taxes are imposed on 
kerosene, LPG, and LNG compared to their social costs, no taxes are levied on coal which is a 
carbon-intensive fuel. Besides, existing electricity tariffs have been managed from the 
government‟s intervention to remain at lower levels than costs to promote industrial 
competitiveness and price stabilization. It is generally agreed that these current taxes and 
electricity pricing system resulted in inefficient resource allocation. 
The unreasonable energy consumption structure caused by the existing systems would 
be worsened when the carbon tax policy is introduced if the relative prices are further 
distorted by the carbon tax.  As a consequence, adding the carbon tax without rearranging the 
current energy tax and pricing systems is likely to be a relatively inefficient policy. 
Therefore, these concerns over the current taxes on energy products and electricity 
price issues motivate us to analyse the effect of improving the energy tax and electricity price 
system when the carbon tax is introduced. We use the integrated model that couples the 
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macro-econometric model with the MCP electricity market model described in the previous 
Chapter Three. Four scenarios: no carbon taxation (Business As Usual, BAU); 50,000 won 
per tonne of carbon (won/Cton); 50,000 won/Cton with energy taxes reform; and 50,000 
won/Cton with energy taxes and electricity price reforms; will be simulated in order to 
compare the quantitative effects of the different scenarios on the economy. The carbon tax 
rate refers to existing studies Kim, 2012; and Park and Kim, 2012) and the case of a European 
country, Denmark, in which the carbon tax has been operated since 1996. The result shows 
that restructuring energy taxes and the electricity pricing system play an important role on 
determining economic costs of the carbon tax and emissions. Overall, the restructuring cases 
are shown to be more cost-effective than the case without restructuring. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two reviews the theories of the 
carbon tax and previous literature on the effects of the carbon tax policies. Section three 
describes the current status of energy taxes and electricity pricing system in Korea. Section 
four performs the simulations of the carbon tax scenarios. Section five concludes this chapter.  
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A carbon tax is a type of Pigovian tax (Pigou, 1920) that internalises a negative 
externality (for example, global warming) by imposing a tax per unit of emissions which is 
equal to the marginal social cost in order to prevent the market failure incurred from the 
externality. The carbon tax is imposed on the carbon content of fossil fuels such as petroleum 
products, coal, and city-gas. The combustion of those products releases CO2 into the 
atmosphere which is one of the greenhouse gases (GHG) causing global warming.  
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The carbon tax creates an economic incentive for agents to abate emissions by the 
following factors; firstly, raising the prices of fossil fuels decreases real income, and thus 
reduces consumption of the fuels in the short-run. Secondly, the changes in relative prices 
among the fuels prompt agents to substitute less carbon-intensive fuels for carbon intensive 
ones in the short-run. Lastly, high energy prices facilitate investment in energy-saving 
technology and development of GHG intensity-reducing technology. In addition to the 
incentive, the carbon tax generates revenue which can be re-distributed in various ways. In 
particular, the government can use the revenue to reduce existing distortionary taxes such as 
labour income and capital taxes. For those reasons, the carbon tax is regarded as one of the 
most efficient policies to reduce GHG emissions.   
The effect of a carbon tax has already been reported in an extensive international and 
domestic literature; Orlov et al. (2013) provides a survey of theoretical studies and empirical 
research on the impact of a carbon tax, mainly the possibility of double dividend – both 
reduce GHG emissions and lower the costs of a tax system. Tol (2013) collects statistics of 
empirical studies on the economic impact of climate change and the marginal damage costs. 
Goulder (2013) and Donald and Toder (2014) summarise the issues of a carbon tax in terms 
from the point of view of a public finance.  
Given the purpose of this thesis, the literature review focuses on the problem of 
distortions in energy taxes and the electricity pricing system and on domestic studies of the 
effects of a carbon tax on the economy.  
It is also worth briefly mentioning notable studies analysing interaction with the other 
taxes. Bovenberg and Mooij (1994); Goulder (1995); and Wissema and Dellink (2007), focus 
on assessing the double dividend hypothesis (i.e. improvement in both the environment and 
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the economy) by reducing distorting pre-existing taxes such as capital and labour taxes 
through the carbon tax revenue recycling. A recent paper, Goulder (2013), reviews this 
literature from the point of view of how climate change policies and environmental policies 
interact with the fiscal system including pre-existing taxes. The paper points out that a tax on 
energy is an implicit tax on factors of production. For example, if a carbon tax is introduced, 
the implicit tax on labour increases the labour supply curve further compared to the case of 
pre-existing tax on labour. Therefore, this leads to a further reduction in labour supply which 
is an additional efficiency loss, termed the tax-interaction effect. Goulder (2013) specifies 
necessary conditions for the double dividend in real world economies; (i) the initial tax 
system must be inefficient along some non-environmental dimension, and (ii) the revenue-
neutral tax reform reduces this non-environmental inefficiency. 
On the other hand, Kopp and Pizer (2007) and Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) argued the 
importance of imposing border tax adjustments (BTAs) for economic efficiency in carbon 
emission abatement among countries. Other studies, Goh (2004), Demailly and Quirion 
(2006), Babiker and Rutherfod (2005), Metcalf and Weisbach (2009), and Metcalf (2013) 
point out the necessity of the BTAs for preventing carbon leakage defined as increase in GHG 
emissions by shifting production or investment from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. 
Earlier Korean studies in the late 1990s have focused on the effects of a carbon tax on 
economic growth and reduction in emissions. Kang (1998) compared the effects of a carbon 
tax, ad valorem tax, and unit tax on energy on the main macroeconomic variables and on 
emissions reduction using a CGE model. He found that the carbon tax is the most cost-
effective policy for emission mitigation. Kang (1999) investigated the effects of the carbon 
tax, domestic emission trading, and international emission trading policies on the economy 
with a CGE model. The results show that domestic policies would cause a heavy burden on 
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the economy because of the high marginal abatement cost, so that introducing international 
emission trading is needed to achieve the emission target cost effectively. Shin (2000) 
compared imperfect competition with economies of scale and with constant returns to scale 
(CRTS) with perfect competition by adopting the CGE model. He concludes that the CRTS 
case may underestimate the economic cost of the carbon tax. Bu (2002, 2003) built up a 
macro-econometric model which consists of macroeconomic, energy, and environmental 
modules. The model is applied to analyse the impact of the carbon tax policy on the economy. 
He found that reinvestment into energy efficiency and renewable energy from the tax revenue 
can reduce the economic loss caused by the carbon tax policy. 
While earlier studies simply assumed that the carbon tax revenue is re-distributed to 
households as a lump-sum transfer, later works paid attention to the role of the carbon 
revenue recycling methods. Oh and Cho (2001) analysed the different impacts of the carbon 
tax when the revenue is used in one of several possible ways; reduction in income tax, pay-
roll tax, or corporate income tax using an overlapping general equilibrium model. The study 
cautiously concludes that carbon tax recycling by reducing the corporate income tax may 
increase GDP despite the reduction of emissions. Ryu and Cho (2004) analysed the cost of a 
carbon tax, performance standard, mandated technology, and fuel tax, given the pre-existing 
distortions from income tax, corporate tax, and value added tax exist using a CGE model. The 
results confirm that the GDP loss was the smallest in the carbon tax case among the policies. 
Lim and Kim (2010) have focused on the payroll and corporate tax reduction. Shin et al. 
(2010) have compared the lump-sum transfer and pay-roll tax reduction. The two studies (Lim 
and Kim, 2010; Shin et al., 2010) using the CGE model point out that employment can be 
improved if the carbon tax revenue is recycled to reduce the payroll tax. 
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                                 Figure 4.1. Marginal and average cost of carbon taxes 
                                    Source: Holeller and Coppel (1992b) 
However, these works have shed little light on the effects of reforming pre-existing 
taxes on energy products and energy pricing system when the carbon tax is introduced. 
Hoeller and Coppel (1992a, b) give convincing answers to these questions with the illustrative 
Figure 4.1.above;  
Assume that there are two countries (A and B), they have the same fuel and the 
demand function satisfying the law of diminishing marginal utility, no tax exists in country A, 
and the fuel is taxed at   
  in country B. Thus, the prices of the fuel are determined at    
  in 
country A and   
    
  in country B, which leads to emissions   
  and   
  respectively. If 
both governments in two countries decide the same reduction target (i.e.   
    
  =  
    
  , 
different levels of the carbon tax are required:   
  in country A and   
  in country B. Therefore, 
the cost measured by loss in consumer surplus is the triangle area,     in country A. In the 
case of country B, the cost calculated by the difference between total loss, the triangle area, 
    and the loss from the pre-existing tax, the triangle area,     is the trapezoid area,     . 
For any demand functions; linear or hyperbolic curves (the cost in the linear case is larger 
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than in the hyperbolic one), the area      is larger than    . Therefore, a pre-existing tax 
enlarges the cost incurred by introducing the carbon tax. However, it is important to note that 
if the tax is set at the right level to internalise externalities such as congestion costs, the 
economic cost is equal to the area of triangle    , since the remaining part of costs,      
would be offset through recycling the revenue for improvement in social welfare. If carbon-
intensive fossil fuels such as coal and heavy-oil are untaxed or lightly taxed compared to their 
social costs, the economic cost is larger than the area of     . Thus, the optimum level of the 
pre-existing tax determines the economic cost which has a range between     and     . 
Practically, Hoeller and Coppel (1992a,b)‟s simulation results using a partial equilibrium 
model advocate that both economic cost and emissions could be reduced through rearranging 
the existing taxes to reflect the externalities of fossil-fuel consumption. Burniaux et al. (1992) 
also find that pricing energy efficiently and then imposing a carbon tax leads to cutting CO2 
emissions more cost-effectively through energy conservation and substitutions. Paltsev et al. 
(2005) analysed the effects of a carbon tax exemption for transportation fuels on the economy 
in U.S. and European countries via a general equilibrium model. They point out that a pre-
existing tax affects the policy cost; if the pre-existing tax is distorted, it increases the cost.  
Recently, growing recognition of the necessity of reforming the existing energy tax 
system before introducing a carbon tax has been reflected in quantitative simulation studies. 
Jung and Park (2010) estimated the inefficiency of energy consumption caused from current 
abnormal electricity prices using a logit cost share model. The result shows that a cost 
reflective price is able to produce net benefits through saving fuel and imports for power 
generation. Park and Kim (2012) analysed the effect of taxation of electricity consumption 
and coal for power generation and CO2 emissions using a CGE model. Lastly, Kim (2012) 
examined the influence of existing energy taxes on the economy when a carbon tax is 
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introduced using a CGE model. Tax recycling methods such as a lump-sum transfer and 
payroll tax reduction are considered. They suggest that reforming the pre-existing tax system 
can lessen costs for reducing emissions. This research directs our attention to reforming the 
pre-existing energy tax system, as in Kim (2012). But, our approach can be distinguished in 
that we analyse the current electricity price system, together with the energy taxes, and adopt 
the integrated model combining a macro-econometric model and an MCP electricity market 
model which allows analysing the current electricity pricing system. 
This integrated model has advantages over the CGE model that the earlier studies 
adopted. While the CGE model has limitations to capture the electricity‟s sector, regarded as 
the most influential sector to determine the carbon cost, due to simplified supply functions, 
the integrated model has the most suitable method to represent the demand pattern for 
electricity and technical properties of power plant precisely by building up a specialized 
module for the electricity sector. Furthermore, CGE models borrow the value of parameters 
from outside rather than using direct estimation. On the other hand, all behavioural equations 
in the integrated model are set up after econometric justification. Consequently, the integrated 
model can be expected to provide a more accurate method to examine the effect of a carbon 
policy on the economy. 
It is also worth mentioning that CGE studies over a long-term period can be used to 
examine the effects of technical progress scenarios on carbon costs. This routine is subject to 
criticism; Herm (2003) point out the assumption for technical progress should be robustly 
scrutinised as the assumption will lower costs of energy supply or efficiency, and explain the 
reason why past predictions of falling costs have not realised. Therefore, we employ a 
dynamic linear logit-model derived from Tradeway (1971)‟s optimal path to adjustment 
process theory which is able to capture gradual changes in energy demand over the long-run 
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due to technological elements empirically (see literature review on section 3.2.3.2(b) in 
chapter 3), rather than matching exogenous assumptions for technical progress. 
 
4.3. CURRENT ENERGY TAXES AND PRICING SYSTEM IN KOREA51
 
4.3.1. Energy taxes 
A wide variety of energy taxes are used around the world; the International Energy 
Agency produces regular reports (see particularly, IEA statistics, 2013). This section, however, 
concentrates on the taxes and levies imposed on energy products in Korea. 
Various taxes and levies have been imposed on petroleum products in Korea. For 
example, there are the transportation tax, individual consumption tax, education tax, local 
motor fuel tax, value added tax, customs, import and sales levy, safety management levy, and 
quality management levy. The individual consumption tax on gasoline and diesel was 
replaced by the transportation tax as a temporary measure from 1994 to 2006. The term, 
„transportation tax‟ has been changed to „transportation-energy-environment tax‟ since 2007. 
Objects of the taxation are gasoline, diesel, and similar substitute fuels for petroleum. The 
transportation-energy-environment tax is a flexible tariff system with basic tax rate of 30%. 
The education tax has been imposed at 15% of the transportation-energy-environment tax or 
individual consumption tax, which is used for expenditure related to education business. The 
tax rate on local motor fuel introduced in January, 2000 increased from 26.5% of the 
transportation tax to 32.5% of the transportation-energy-environment tax in July, 2007, which 
is mainly spent for subsidising transportation. In addition to these taxes, the import and sales 
                                                 
51
 This section refers to Jung and Park (2010) who conduct a study analysing problems of the existing energy tax 
and price system. 
- 212 - 
levy has been introduced since 2001 for demand management and price stabilization. This tax 
system for petroleum products has been transformed from an ad valorem tax to a unit tax 
since 1996 in order to gain revenues steadily in spite of volatile international oil prices and 
raise foreseeability. In the case of city-gas and electricity, value added tax, individual 
consumption tax, duties and several levies are imposed on the city-gas tariff. But only value 
added tax and electric power industry basis fund are levied on the electricity tariff (see Table 
A.4.1 in appendix for current energy taxation system). 
As explained above, these taxes have been introduced mainly for securing tax revenue 
and financing transportation infrastructure expenditure. However, these complex taxes on 
petroleum products are far apart from the purpose that induces end users to save energy 
consumption and reduce environmental pollution through raising prices by taxation so as to 
reflect social costs of externalities. Even worse, the government levies a different tax rate on 
each energy product without a clear standard, which contradicts the principle of equal taxation. 
Jung and Park (2010) assess the structure of energy prices and analyse its problems in Korea. 
They compare the taxes rates on energy products with social costs which include traffic 
congestion costs and environmental costs. They point out that excessive tax rates and 
additional charges on kerosene and propane should be reduced, while the tax rate on heavy-oil 
and diesel should be increased. 
Figure 4.2 compares social costs and taxes of energy products. As mentioned in Jung 
and Park (2010), overall, the current tax system does not reflect social costs correctly, even 
though various taxes are imposed on petroleum products. And the inequalities in tax burdens 
bring distortions in energy consumption, which will be explained later. 
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           Figure 4.2. Energy product’s externality cost and tax 
            Source: Jung and Park (2010)  
            Note: the externality cost consists of air pollution, GHG emission, and traffic congestion. Their monetary 
value refers to European Commission Directorate General Environment (2005); EU-ETS emissions 
permit price, 25 EUR/tCO2, and the Cho et al. (2007) respectively. 
            ACOAL and BCOAL represent anthracite and bituminous coal respectively. 
 
4.3.2. Energy prices  
While petroleum products prices have been determined by the price mechanism in a 
competitive market as the government has introduced price liberalization since 1997, the 
tariffs of network energy such as city-gas and electricity have been regulated by Rate of 
Return Regulation (RORR) by the government.  
It is generally agreed that the biggest problem the network energy pricing system 
facing is for electricity. The electricity tariff system is primarily divided by end user 
classification and then further subdivided into groups according to voltage and contracts. 
Different prices are charged to each type of end-users. The relatively higher tariffs have been 
imposed on residential and general users to guide saving energy, whereas lower tariffs have 
been levied on the industrial and agriculture sectors to enhance industrial competiveness, 
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because electricity is regarded as one of the important input factors for production in Korea. 
These different compensation rates lead to cross-price subsidy systems.  
Overall, the electricity tariffs for all customers are too low to cover supply costs. The 
Korea Electric Power Corporation, (KEPCO) which is a monopolistic supplier has never 
gained the desired level of RORR since 2003 by the government‟s intervention. Table 4.1 
shows the current average electricity cost and price in Korea. Although the fuel costs for 
power generation have risen significantly since the mid-2000s, the increase in electricity tariff 
has stayed at a lower level than the rise in the cost, due to the government regulation. The 
government planned to introduce a “linking the electricity tariff with fuel procurement 
expenses” system in July, 2011 in order to readjust the electricity prices to a realistic level. 
But, the government postponed the effective date of the regulation, owing to concerns over a 
rise in inflation. Thus, the average selling price has been consistently lower than the average 
cost, as seen in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1. Average electricity costs and price in Korea                                                   (unit: won/kWh) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Average  
cost 
75.88 80.48 82.95 102.00 92.06 96.27 103.31 
Average 
selling price 
74.39 76.45 77.71 79.24 84.23 86.80 90.32 
Compensation 
Rate (%) 
98.00 95.00 93.70 77.70 91.50 90.20 87.40 
Source: Jung and Park (2010) 
 
4.3.3. Distortion in energy consumption  
Aforementioned, the inequalities in tax assessments and the government‟s network 
price regulations cause relative energy price distortions and an unreasonable energy 
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consumption structure. In particular, the electricity prices became significantly lower than 
some petroleum products, because fuel costs for power generation were not reflected 
accurately in the electricity tariffs at the right time and relatively high taxes are imposed on 
petroleum produces. Table 4.2 compares the two petroleum products for heating and 
electricity prices.  
Table 4.2. Petroleum and Electricity prices                                                        (unit: thousand won/TOE) 
 
Petroleum Electricity 
Kerosene Propane Households Public Industry Agriculture 
2005    1,004      943  1,059 1,107 701 485 
2006    1,076     1,036  1,090 1,138 720 500 
2007    1,046     1,104  1,102 1,135 751 494 
2008    1,384     1,485  1,135 1,108 770 493 
2009    1,091     1,309  1,140 1,145 857 490 
2010    1,201     1,504  1,202 1,150 891 495 
2011    1,476     1,688  1,222 1,182 945 495 
Source: Author‟s calibration based on Korean Energy Economic Institute (2012) 
 
Thus, the customers lean excessively toward electricity for heating. In view of energy 
conversion and transmission efficiency, the position of current electricity consumption 
contradicts the optimal allocation of resources
52
.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates changes in the fuel mix of final energy demands from 1990 to 
2010. We exclude coking coal and petroleum products for non-energy use to focus on pure-
energy use by end-users. The share of electricity in final energy rose from 13.6% in 1990 to 
30.6% in 2010. On the other hand, the share of petroleum in final energy, which accounts for 
the largest share, 70.8% in 1995, decreased to 43.8% in 2010. As LNG has been imported 
                                                 
52
 Note that Korea has not experienced supply interruptions so far. Besides, fossil fuels for power are also 
imported from other countries. Thus, it cannot be seen that security of supply concerns restricted the current 
excessive demand for electricity.  
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from 1986, the share of city-gas also steadily increases to 17.3% in 2010 from 1.7% in 1990. 
The share of coal, which occupied 20.3% in 1990, sharply decreases to 8.3% of final energy 
demands. 
 
                      Figure 4.3. The change in final energy demands from 1990 to 2010 
 
As seen from the share of electricity and petroleum, the low electricity tariff with the 
tax system drives out oil-stoves and promotes the installation of electric heaters, and 
consequently the demand for electricity goes on rapidly growing. This excessive demand for 
electricity gives rise to concern over lack of reserve supplies at peak times in summer and 
winter. To crown all, a temporary blackout took place on September 15
th
, 2011 due to a surge 
in demand caused by unseasonably hot Fall weather, together with reduced capacity because 
of regular maintenance. 
Furthermore, the abnormal energy pricing system incurred excessive electricity 
demands in Korea where coal is the dominant technology in generation (bituminous and 
anthracite coals represent 40 per cent in total generation in 2010) and it is hard to reduce GHG 
emissions from coal power plants given the limited abatement options for coal fired power. 
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There are, overall, three types of abatement technology; energy saving, fuel-switching (oil-
gas), and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), although its feasibility is uncertain at this time. 
The government also pays attention to a new technology; an Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plant that reduces emissions significantly through coal 
gasification, but its cost is much higher than the traditional coal power plant at this stage. 
Dealing with emissions from coal fired power plant is a key factor to help mitigate GHG 
emissions in Korea.  
To sum up, the price stabilization and industrial competiveness from the electricity 
price intervention is an offset to the inadequate energy consumption structure and aggravated 
environmental externalities.  
 
4.4. METHODOLOGY AND SIMULATION 
4.4.1. Methodology 
Carbon tax policy simulations are conducted using the integrated model combining the 
macro-econometric model and the MCP electricity model presented in the second and third 
chapters. The model has advantages over existing studies in that the electricity sector which is 
the largest source of emissions is modelled more accurately by employing the bottom-up 
method and fuel-switching effects in the non-electricity sector are examined empirically by 
adopting the cost logit model which is an econometric model of inter-fuel substitution. 
Besides, the parameters on agent‟s behavioural equations verified by econometric methods 
capture the current pricing system; adopting the partial adjustment model is able to explain 
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the relatively slow adjustment of the price level. Thus, the model is expected to provide 
realistic quantified results for the carbon tax policy‟s effects on the economy.   
We run an ex-post dynamic simulation given exogenous variables such as foreign 
countries‟ GDP, CPI, interest rate, and international price indices over the period from 2005 
to 2011. A policy experiment requires at least two simulations; a controlled simulation which 
produces a reference case solution and a policy disturbed simulation which provides a new 
solution which reacts to the impact of changing parameter values or exogenous variables by 
setting a policy scenario. Macro-econometric studies usually measure a percentage change in 
an endogenous variable corresponding to different carbon tax scenarios in order to examine 
the impacts of a policy on the economy.  
It is worth defining the multiplier. The difference between the reference case and the 
policy solution give a multiplier
53
 which is normally measured by a percentage change in an 
endogenous variable to correspond to an increase in a policy variable of 1. For example, 
increase a policy variable, G by 2, and then a multiplier is obtained by taking the changes in a 
endogenous variable Y and dividing the changes in Y by the size of the change in G, 2 which 
is corresponds to an increase in G of 1 (For details, see page 422 in Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1997). Thus, the multiplier can be regarded as an index adjusted by the scale of the change in 
a policy variable in order to evaluate the extent to which a change in one variable affects other 
variables. Finally, the policy effects on the economy can be figured out by looking at the 
multipliers of the endogenous variable.  
 
                                                 
53
 A dynamic model which has lagged variables yields a sequence of multipliers. An impact multiplier (or short-
term multiplier) is the change in the initial first-period and the total long-run multiplier is obtained by summing 
up all the dynamic multipliers over the simulation period (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1997). 
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4.4.2. Scenarios 
In view of existing literature (Kim, 2012; Park and Kim, 2012) analysing the effects of 
the carbon tax rate on the Korean economy and Denmark in which the carbon tax rate, 16.4 
U.S. dollars per tonne of CO2
54
 has been uniformly imposed on all fossil fuels in 2007 (Kim, 
2012), a carbon tax of 50,000 won/CTon
55
 is adopted for simulation. The carbon tax is 
imposed on coal (anthracite coal and bituminous coal), petroleum goods (gasoline, kerosene, 
diesel, heavy oil, propane, butane, and non-energy oil), and LNG. 
As explained in section 4.3, several petroleum products such as kerosene, LPG, and 
city-gas are already highly taxed compared to their social costs and the electricity supplier 
receives tariffs which are lower than its costs due to government intervention. Therefore, we 
examine the effects of restructuring the existing electricity pricing and tax systems on energy 
products on the economy, emissions reduction, and the energy mix when the carbon tax is 
introduced by setting the following four cases;  
(1) No carbon taxation, Business as usual (BAU) case 
(2) Maintaining the current electricity pricing system and energy taxes, and introducing a 
carbon tax of 50,000won/Cton along with passing carbon tax costs in power generation on to 
customers slowly by the electricity pricing equation (3.81) (CTAX50) 
(3) Restructuring the pre-existing energy tax system in which the carbon tax, 50,000won/Cton 
is imposed on fossil fuels except for kerosene, LPG, and city-gas, along with the same slow 
adjustment of electricity price as in case (2) (CTAX+RT) 
                                                 
54
 1 tonne of Carbon is equivalent to 44/12 tonnes of CO2. 
55
 50,000 Won is equivalent to 13.5 U.S. Dollar in April, 2014.. 
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(4) Restructuring the pre-existing energy tax system as in the CTAX+RT case and introducing 
a reformed electricity pricing system in which an electricity supplier receives a 100% cost 
compensation rate from all sectors (industry, commerce and public, and households)
56
 and 
passing the full additional costs incurred from the carbon tax in power generation directly on 
to customers as well as introducing the carbon tax of 50,000won/Cton using the following 
equation (CTAX50+RTRP) 
               
    =     
     +    
        
where,      
     denotes electricity prices by sector j,     
      the normal electricity price in which 
the supplier receives 100% cost compensation rate, and     
     the carbon tax cost in power 
generation sector.  
It is important to note that fundamentally, the revenues from the carbon tax are re-
distributed to households as a lump-sum transfer in all cases under the revenue-neutral 
assumption. Besides, we assume that the electricity supplier issues a bond to finance the 
deficit caused from the low electricity tariff in cases 1~3. Therefore, any increase in this 
deficit raises the yield of corporate bonds in the macro-econometric module. The estimation 
result for the corporate bond yield equation shows that the elasticity of yield with respect to 
the deficit adjusted by GDP deflator is 0.35, although it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient is assumed to hold for the simulations in this study.  
                                                 
56
 Note that due to data availability, we apply the compensation rate in 2011 to the simulation period. The data in 
2011 is provided in Table 4.3. 
 
                       Table 4.3. Average electricity costs and price in 2011                                                                                     
 
Average cost 
(won/kWh) 
Average selling price 
(won/kWh) 
Compensation rate 
(%) 
Residence 135.87 119.99 88.3 
General 109.69 101.61 92.6 
Industry 92.88 81.23 87.5 
Total 103.31 90.32 87.4 
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In addition, it is worth mentioning that simulation scenarios adopted in this study are 
carefully chosen based on a revenue neutrality assumption adopted in the existing simulation 
studies in which the government imposes one tax and lightens another. One would think of 
simply reforming the existing taxes as a scenario, but it needs the revenue neutrality 
assumption to compare with the other cases fairly. In our case, the simple reform case, just 
giving exemptions to kerosene, LPG, and LNG is very likely to incur a budget deficit problem 
in a nation. The results cannot be fairly compared with the other cases due to a different 
finance situation. Alternatively, the CTAX50+RT case provides a suitable method to examine 
pre-existing taxes 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
This section summarises the main effects of the carbon tax policy on energy prices, the 
energy mix of final energy demands and power generation, and macroeconomic indicators 
such as GDP, consumption, investment, export, the unemployment rate, the consumer price 
and producer price index, and emission reductions
57
.  
 
4.5.1. Energy prices 
Given the carbon tax scenarios, average annual increases for specific energy products 
are provided in Table 4.4. The high carbon emission factor of energy causes higher energy 
                                                 
57
 Emission reductions can bring primary benefits and secondary benefits. According to Ayers and Walter (1991), 
the primary benefit is defined as the avoided direct damage such as loss of economic activity and other 
consequences environmental changes. The secondary benefit includes reducing fossil fuels consumption per unit 
of economic activity (energy conservation) and substitution between lower carbon energy for carbon-intensive 
energy (carbon substitution). However, the benefit cannot be directly measured due to difficulties of estimating 
their monetary values (see next section 4.5.2.). Therefore, this study focuses on the effects of the carbon tax on 
GDP and reduction of emissions. 
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prices; compared to the BAU case, bituminous coal has the highest average increase, 35.64%, 
followed by anthracite coal, 33.49%, under all carbon tax scenarios. The currently high prices 
of energy forms such as aggregated oil and clean energy sources such as city-gas imply 
relatively lesser increases of 3.34% and 5.36% respectively in the CTAX50 case in which the 
tax of 50,000 won per tonne of carbon is imposed on all fuel products. However, the price of 
aggregated oil increases by only 1.81% and the price of city-gas remains as the BAU case in 
CTAX50+RT and CTAX+RTRP cases, as kerosene, LPG, and LNG are exempted from the 
carbon tax in these cases.  
As for electricity prices in the cases, given the current pricing system regulated by the 
government, the carbon tax pushes the electricity price up by 5.38% and 5.39% in the 
CTAX50 and CTAX50+RT cases. The CTAX50+RTRP case has the highest electricity price; 
when the electricity pricing system was reformed and the carbon tax introduced, the 
electricity price rises by 31.53%.  
 Table 4.4. Carbon tax and  price increase rate 
Fuel 
Price increase rate (%) 
CTAX50 CTAX50+RT CTAX50+RTRP 
Anthracite coal 33.49 33.49 33.49 
Bituminous coal 35.64 35.64 35.64 
Aggregated oil 3.34 1.81 1.81 
City-gas 5.36 0.00 0.00 
Electricity 5.38 5.39 31.53 
 
4.5.2. Macroeconomic indicators and emission reduction 
Table 4.5 compares the change in major macroeconomic indicators, total primary 
energy demands and emissions in the carbon tax scenarios. Overall, the carbon tax policy 
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decreases the GDP even though the revenue from the carbon tax is re-distributed to 
consumers as a lump-sum. As the carbon tax is introduced, the carbon tax increases the 
producer prices, which raises export prices and consumer prices in turn. Therefore, GDP falls 
by at least 0.24% on yearly average in the CTAX50+RT and at most by 0.49% on yearly 
average in the CTAX50+RTRP. 
As seen in Table 4.5, depending on the pre-existing taxes on energy and electricity 
pricing system, the carbon tax policy‟s effects on the economy and emissions yield different 
results. We found that restructuring the pre-existing taxes on energy in the CTAX50+RT case 
is able to reduce the GDP losses by 0.24% compared to the BAU case. The most notable 
decrease in emissions is found when the electricity price system is reformed in the 
CTAX50+RTRP case, which reduces emissions by 11.51% compared to the BAU case. 
However, the significant rise in the price indices such as CPI and PPI coming from the 
electricity price increase brought the largest losses, -0.49% in GDP.  
We define economic cost as GDP loss per tonne of carbon saved relative to BAU
58
. 
Note that the social cost of carbon (SCC) is not offset against this economic cost, given the 
monetary valuation of SCC is complicated by the wide range of SCC values in literature and 
the large uncertainty involved in estimating the potential economic impacts and related costs 
of climate change (Tol, 2013)
59
. Welfare comparisons are vulnerable to sensitivity to the 
valuation of SCC, as the ranking of policy options can be easily manipulated by adopting a 
                                                 
58
 The economic cost is calculated by 
            ∑
 
      
 
   
  
                  
                            
  
where t represents the initial year, N  the last year, and r a discount factor; 0.05  
59
 There are 75 studies with 588 estimates based on different models in his survey. The mean social cost of 
carbon was $196 per ton with a standard deviation of $322 in 2010 dollars. The large divergence is partially due 
to the use of different discount rate. However, controlling for difference does not eliminate uncertainty about the 
social cost of carbon; at a 3 percent real discount rate, the mean social cost was $25 with a standard deviation of 
$22. 
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wide range of values of SCC. On the other hand, the economic cost defined above can provide 
a robust ranking result in terms of the cost per tonne of carbon reduction. The reader could 
then compare these figures to their own preferred value for the social cost of carbon, or use 
that value to obtain a change in overall welfare. Therefore, this thesis intends to focus on 
analysing the effects of a carbon tax on the macroeconomic variables purely as most literature 
did, so that we distinguish the carbon cost from GDP loss per tonne of carbon reduction by 
using a terminology on economic cost that is consistent with Hoeller and Coppel (1992a).  
Table 4.5. Annual average change in variables and economic cost 
  CTAX50 CTAX50+RT CTAX50+RTRP 
GDP -0.27% -0.24% -0.49% 
Private Consumption -0.39% -0.36% -0.88% 
Investment -0.08% -0.08% -0.16% 
Export -0.29% -0.27% -0.44% 
Imports -0.25% -0.23% -0.48% 
Unemployment rate 1.53%p 1.39%p 2.27%p 
CPI 0.35% 0.24% 0.87% 
PPI 0.36% 0.32% 1.21% 
Total primary energy supply 
(TPES) 
-3.60% -3.19% -7.65% 
Emissions (CO2) -5.79% -6.10% -11.51% 
Economic cost  
(Won/Cton) 
263,946 230,940 246,898 
Note: the change in total primary energy does not consider hydro and renewable energy, as they are treated 
exogeously in the model. 
 
The economic cost described in the last row in Table 5 shows that if reforming the energy tax 
(CTAX50+RT) or both energy tax and electricity pricing (CTAX50+RTRP) the economic 
costs are lower than in the CTAX50 case. It implies that well-designed restructuring of the 
pre-existing energy taxes and the electricity pricing system can reduce emissions more cost-
effectively. The reason that CTAX+RTRP is the second in the economic cost can be 
explained by the country‟s economic structure; as seen Table 4.5, the highest change in PPI 
caused the biggest drop in exports despite the largest reduction of emissions. The problem 
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here is an example of the theory of the second best, in that when only some taxes are reformed, 
welfare may not increase. Taxes in Korea have been reformed, but if other countries do not 
impose a carbon tax, this will encourage production of carbon-intensive products to shift to 
lower-carbon tax jurisdictions, making Korea‟s exports less competitive and also encourage 
Korean customers to purchase the carbon-intensive products from lower-carbon intensive 
jurisdictions. One solution to this is to adopt border tax adjustments to offset the impact on 
exporters (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Metcalf 2013). 
It is also worth noting the total primary energy supply (TPES) in the CTAX50+RT 
case. The carbon taxation with reforms to existing taxes achieved the lowest economic cost 
among all cases, despite the smallest decrease in TPES among all cases. It can be interpreted 
that emissions can be reduced cost-effectively by optimal allocation of energy brought about 
by internalising the social cost of energy into its price rather than restraining energy 
consumption through simple taxation. The following section describes the results of the 
changes in energy mix.    
 
   Figure 4.4. Results for GDP (Billion Won)              
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5 depict GDP and emissions respectively. GDP in 2011 is expected 
to reach 1,062 trillion won at least in the CTAX50+RTRP and at most 1,066 trillion won in 
the BAU case. Emissions in the BAU and the CTAX50+RTRP are recorded at 694 and 622 
million tonnes of CO2 respectively in 2011. 
 
 Figure 4.5. Results for emissions (CO2 million tonnes) 
 
4.5.3. Energy mix of final energy demands and power generation 
The reduction in emissions is attributed to two factors, the decrease in energy 
consumption and fuel shifting to less carbon intensive fuels. Consequently, the fuel-switching 
behaviour affects changes in the energy mix.  
Table 4.6 describes the changes in final energy demands and primary energy for 
power generation. As seen in Table 6, the carbon taxation decreases the TPES in the three 
carbon tax cases, because rising fuel prices reduce the real income of agents. In terms of 
changes in the demand for specific energy products in the CTAX50, the demand for coal 
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which has the highest carbon content significantly declines by 7.89% on yearly average. The 
demand for petroleum products for energy-use shows a relatively small decrease, by 2.79%. 
Electricity and city-gas demands reduce by 6.21% and 6.13% respectively, since the carbon 
tax raises the cost of input sources such as bituminous coal and LNG for the final energy 
products.  
In the case of restructuring pre-existing taxes on energy (CTAX50+RT), the demand 
for city-gas which is a less carbon-intensive energy decreases only by 1.79%. The largest 
decline in the electricity demand is found in the CTAX+RTRP, since the reformed electricity 
tariff considered as the right level of price reflecting the supplier‟s cost rises almost by 30%, 
compared to the BAU case. As a result, the amount of input energy for power generation 
significantly decreases. 
Table 4.6. Results of changes in final energy and primary energy for power generation 
  CTAX50 CTAX50+RT CTAX50+RTRP 
Final energy demands    
. Petroleum -2.79% -2.45% -2.32% 
. Coal -7.89% -7.60% -7.57% 
. Electricity -6.21% -5.95% -19.48% 
. City-gas -6.13% -1.79% -4.33% 
Power generation    
. Nuclear 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
. Coal -9.84% -17.60% -33.12% 
. HEAVY-OIL -37.95% -37.95% -52.58% 
. CCGT -12.82% -1.32% -10.18% 
 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict the final energy and power generation mixes. It appears that 
the CTAX50 and CTAX50+RT cases do not make significant changes in electricity‟s share in 
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final energy demands, as the electricity tariffs still remain at a lower level than the costs. 
Adding the carbon tax without restructuring the electricity pricing system cannot improve 
much the pre-existing distortions in relative energy prices. Thus, it can be interpreted that 
these policies have only a limited ability to improve efficient resource allocation. However, 
the CTAX50+RTRP case makes certain changes in the energy mix; the share of electricity 
falls by 3.8% and the share of city-gas and petroleum for energy use increases by 0.8% and 
2.9% respectively in 2011 when the right level of electricity tariff is imposed on customers.  
 
Figure 4.6. Final energy mix in 2011 
 
As for the power generation mix indicated in Figure 4.7, base load technology (nuclear 
and coal power plants) are still cost-effective in merit order when the carbon tax of 
50,000won/Cton is imposed, so that they represent approximately at least 70% of output in all 
cases. Notable changes in the proportion of LNG are found in the CTAX+RT and 
CTAX+RTRP cases; the share of LNG in power generation rises by about 2%. It is important 
to note that the share of coal considerably decreases from 40.9% to 33.0% via the decreased 
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demand for electricity in the CTAX50+RTRP case. Nuclear power keeps the same amount of 
output as in the BAU case, thereby occupying the largest share, 38.2%.  
 
Figure 4.7. Power generation mix in 2011 
 
To sum-up, the carbon tax policy with restructuring of pre-existing energy taxes and 
electricity pricing system induces energy prices to reflect the social cost fairly, and then 
allocate resources efficiently by shifting from high to low-carbon energy. 
 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
We examine the effects of the current energy taxes and electricity pricing system on 
the Korean economy when a carbon tax policy is introduced using an integrated model which 
combines the macro-econometric model and the MCP electricity market model developed 
earlier. Four scenario simulations are implemented to measure the magnitude of the effects of 
current systems on the economy; 1) no carbon taxation (BAU), 2) imposing a carbon tax of 
50,000 won per tonne of carbon on energy products (CTAX50), 3) imposing the same carbon 
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tax rate and reforming pre-existing energy taxes through exempting kerosene, LPG, and LNG 
from the carbon taxation (CTAX+RT), and 4) imposing the same carbon tax rate with the 
same tax reform and a new electricity pricing system in which the electricity supplier charges 
cost-reflective prices (CTAX+RTRP). The revenues from the carbon tax are assumed to be re-
distributed to households as a lump-sum transfer. 
The CTAX+RTRP case‟s results show that while the GDP shrinks by 0.49% on 
annual average, emissions decrease by 11.51%, compared to the BAU case. This case makes 
the electricity tariff reflect the social cost accurately without delay or disturbance from the 
government intervention. Besides, the tax burden in fuel prices is exactly proportional to their 
carbon content in the case of reforming the taxes on energy. As a result, the share of lower-
carbon energy rises and the decreased demand for electricity lowers the demand for coal 
which has the highest carbon content. This contributes to the largest reduction in emissions. It 
is also worth mentioning a decrease in expenditure on imported energy for this energy-import 
dependent country
60
. As seen in Table 4.5, the CTAX+RTRP case is likely to bring a 
considerable decrease in imports, having the most reduced total primary energy supply among 
the carbon tax cases. While this case reduces the economic cost, which is defined as the GDP 
loss per tonnes of carbon saved relative to BAU in this study, compared to the CTAX50 case, 
a sudden change in the electricity pricing system incurs the highest increase in the CPI and 
PPI, thereby resulting in the largest GDP losses among the carbon tax cases. In particular, the 
PPI directly affects the export prices, so that concerns over industrial competiveness would be 
raised by export-centred industry.  
The result of CTAX50+RT case indicates that it is the most cost effective policy; the 
smallest losses in GDP and relatively larger reduction in emissions than the CTAX50 case can 
                                                 
60
 Approximately 96% of demands for fossil fuels were met by imports in 2011. 
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be expected, since the low carbon energy sources such as LPG and LNG are exempted from 
the carbon taxation. However, by only reforming the current tax system, CTAX+RT is not 
able to provide a remedy for the root of the trouble resulting from the low electricity prices. 
Figure 4.6 show that the share of electricity in final energy demands remains at a high level as 
in the BAU case, which is far from the optimal allocation of energy from the viewpoint of 
energy efficiency. The excessive electricity use also would worsen the deficit problems of the 
electricity supplier originating from the current low electricity tariffs and at some point, this 
kind of deficit has to be sorted out
61
. 
As for the CTAX case, the result confirms that implementing the carbon tax policy 
without restructuring the current energy tax or electricity pricing system leads to the largest 
economic cost in that the carbon tax extends the distortions in relative energy prices in the 
pre-existing tax and pricing systems. Thus, the distortion restricts the effects of the fuel 
switching from high to low carbon energy. As a consequence, neither the energy mix nor the 
electricity supplier‟s deficit problems can be significantly lessened. In this case, the reduction 
in emissions is mainly achieved by the decreased real income.  
These results confirm that well-designed reform of pre-existing energy taxes and 
pricing system lessens the economic costs of CO2 reduction when climate change policies are 
introduced into a nation. It implies that internalising the social cost of energy to its price via 
taxation and the regulated pricing system is able to provide a more cost-effective way to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Therefore, the current complicated energy taxes need to be converted 
to an environmental taxation system. In addition, a normalisation of electricity prices is also 
necessary to restrain further distortions in energy consumption before the carbon tax is 
                                                 
61
 As for recent accounting treatment for the deficit, the electricity supplier, KEPCO treated the accumulated 
uncollected amount, approximately 1.9 trillion won, incurred from delay in implementation of linking the 
electricity tariff with fuel procurement expenses as non-operating losses in March, 2013. 
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introduced. However, considering the effect of the electricity price on industrial 
competiveness, gradual reforms rather than drastic changes in the current electricity pricing 
system would be recommended in order to soften the burden imposed by the carbon tax on the 
economy. 
However, modelling the carbon tax policy is a continuous process, since the current 
simulation is done on the assumption that the carbon tax revenue is recycled to households 
through a lump-sum transfer. The assumption is inevitable because of the unavailability of 
time-series data for income, payroll, and corporate tax rates. The availability of such data will 
contribute to the development of modelling the effects of the various revenue recycling 
methods on the economy. Moreover, modelling the recycling through investment in energy 
efficiency and GHG reduction technology by adopting an engineering sub-model for 
important demand and supply side sectors would provide a policymaker with more practical 
guidelines for deciding an optimal carbon tax rate. The model can also be improved by 
modifying the foreign trade block which currently uses aggregated import data. It can be 
extended by modelling individual imported energy demands to quantify the effects of the 
energy policy on the rate of dependence on imports and analyse the effects of energy 
substitution on energy imports in more detail. In addition, the model needs to introduce agents‟ 
expectations into the empirical framework to respond to the Lucas critique in terms of the 
econometric policy evaluation. Lastly, the welfare analysis can be implemented by obtaining 
universal information for valuation of the social cost of carbon emissions in order to measure 
benefits of reducing emissions, but this remains for future studies. 
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APPENDIX 4 
A.4.1. Energy taxation system 
      Table A.4.1. Energy taxation in Korea (2012.6) 
  
Gasoline 
(won/ ) 
Kerosene 
(won/ ) 
Diesel 
(won/ ) 
Heavy-oil 
(won/ ) 
LPG (won/kg) 
LNG 
(won/m3) 
Briquette 
(won/EA) 
Electricity for 
households 
(won/kWh) 
Heat for 
households 
(won/10kcal) Propane Butane 
Customs 
Tax 
General 3% 3% 3% - - - 
Quota 
(Provisional) 
Crude Oil for LPG and Naphtha: 0% 
Product: 0% 
Crude Oil: 0% 
Product: 0% 
2% - - - 
Individual 
Cons. Tax 
General - 90 - 17 20 252 60 - - - 
Flexibility - - - - - 275 - - - - 
Transportation 
Energy 
Environment Tax 
General 475 - 340 - - - - - - - 
Flexibility 529 - 375 - - - - - - - 
Education Tax 79.35 13.5 56.25 2.55 - 41.25 - - - - 
Local Drive Tax 137.54 - 97.50 - - - - - - - 
VAT 160.82 102.86 146.07 - - - 80.8 - 11.8 79.3 
Import Fee 16 16 16 16 - - 24.2 - - - 
Quality Examination Fee 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.027 0.027 - - - - 
Safety Management Levy - - - - 5.0 5.0 4.4 - - - 
Sales Levy 
36 
(High) 
- - - - 62.28 - - - - 
Electric Power Industry Basis Fund - - - - - - - - 4.4 - 
Total Tax Amount 
Amount 923.2 232.8 691.3 36.0 25.0 383.6 169.4 - 16.2 79.3 
Price Share 
Ratio 
46.9% 16.1% 38.9% 3.2% 1.2% 15.9% 19.1% 0.0% 12.0% 9.1% 
Consumption Price (2012,6) 1,968.8 1,387.1 1,777.2 1,125.2 2,172.4 2,412.1 889.2 371.3 134.6 872.1 
      Source: Kim (2012) 
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A.4.2. Results of the carbon tax policy simulation 
Table A.4.2. Aggregated petroleum price for industry                                                                  (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               772,590                813,515  5.30%               802,100  3.68%           802,100  3.68% 
2006               921,802                962,727  4.44%               951,312  3.10%           951,312  3.10% 
2007           1,013,203            1,054,128  4.04%           1,042,713  2.83%        1,042,713  2.83% 
2008           1,437,693            1,478,618  2.85%           1,467,203  2.01%        1,467,203  2.01% 
2009           1,211,915            1,252,840  3.38%           1,241,425  2.38%        1,241,425  2.38% 
2010           1,302,588            1,343,513  3.14%           1,332,098  2.22%        1,332,098  2.22% 
2011           1,525,532            1,566,457  2.68%           1,555,042  1.90%        1,555,042  1.90% 
 
Table A.4.3. Aggregated petroleum price for commerce and public                                            (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005           1,037,219            1,014,913  -2.15%           1,051,154  1.33%        1,051,154  1.33% 
2006           1,175,606            1,103,268  -6.15%           1,189,541  1.17%        1,189,541  1.17% 
2007           1,239,956            1,140,374  -8.03%           1,253,891  1.11%        1,253,891  1.11% 
2008           1,643,559            1,558,028  -5.20%           1,657,494  0.84%        1,657,494  0.84% 
2009           1,320,607            1,193,707  -9.61%           1,334,542  1.04%        1,334,542  1.04% 
2010           1,438,864            1,402,607  -2.52%           1,452,799  0.96%        1,452,799  0.96% 
2011           1,657,224            1,543,692  -6.85%           1,671,159  0.83%        1,671,159  0.83% 
 
Table A.4.4. Aggregated petroleum price for households                                                             (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               973,573            1,076,589  10.58%               996,263  2.28%           996,263  2.28% 
2006           1,061,928            1,214,976  14.41%           1,084,618  2.09%        1,084,618  2.09% 
2007           1,099,034            1,279,326  16.40%           1,121,724  2.02%        1,121,724  2.02% 
2008           1,516,688            1,682,929  10.96%           1,539,378  1.47%        1,539,378  1.47% 
2009           1,152,367            1,359,977  18.02%           1,175,057  1.93%        1,175,057  1.93% 
2010           1,361,267            1,478,234  8.59%           1,383,957  1.64%        1,383,957  1.64% 
2011           1,502,352            1,696,594  12.93%           1,525,042  1.49%        1,525,042  1.49% 
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Table A.4.5. City-gas price for industry                                                                                          (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               401,935                433,785  7.92%               401,935  0.00%           401,935  0.00% 
2006               476,145                507,995  6.69%               476,145  0.00%           476,145  0.00% 
2007               545,600                577,450  5.84%               545,600  0.00%           545,600  0.00% 
2008               617,255                649,105  5.16%               617,255  0.00%           617,255  0.00% 
2009               637,744                669,594  4.99%               637,744  0.00%           637,744  0.00% 
2010               654,982                686,832  4.86%               654,982  0.00%           654,982  0.00% 
2011               678,215                710,065  4.70%               678,215  0.00%           678,215  0.00% 
 
Table A.4.6. City-gas price for commerce and public                                                                    (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               481,328                513,178  6.62%               481,328  0.00%           481,328  0.00% 
2006               562,903                594,753  5.66%               562,903  0.00%           562,903  0.00% 
2007               621,163                653,013  5.13%               621,163  0.00%           621,163  0.00% 
2008               673,109                704,959  4.73%               673,109  0.00%           673,109  0.00% 
2009               664,923                696,773  4.79%               664,923  0.00%           664,923  0.00% 
2010               664,339                696,189  4.79%               664,339  0.00%           664,339  0.00% 
2011               675,715                707,565  4.71%               675,715  0.00%           675,715  0.00% 
 
Table A.4.7. City-gas price for households                                                                                     (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               483,937                515,787  6.58%               483,937  0.00%           483,937  0.00% 
2006               548,756                580,606  5.80%               548,756  0.00%           548,756  0.00% 
2007               608,581                640,431  5.23%               608,581  0.00%           608,581  0.00% 
2008               670,602                702,452  4.75%               670,602  0.00%           670,602  0.00% 
2009               659,402                691,252  4.83%               659,402  0.00%           659,402  0.00% 
2010               695,961                727,811  4.58%               695,961  0.00%           695,961  0.00% 
2011               715,247                747,097  4.45%               715,247  0.00%           715,247  0.00% 
 
  
- 236 - 
Table A.4.8. Electricity price for industry                                                                                       (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005               705,761                732,419  3.78%               732,875  3.70%           984,056  28.28% 
2006               718,911                767,009  6.69%               767,903  6.38%        1,017,791  29.37% 
2007               735,096                801,819  9.08%               803,169  8.48%           994,545  26.09% 
2008               771,043                854,349  10.80%               855,498  9.87%        1,125,558  31.50% 
2009               866,924                966,179  11.45%               967,068  10.36%        1,225,335  29.25% 
2010               908,895            1,021,129  12.35%           1,020,605  10.95%        1,256,063  27.64% 
2011               955,915            1,077,253  12.69%           1,074,930  11.07%        1,310,576  27.06% 
 
Table A.4.9. Electricity price for commerce and public                                                                (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005           1,122,286            1,141,178  1.68%           1,141,498  1.68%        1,379,333  18.64% 
2006           1,125,760            1,154,220  2.53%           1,154,745  2.51%        1,424,403  20.97% 
2007           1,131,008            1,164,471  2.96%           1,165,148  2.93%        1,363,185  17.03% 
2008           1,105,620            1,139,408  3.06%           1,139,754  2.99%        1,442,067  23.33% 
2009           1,140,619            1,171,929  2.75%           1,172,014  2.68%        1,482,828  23.08% 
2010           1,164,983            1,196,263  2.69%           1,195,605  2.56%        1,479,998  21.28% 
2011           1,185,275            1,214,459  2.46%           1,213,106  2.29%        1,508,043  21.40% 
 
Table A.4.10. Electricity price for households                                                                                (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005           1,068,253            1,112,549  4.15%           1,113,309  4.05%        1,382,659  22.74% 
2006           1,087,428            1,149,053  5.67%           1,150,216  5.46%        1,428,836  23.89% 
2007           1,104,207            1,172,209  6.16%           1,173,634  5.92%        1,384,728  20.26% 
2008           1,147,374            1,215,789  5.96%           1,216,331  5.67%        1,530,395  25.03% 
2009           1,160,007            1,217,299  4.94%           1,217,214  4.70%        1,537,448  24.55% 
2010           1,200,532            1,257,874  4.78%           1,256,008  4.42%        1,599,018  24.92% 
2011           1,232,773            1,285,013  4.24%           1,281,678  3.82%        1,615,395  23.69% 
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Table A.4.11. Bituminous coal price for non-power                                                                       (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005       114,028        166,978  46.44%            166,978  31.71%                 166,978  31.71% 
2006       101,582        154,532  52.13%            154,532  34.26%                 154,532  34.26% 
2007       108,596        161,546  48.76%            161,546  32.78%                 161,546  32.78% 
2008       225,052        278,002  23.53%            278,002  19.05%                 278,002  19.05% 
2009       180,125        233,075  29.40%            233,075  22.72%                 233,075  22.72% 
2010       197,492        250,442  26.81%            250,442  21.14%                 250,442  21.14% 
2011       236,096        289,046  22.43%            289,046  18.32%                 289,046  18.32% 
 
Table A.4.12. Briquette price                                                                                                            (unit: won.TOE) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005       126,125        181,125  43.61%            181,125  30.37%                 181,125  30.37% 
2006       126,250        181,250  43.56%            181,250  30.34%                 181,250  30.34% 
2007       126,125        181,125  43.61%            181,125  30.37%                 181,125  30.37% 
2008       176,833        231,833  31.10%            231,833  23.72%                 231,833  23.72% 
2009       199,615        254,615  27.55%            254,615  21.60%                 254,615  21.60% 
2010       244,563        299,563  22.49%            299,563  18.36%                 299,563  18.36% 
2011       244,563        299,563  22.49%            299,563  18.36%                 299,563  18.36% 
 
 
Table A.4.13. GDP                                                                                                                           (unit: billion won)  
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 881,562  880,829  -0.08% 880,887  -0.08% 879,046  -0.29% 
2006 933,975  932,072  -0.20% 932,208  -0.19% 929,511  -0.48% 
2007 979,078  976,099  -0.30% 976,305  -0.28% 973,409  -0.58% 
2008 997,831  994,016  -0.38% 994,264  -0.36% 991,660  -0.62% 
2009 995,990  992,146  -0.39% 992,416  -0.36% 990,258  -0.58% 
2010 1,038,141  1,034,642  -0.34% 1,034,927  -0.31% 1,032,550  -0.54% 
2011 1,066,100  1,064,325  -0.17% 1,064,621  -0.14% 1,062,120  -0.37% 
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Table 4.A.14. Private consumption                                                                                               (unit: billion won)  
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 473,525  472,961  -0.12% 473,006.5  -0.11% 470,899  -0.55% 
2006 500,796  499,250  -0.31% 499,355.0  -0.29% 496,184  -0.92% 
2007 524,958  522,544  -0.46% 522,703.3  -0.43% 519,188  -1.10% 
2008 538,391 535,350 -0.56% 535,538.4 -0.53% 532,376 -1.12% 
2009 541,505 538,551 -0.55% 538,751.5 -0.51% 536,358 -0.95% 
2010 555,133 552,561 -0.46% 552,762.6 -0.43% 550,277 -0.87% 
2011 567,552 566,082 -0.26% 566,271.1 -0.23% 563,787 -0.66% 
 
Table 4.A.15. Investment                                                                                                                (unit: billion won)  
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 254,341 254,372 0.01% 254,369 0.01% 254,319 -0.01% 
2006 262,784 262,791 0.00% 262,789 0.00% 262,655 -0.05% 
2007 270,264 270,179 -0.03% 270,178 -0.03% 269,958 -0.11% 
2008 265,047 264,855 -0.07% 264,855 -0.07% 264,582 -0.18% 
2009 270,860 270,534 -0.12% 270,532 -0.12% 270,229 -0.23% 
2010 276,113 275,691 -0.15% 275,688 -0.15% 275,357 -0.27% 
2011 280,576 280,105 -0.17% 280,099 -0.17% 279,752 -0.29% 
 
Table 4.A.16. Export                                                                                                                       (unit: billion won)  
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 354,174 353,896 -0.08% 353,918 -0.07% 353,761 -0.12% 
2006 396,560 395,839 -0.18% 395,893 -0.17% 395,512 -0.26% 
2007 441,531 440,278 -0.28% 440,367 -0.26% 439,781 -0.40% 
2008 471,839 470,028 -0.38% 470,144 -0.36% 469,333 -0.53% 
2009 451,141 449,202 -0.43% 449,325 -0.40% 448,387 -0.61% 
2010 490,093 487,985 -0.43% 488,123 -0.40% 486,970 -0.64% 
2011 526,336 524,884 -0.28% 525,029 -0.25% 523,682 -0.50% 
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Table 4.A.17. Import                                                                                                                       (unit: billion won)  
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 327,294 327,214 -0.02% 327,221 -0.02% 326,920 -0.11% 
2006 361,660 361,296 -0.10% 361,320 -0.09% 360,628 -0.29% 
2007 395,871 395,084 -0.20% 395,136 -0.19% 394,092 -0.45% 
2008 424,547 423,289 -0.30% 423,369 -0.28% 422,130 -0.57% 
2009 389,887 388,467 -0.36% 388,558 -0.34% 387,437 -0.63% 
2010 429,330 427,661 -0.39% 427,772 -0.36% 426,525 -0.65% 
2011 464,489 462,796 -0.36% 462,920 -0.34% 461,554 -0.63% 
 
Table 4.A.18. Consumer price index                                                                                     (unit: index, 2005=100)                   
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 100.77 100.95 0.18% 100.87 0.11% 101.21 0.44% 
2006 103.84 104.15 0.30% 104.04 0.19% 104.58 0.71% 
2007 106.56 106.95 0.37% 106.82 0.24% 107.40 0.79% 
2008 111.47 111.92 0.40% 111.78 0.27% 112.51 0.93% 
2009 113.56 114.01 0.40% 113.88 0.28% 114.73 1.04% 
2010 116.27 116.74 0.40% 116.61 0.29% 117.53 1.08% 
2011 119.86 120.33 0.39% 120.22 0.29% 121.17 1.09% 
 
Table 4.A.19. Producer price index                                                                                       (unit: index, 2005=100) 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 100.73 101.00 0.27% 100.93 0.20% 101.82 1.08% 
2006 101.09 101.43 0.33% 101.36 0.27% 102.35 1.25% 
2007 102.61 103.00 0.37% 102.94 0.32% 103.72 1.08% 
2008 112.18 112.60 0.37% 112.56 0.33% 113.62 1.28% 
2009 112.38 112.81 0.39% 112.78 0.36% 113.85 1.31% 
2010 116.70 117.17 0.41% 117.15 0.39% 118.15 1.25% 
2011 120.49 120.98 0.40% 120.97 0.40% 121.98 1.23% 
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Table 4.A.20. Total primary energy supply                                                                              (unit: thousand TOE)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 228,945 217,848 -4.85% 219,084 -4.31% 208,490 -8.93% 
2006 234,013 225,111 -3.80% 226,404 -3.25% 215,460 -7.93% 
2007 236,185 226,462 -4.12% 227,783 -3.56% 217,294 -8.00% 
2008 239,664 231,614 -3.36% 232,559 -2.96% 220,439 -8.02% 
2009 243,912 237,868 -2.48% 238,830 -2.08% 227,704 -6.65% 
2010 254,300 245,394 -3.50% 246,068 -3.24% 235,075 -7.56% 
2011 271,105 262,687 -3.10% 263,115 -2.95% 253,619 -6.45% 
 
Table A.21. Total CO2 emissions                                                                                                  (unit: million tCO2)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 564.58 528.26 -6.43% 523.20 -7.33% 490.42 -13.14% 
2006 583.95 551.25 -5.60% 552.85 -5.33% 519.40 -11.05% 
2007 607.93 572.09 -5.89% 573.11 -5.73% 541.10 -10.99% 
2008 620.39 588.13 -5.20% 588.71 -5.11% 552.48 -10.95% 
2009 646.46 604.10 -6.55% 602.57 -6.79% 567.58 -12.20% 
2010 662.30 624.29 -5.74% 618.81 -6.57% 583.46 -11.90% 
2011 694.04 658.34 -5.14% 653.35 -5.86% 622.13 -10.36% 
 
Table A.22. Total final energy demand of petroleum products                                              (unit: thousand TOE)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 95,889 94,630 -1.31% 94,941 -0.99% 93,352 -2.65% 
2006 97,423 95,865 -1.60% 96,143 -1.31% 94,949 -2.54% 
2007 98,388 96,620 -1.80% 96,882 -1.53% 96,292 -2.13% 
2008 95,884 94,206 -1.75% 94,430 -1.52% 93,756 -2.22% 
2009 96,814 94,935 -1.94% 95,193 -1.67% 94,736 -2.15% 
2010 98,218 96,239 -2.01% 96,507 -1.74% 96,281 -1.97% 
2011 98,473 96,546 -1.96% 96,833 -1.67% 96,735 -1.76% 
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Table A.23. Total final energy demand of coal products                                                                     (unit: MWh)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 8,801 8,293 -5.77% 8,349 -5.14% 7,959 -9.57% 
2006 9,488 8,724 -8.05% 8,770 -7.57% 8,520 -10.20% 
2007 10,201 9,203 -9.78% 9,241 -9.41% 9,164 -10.16% 
2008 10,286 9,325 -9.35% 9,354 -9.07% 9,241 -10.16% 
2009 10,939 9,917 -9.34% 9,949 -9.06% 9,896 -9.53% 
2010 11,665 10,655 -8.66% 10,690 -8.36% 10,683 -8.42% 
2011 12,269 11,301 -7.89% 11,337 -7.60% 11,341 -7.57% 
 
Table A.24. Total final energy demand of electricity                                                              (unit: thousand TOE)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 28,228 27,228 -3.54% 27,468 -2.69% 23,668 -16.15% 
2006 30,535 29,240 -4.24% 29,413 -3.67% 24,667 -19.22% 
2007 32,521 30,916 -4.93% 31,034 -4.57% 25,790 -20.70% 
2008 33,910 32,170 -5.13% 32,240 -4.92% 27,783 -18.07% 
2009 36,378 34,285 -5.75% 34,360 -5.55% 30,250 -16.85% 
2010 38,885 36,496 -6.14% 36,581 -5.93% 31,628 -18.66% 
2011 40,962 38,421 -6.21% 38,523 -5.95% 32,985 -19.48% 
 
Table A.25. Total final energy demand of City-gas                                                                 (unit: thousand TOE)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 16,979 16,199 -4.59% 16,690 -1.70% 15,380 -9.42% 
2006 17,756 16,792 -5.43% 17,437 -1.80% 16,151 -9.04% 
2007 18,202 17,132 -5.87% 17,866 -1.84% 17,007 -6.56% 
2008 18,759 17,652 -5.90% 18,438 -1.71% 17,317 -7.69% 
2009 19,495 18,292 -6.17% 19,151 -1.76% 18,194 -6.67% 
2010 20,262 19,008 -6.19% 19,898 -1.80% 19,169 -5.39% 
2011 21,089 19,796 -6.13% 20,712 -1.79% 20,175 -4.33% 
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Table A.26. Nuclear power plant’s output                                                                                            (unit: GWh)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 34,918 34,918 0.00% 34,918 0.00% 34,918 0.00% 
2006 34,918 34,918 0.00% 34,918 0.00% 34,918 0.00% 
2007 30,030 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 
2008 30,030 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 
2009 30,030 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 
2010 30,030 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 30,030 0.00% 
2011 31,724 31,724 0.00% 31,724 0.00% 31,724 0.00% 
 
Table A.27. Bituminous coal power plant’s output                                                                              (unit: GWh)                                                                                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 131,744 102,829 -21.95% 87,520 -33.57% 65,572 -50.23% 
2006 136,196 122,283 -10.22% 120,937 -11.20% 100,705 -26.06% 
2007 152,170 143,744 -5.54% 137,979 -9.33% 116,871 -23.20% 
2008 176,380 155,975 -11.57% 154,976 -12.13% 128,523 -27.13% 
2009 178,658 147,373 -17.51% 146,587 -17.95% 117,771 -34.08% 
2010 181,722 154,589 -14.93% 142,270 -21.71% 110,461 -39.21% 
2011 181,433 163,047 -10.13% 148,245 -18.29% 118,650 -34.60% 
 
Table A.28. Heavy-oil plant’s output                                                                                                     (unit: GWh)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 13,357 4,565 -65.83% 4,733 -64.57% 4,126 -69.11% 
2006 10,187 5,440 -46.60% 5,496 -46.05% 4,196 -58.81% 
2007 10,701 5,398 -49.56% 5,427 -49.29% 4,284 -59.97% 
2008 8,660 4,912 -43.27% 4,895 -43.48% 4,284 -50.53% 
2009 10,200 6,227 -38.95% 6,191 -39.31% 4,275 -58.09% 
2010 9,827 6,227 -36.64% 6,227 -36.64% 4,463 -54.59% 
2011 9,346 6,227 -33.37% 6,227 -33.37% 4,759 -49.08% 
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Table A.29. CCGT power plant’s output                                                                                 (unit: thousand TOE)                                                                 
 
BAU 50,000/Cton % Change 50,000/Cton+RT % Change 50,000/Cton+RTRP % Change 
2005 55,435 54,558 -1.58% 78,595 41.78% 66,957 20.78% 
2006 59,755 52,959 -11.37% 56,744 -5.04% 42,373 -29.09% 
2007 61,136 44,561 -27.11% 55,042 -9.97% 38,938 -36.31% 
2008 58,708 62,608 6.64% 63,288 7.80% 41,320 -29.62% 
2009 67,056 97,398 45.25% 97,403 45.26% 82,070 22.39% 
2010 96,155 106,878 11.15% 119,152 23.92% 105,734 9.96% 
2011 98,423 101,699 3.33% 115,783 17.64% 105,464 7.15% 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION  
 
5.1. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The main purpose of this thesis was to examine the effects of climate change policies 
on the Korean economy in order to draw policy implications. We have paid attention to two 
promising economic instruments; a cap and trade system and carbon tax policies. In particular, 
we focus on recently emerging issues, the initial permit allocation rules in the electricity 
sector and restructuring the current energy tax and electricity pricing systems with a carbon 
tax policy. These issues are important factors to determine the economic costs of GHG 
mitigation. 
In order to perform quantitative simulation analysis, this thesis builds two models; 
one is the electricity market model based on the MCP framework which is able to incorporate 
operation, investment, and emission trade decisions in the deregulated electricity market in 
order to provide more realistic results. In particular, the allocation rules to new entrants are 
modelled explicitly in this study. The second model is an integrated model linking the MCP 
electricity market model and a macro-econometric model which has advantages over a single 
model for analysing the effects of climate change policies on the economy in that the 
integrated model is capable of representing the electricity sector‟s technological constraints 
by adopting a bottom-up approach and macroeconomic interactions between variables by 
employing a top-down approach at the same time. Furthermore, the soft-link integration 
method adopted in this model provides the highest degree of detailed modelling of the 
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electricity sector‟s properties; power output decisions for multiple periods and demand 
response to changes in fuel and energy prices. 
The main findings of each chapter are summarized as follows; 
1. Chapter two quantifies the impacts of different initial allocation rules on 
emissions, capacity mix, emission allowance prices, electricity prices, and social 
welfare. We examine typical allocation rules such as auctioning to all power 
plants, a free allocation based on a uniform benchmark to all power plants, free 
allocation based on a fuel-specific benchmark to existing power plants and a 
uniform benchmark to new entrants, and a fuel-specific benchmark to all power 
plants.  
1) The fuel-specific benchmark allocation method to existing and new entrants ranks 
the highest in social welfare through prompting more new investment in an 
imperfectly competitive industry, thereby resulting in lower electricity prices. But, 
the method raises the cost of achieving the emission reduction target by highly 
incentivizing investment in new coal power plants. Given the long economic life 
span of the plant, the high allowance prices would remain a burden on the 
economy in the long-run. Therefore, the government should recognise the trade-
off relationship between the low electricity price and the high carbon cost when 
they choose the allocation method. 
2) The second highest welfare is in the auction case, which is the most powerful 
policy to reduce emissions in the electricity sector. Although this allocation 
method has several merits; preventing distortion in investment decisions and 
giving the biggest amount of revenue, the auction is likely to face political 
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resistance from industries due to concerns over the highest increase in electricity 
prices which incurs the largest consumer welfare loss in the model. In this case, it 
is worthwhile to consider that a part of the auction revenue could be redistributed 
to subsidise customers.   
3) According to the Coase theorem, the uniform benchmark to all power plants and 
fuel-specific benchmark to existing power plants along with the uniform 
benchmark to new entrants have same effects on the market. Although they 
brought down the highest social costs equally, the latter case would be more 
helpful to reduce resistance from the power industry by allowing more permits to 
only existing power plants in the initial period.     
 
2. Chapter 3 provides an integrated model that combines the MCP electricity market 
model (bottom-up approach) built in chapter two and a macro-econometric model 
(top-down approach) in order to analyse the effect of a carbon policy on the 
economy. The macro-econometric model consists of seven blocks; final demand, 
labour and supply, price and wage, fiscal and monetary, finance, foreign trade, 
and energy and environment blocks. The total number of equations is 148 in 
which 57 behavioural equations and 91 identities exist. In terms of variables, there 
are 148 endogenous variables and 58 exogenous variables. 
1) The energy module in the macro-econometric model estimates own-price and 
cross-price elasticities of petroleum, coal, electricity, and city-gas in industry, 
commerce and public, and households sectors using the elaborate inter-fuel 
substitution econometric method, the cost share logit model (Considine and 
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Mount, 1984). The result shows that all energy products have negative own-price 
elasticities. Estimated parameters for the cross-price elasticities indicate that 
relatively low substitution possibilities from carbon intensive energy to less 
intensive one are found in the industry sector, but there is a higher replacement 
possibility in the household sector.  
2) We perform in-sample simulation to test the predictive ability of the model as a 
simultaneous system. Statistical measures based on MAPE suggest that the overall 
performance of the model is reliable. 
 
3. Chapter 4 analyses the effects of the current energy taxes and electricity pricing 
system on the Korean economy when the carbon tax policy is introduced using the 
integrated model provided in chapter three. Currently, relatively high taxes are 
imposed on kerosene, LPG, and LNG compared to their social costs, and the 
government keeps low electricity tariffs for industrial competiveness and price 
stabilization, which raise a concern over inefficiency and possible side-effects if 
the carbon tax is imposed without adjustment.  
The model performs four scenario simulations for the period from 2005 to 2011: 
(1) no carbon taxation (BAU); (2) maintaining the current energy taxes and 
electricity pricing system and introducing a carbon tax of 50,000 won per tonne of 
carbon on energy products (CTAX50); (3) introducing the carbon tax and 
reforming pre-existing energy taxes in which kerosene, LPG, and LNG are 
exempted from the carbon taxation (CTAX+RT); and (4) restructuring the 
electricity pricing system in which a cost reflective electricity tariff is charged to 
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customers (CTAX+RTRP). The carbon tax revenue is assumed to be recycled to 
households as a lump-sum transfer in all carbon tax cases. 
(1) The results of the CTAX case show that it incurs the largest mitigation cost per 
reduced CO2 tonne among the cases; it reduces GDP by 0.27% on annual average 
and emissions by 5.79% in the last year, since simply adding the carbon tax into 
the current energy tax and electricity pricing system without adjustment worsens 
further the distortions in relative prices, so that it limits the fuel switching effects. 
As a consequence, this case becomes the least cost-effective policy.  
(2) The result of CTAX50+RT case indicates that it is the most cost-effective policy; 
it yields the smallest losses in GDP, by 0.24% and a relatively larger reduction in 
emissions, by 6.10%, because energy prices are rearranged to reflect social costs 
more accurately by reforming the pre-existing energy taxes. However, this case 
has a limited ability to reduce chronic excessive electricity consumption caused 
from the low electricity tariff from the government intervention, which in turn still 
needs a large amount of coal for power generation in the merit order system and 
worsens the electricity supplier‟s deficit problems. 
(3) The CTAX + RTRP case‟s result is the most powerful policy to reduce emissions, 
by 11.51%, but leads to the largest loss in GDP, by 0.49%. This is, however, still 
more cost-effective than the CTAX case, since the electricity prices are adjusted 
to reflect the social cost accurately without the government intervention. In 
addition, the carbon tax is imposed in proportion to their carbon contents by 
reforming the taxes on energy. These lead to a lower cost per unit of reduced 
emissions by changing the final energy demand mix. However, a rapid change in 
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the electricity pricing system would worsen industrial competiveness of export-
centred industry.  
To sum up, restructuring pre-existing energy taxes and the electricity pricing 
system can lessen the economic cost of the carbon tax. However, we suggest 
gradually reforming the current electricity pricing system in order to minimize the 
negative effect on the industrial competiveness in the Korean economy. 
 
5.2. FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
This study can be regarded as a keystone that can be extended in order to provide 
more detailed and realistic results for climate change policies in the Korean economy. There 
are several possibilities for further developments towards the sophisticated model based on 
the integration approach;   
1. The macro-econometric model can be extended to a macro-econometric and input-
output model which incorporates inter-industry linkages. Given the input-output table 
and disaggregated data on macroeconomic indicators and energy consumption by 
sector, the model can conduct analysis on the effects of the climate change policies on 
the different sectors‟ output. Furthermore, imports of energy products can modelled 
individually, which allows the model to examine the effects of changes in the energy 
mix on imports of the corresponding energy products. In addition, the econometric 
method needs to introduce rational expectations in order to reinforce the validity of 
policy simulation results. 
2. Important energy supply sectors such as the petroleum supply chain and energy 
intensive industries, for example, iron, cement, steel and chemicals could be modelled 
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in detail using the bottom-up approach that captures technical properties of input 
energy demands and marginal abatement curves. Also, new technology options for 
GHG reduction can be simulated to examine their contributions. 
3. The model can examine the effects of carbon tax revenue recycling methods provided 
that time-series data of income and corporate tax rates are obtained. Besides, 
modelling re-investment from a carbon tax or auction revenue into energy efficiency 
and other GHG reduction technology is expected to provide useful guidance to policy 
makers for the recycling policy.  
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